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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3E. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant was convicted of "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations", "Failure 
to register a vacant building in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3", an 
infraction, and of "Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC, Chapter 
8, Section 16.8B-5", an infraction "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002". 
1. The chief issue in this case is did the Court err in determining that Ogden City 
Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Title 16, Article B is not void for Ogden City's failure to 
comply with enabling statute Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 and or § 10-9-403 and or 
failed to consider that said ordinance is void? 
Whether the ordinance is void is a question of law. Ogden City charged 
Defendant with multiple violations of "Zoning Ordinance". Ogden City failed to comply 
with Utah Code §§ 10-9-401-405 when the City adopted said ordinance. The applicable 
standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
2. If said ordinance is valid under Utah Code then said ordinance as applied to 
Appellant, deprived Appellant of numerous rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States and required that Appellant waive Appellants constitutional rights, if 
Appellant was to acquiesce to Ogden City's demands in violation of the Constitution of 
the United States. Can Appellant be convicted of a crime predicated on unconstitutional 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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actions or prior restraint of Constitutional rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the 
United States by Ogden City? 
This issue is fundamental to a democratic society and the violations Appellant was 
charged with in the first information by Ogden City was "Zoning Violations" for 
"unlawful signs". The Second Judicial District Court of Weber County ruled that Ogden 
City Vacant Building Ordinance 16.8B-9.G was unconstitutional on its face and violates 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The applicable 
standard of appellate review is correctness of law. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
3. Did the Court err in concluding that the Appellant's buildings were "vacant" 
and came within the registration requirement of Ogden Municipal Code, 16.8B-3? 
This issue involves a determination of whether the trial court could have found the 
building to be "vacant" under the language and interpretation of the ordinance. The 
applicable standard of appellate review is one of abuse of discretion. State v. GallU 967 
P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
4. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant of failure to register and failure to 
file a vacant building plan "on or about January 1st through 12th, 2002", when Ogden 
City by its own written notification allowed Appellant to "register the building within ten 
days of this notification, and otherwise begin to comply with the requirements of the 
ordinance", when Appellant received the required notice on January 13,2002? 
Whether the defendant could have been guilty of criminal behavior within the time 
that Ogden City alleged defendant was in violation ("on or about January 1st through 
2 
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12th, 2002") is a question of law. The applicable standard of appellate review is 
correctness of error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
5. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant for failure to file a vacant 
building plan, when Ogden City motivation was retaliation against Appellant for having 
signs on Appellant's property that stated in part "Ogden City Administration has no 
integrity" as part of Appellant's petition to Ogden City to redress grievances when no 
other charges against any other parties have been filed by Ogden City for the same 
violations? 
Whether the defendant was guilty of criminal behavior when Ogden City's 
motivation was retaliation against Appellant is a question of law. The applicable 
standard of appellate review is correctness of error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
6.. Did the Court err in determining that Ogden City Code 16.8B was not in 
violation of Utah State Code Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming Uses and Structures? 
The applicable standard of appellate review is one of abuse of discretion. State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)6 
7. Did the Court err in convicting the Appellant for "Failure to Register a Vacant 
Building in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3" and 
"Failure to Provide Vacant Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, 
Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5" when filing a plan is predicated on registering? 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Whether the defendant could have been guilty of multiple charges of criminal 
behavior for the same offense is a question of law. The applicable standard of appellate 
review is correctness of error. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 
371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
8. Did the Court err in its order determining "The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 
2 is granted, b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied." 
when the Second Amended Information and controlling Information filed by the 
prosecuting attorney makes no reference to a count 3 or 4? 
Whether the defendant can be guilty of a charge that defendant was not charged 
with is a matter of law. The applicable standard of appellate review is correctness of 
error. State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998); State v. Harley, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
The issues were preserved in the trial Court in appellant's Motion to Dismiss and 
Vacate [Legal Index 055 and 078] and related proceedings. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Many constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant to this appeal. The most 
salient are the following and are attached to Appendix 12 
United States Constitution, Amendment I. 
United States Constitution, Amendments V. 
United States Constitution, Amendments XIV. 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
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Utah Constitution Article I, § Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.] 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-102. Purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401. General powers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402. Preparation and adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-404. Temporary regulations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405. Zoning districts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode 
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2. Zoning Regulations Purpose 
Ogden City Code § 16.8A-3. Definitions. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-2. Purpose and Intent Vacant Building. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-3. Obligation to Register Vacant Buildings. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-5. Vacant Building Plan. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-9.G. Maintenance Standards. Signage. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-9.J. Maintenance Standards. Obscuring Of Windows. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On January 23, 2002, Ogden City filed two, two count informations against 
Appellant, for "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations"; (1) "The windows and glass 
doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs 
visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9J OMC, Class 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B", and (2) "Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent 
properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9.G 
OMC Class B", "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002", in the Second Judicial District 
Court. Attached hereto as Addendum 5; R. 001. 
Ogden City on January 23,2002, filed two separate informations against 
Appellant case number 021900315 and 021900420. Each information was for a separate 
property that Appellant owned. The properties are adjacent to each other and located in 
the Downtown Historic District of Ogden City. The informations are identical, the facts 
are identical, with the exception of one broken window on one property that was covered 
with plywood in case number 021900420. The trial and all hearings in the District Court 
were at all times consolidated. On May 5,2002, the Utah Court of Appeals consolidated 
case No. 20030988 and case No 20030989 for the purpose of judicial economy. The 
legal index used is for case number 021900315. 
Arraignment was on January 31,2002. R. 003-004. 
On March 5,2002, Ogden City filed an Amended Information charging Appellant 
with having violated the "Ogden City zoning ordinances" from "on or about January 1st 
through 12th, 2002" and included 2 additional charges; "(3) Failure to register and 
provide a vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3 Class B" and 
"(4) Failure to maintain vacant building in accordance with Vacant Building Standards 
OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-9.J". Attached hereto as Addendum 6; R. 006. 
Again on October 2,2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information 
charging Appellant with "zoning ordinance violations", "on or about January 1st through 
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12th, 2002", and changing the charges to infractions because Appellant had demanded a 
jury trial. The Second Amended Information also eliminated the fourth charge of the 
Second Information and bifurcated the third charge to include; "Failure to provide vacant 
building plans in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5" and "Failure to register 
a vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3 Class B". Attached 
hereto as Addendum 7; R. 017-018. 
The charges were bifurcated on August 16,2002. R 012-013. Ogden City in 
addition to the criminal charges filed a civil suit against Appellant on February 5,2002, 
to restrain Appellant from having signs located on the interior of Appellant's property 
that stated that "Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity". The ACLU of Utah 
represented Appellant in the civil case. The ACLU of Utah challenged the 
constitutionality of Ogden Municipal Code, 16.8B-9.G, hereafter the "sign ordinance". 
On October 18,2002, following a nonjury trial held in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ernest Jones presiding, Appellant was 
found guilty of "Failure to Register a Vacant Building in violation of Ogden Municipal 
Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and "Failure to Provide Vacant 
Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5, an 
infraction" on each of Appellant's properties. R. 021-025. 
Appellant filed a timely appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 20020957-
CA. R. 28-029. On August 21, 2003, the order of the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it is not taken from a 
final judgment of conviction. The dismissal is without prejudice to a timely 
appeal after a final, appealable judgment is entered by the trial court. 
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R. 050-051. 
On October 1st, 2003, in the case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards, Civil No. 
020900777, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, before the Honorable 
Parley R- Baldwin, the Court ruled, on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G, was 
unconstitutional on its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. In said Memorandum the Court stated the Ordinance was 
"overbroad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction". Attached 
hereto as Addendum 9. 
On October 9,2003, Appellant filed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Vacate and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate with the Second 
Judicial District Court. Attached hereto as Addendum 10, R. 055-064. 
On November 10, 2003, the case was set for review and disposition at which time 
Ogden City moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2 due to the ruling of October 1, 2003, 
holding that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional. Ogden City's Motion to 
Dismiss was granted by the Court. R. 054. 
On November 10, 2003, the Court advised Appellant that there was no copy of 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate in the file and Appellant presented a brief 
summary of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss to the Court that the previous findings of the 
Court should be vacated and or dismissed. Appellant's Motion to Vacate and Dismiss 
and Memorandum in Support was docketed on October 9,2003, with the Second Judicial 
District Court but as of November 18,2003, said Motion and Memorandum was still not 
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located or in the file. That Appellant refiled said Motion and Memorandum with the 
Second Judicial District Court on November 20,2003. R. 078-087. 
Ogden City filed no responsive pleading to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and 
Vacate, which was personally delivered to Ogden City Prosecuting Attorney office on 
October 9,2003 and on November 21,2003. 
Appellant requested oral argument on November 24,2003, to Appellant's Motion 
to Dismiss and Vacate but the Court submitted its order on November 26,2003, ruling on 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate. R. 092-94. 
The Order of the Court of November 26,2003, stated: 
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's memorandum of Law and having 
heard oral arguments from both parties, enterers the following ruling: 
1. In the case of #0219000315: 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied. 
2. In the case of #0219000420: 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied." 
Attached hereto as Addendum 11, R. 098. 
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on December 1,2003. R. 099-101. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ogden City Council, on December 4, 2001 adopted #2001-69 amending Chapter 
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden 
City Code for the abatement of dangerous buildings, and, in particularly, repealing 
Article B, concerning temporary boarding of buildings and temporary boarding 
permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration of vacant 
buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan, adopting 
standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing additional fees 
for re-registration when there the owner does not comply with the plan and for 
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each month that a vacant building is boarded; by revising Subsection 16-12-3 
regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to reflect the changes in the 
regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and increasing the civil 
penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations. 
Attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
The notice amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal code was posted 
on 30th day of November, 2001, by the Ogden City Recorder, Gloria J. Berrett in three 
public places. Attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
Ogden Standard on December 4,2001, published "The city will vote on the new 
ordinance at its 5 p.m. meeting today. There is not a public hearing scheduled." 
Appellant had no prior knowledge and or notice of the zoning ordinance prior to 
January 2,2003. 
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16 was approved as to form by Andrea 
W. Lockwood, Chief Deputy City Attorney Civil Division, on December 5,2001. 
Addendum 1, p. 14. 
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16, was transmitted to Matthew Godfrey, 
Mayor of Ogden, and approved on December 6,2001. Addendum 1, p. 14. 
The amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16; was published on December 9,2001, 
and became effective on December 9,2001. Addendum 1, p. 14. 
No other notice to the public took place prior to the posting on the 30th day of 
November, 2001, by the City Recorder, of said amended ordinance. Addendum 10, p. 2. 
Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 10-9-403-l.B, in amending Chapter 8, Title 16, in that Ogden City Council 
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failed to submit said amendment to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval 
or recommendations. 
Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah 
Code Annotated § 10-9-403-2, in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the 
procedure specified in Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402, in preparing and adopting an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance. 
Ogden City Council failed to have a public hearing pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-9-402-2.A, or pursuant to § 10-9-403-2, in amending Chapter 8, Title 16 
of the Ogden Municipal Code. 
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2.B or pursuant to § 10-9-403-2 in 
amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code. 
On January 9,2002, Michael McDonald, Ogden City Building Inspector, 
inspected the property at 207 25th Street arriving between 12-1 and prepared an 
inspection report. The inspection report comments were that the building vacant, sign in 
window and prepared letter. Attached hereto as Addendum 8. 
On January 9, 2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager, Wayne 
Glover, mailed Appellant a written notice to register his building within 10 days of 
Appellant's notification. Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002. As a 
condition of registering Ogden City had determined that the signs on the interior of 
Appellant's property, that stated "Ogden City Administration has no integrity" etc., were 
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"unlawful" and had to be removed and any window that was obscured had to be 
unobscured. Attached hereto as Addendum 3. 
Appellant personally delivered to Ogden City Building Services Manager, Wayne 
Glover, on January 15, 2002, a letter that stated that Appellant's ""unlawful signs" are 
protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution". Attached hereto 
as Addendum 4. 
Appellant and Ogden City entered into an agreement on October 12,2001, 
whereby Appellant would remove the signs on the interior of Appellant's building that 
petitioned Ogden City Administration for a redress of grievances for a period of 60 days 
to provide Ogden City the opportunity to redress Appellant's grievances with Ogden 
City. The agreement to remove the signs was entered before the Honorable Judge West, 
in the Second Judicial District Court. Tt p. 138-139. 
Ogden City failed to redress Appellant's grievances or meet with Appellant, 
pursuant to the October 12th agreement during the 60 days that Appellant had agreed to 
remove said petitions. On December 31,2001, Appellant placed several of the signs that 
were removed in October 2001 back in the windows of Appellant's property. Tt p. 139. 
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed two informations charging Appellant "on 
or about January 1st through 12th, 2002" with "2 counts Ogden City Zoning Ordinance 
Violations:" "1 . The windows and glass doors on the building are painted or otherwise 
obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building, in 
violation of Section 16.8B-9.J OMC, Class B", and "2. Unlawful signs visible from 
adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9-G OMC Class B" for each of Appellant's 
properties. Addendum 5 R.001. 
These buildings have been largely used by the defendant for storage of 
construction materials and personal property, for a wood shop, for office use for himself 
and as a political forum. Tt 53-58, 68,126. 
Appellant's property was not empty "on or about January 1 thru 12 ,2002". 
Appellant's property was occupied on a regular basis by an occupant and the property 
was used on a on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for which the 
building(s) were designed and lawfully permitted by Appellant "on or about January 1st 
thru 12th, 2002". Tt 53-58, 68, 126. 
Appellant was personally served on January 24,2002, and arraignment was on 
January 31, 2002. R. 0023. The case jvas continued to February 20, 2002, to allow 
Appellant to obtain counsel. R. 003-004. 
On February 5, 2002, Ogden City filed a civil complaint in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County in the case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards Civil No. 
020900777. On February 6, 2002, in the case Ogden City v. Edwards before the 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, Ogden City sought and obtained a restraining order 
requiring Appellant to remove all signs on the interior of Appellant's property. 
Appellant's signs located on the interior of Appellant's property were for the purpose to 
petition Ogden City Administration, for redress of grievances, protected by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. R 012-013. 
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On March 5,2002, Ogden City filed an Amended Information charging Appellant 
with having violated the "zoning ordinance" from "on or about January 1st through 12th, 
2002", and included 2 additional charges; "Failure to register and provide a vacant 
building plan in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, Class B" and "Failure to 
maintain vacant building in accordance with Vacant Building Maintance Standards 
OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-9 J Class B". Addendum 6. 
Again on October 2,2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information 
charging Appellant with having violated "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance", "on or about 
January 1st through 12th, 2002", and changing the charges to infractions because Affiant 
had demanded a jury trial. In addition, the Second Amended Information was a 2 page 
information with 2 charges on each page that were identified as 1 & 2 on each page 
eliminating the fourth charge from the Second Amended Information and amending the 
third charge of the Second Amended Information into two separate charges. Addendum 
7. 
Ogden City moved to bifurcate the issues of January 23, 2002 and the two charges, 
which were amended on October 2,2002, that were served on Appellant, the day of trial, 
because Appellant requested a jury trial. R. 012-013. 
On October 18, 2002, following a nonjury trial held in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Ernest Jones presiding, Appellant was 
found guilty of; "Failure to Register a Vacant Building in violation of Ogden Municipal 
Code, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and "Failure to Provide Vacant 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Building Plans in violation of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16-8B-5, an 
infraction". R. 023-025. 
On October 1st, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in the 
case Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards Civil No. 020900777, the Honorable Parley R. 
Baldwin, ruled on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiff Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Memorandum stated that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G OMC, 
was unconstitutional on its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. In said Memorandum, the Second Judicial District Court, 
stated the Ordinance "is overbroad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner 
restriction". Addendum 9. 
Ogden City thereafter sought to dismiss the remaining charges against Appellant-
because the remaining charges were unconstitutional. 
On November 26,2003 the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
Vacate and the Order of the Court was: 
In the case of #0219000315: 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied. 
Addendum 11,R. 098. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The chief issue is whether Ogden City complied with enabling legislation in 
adopting its zoning ordinance, to regulate and restrict the erection, construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and structures, those of vacant 
buildings. Ogden City Municipal Code Chapter 8 Title 16 Article B is void. Clearly 
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Ogden City failed to perform any of the duties required by § 10-9-402, § 10-9-403 or 
§ 10-9-404 and therefore said ordinance is void. 
Ogden City required Appellant, as a condition to file a vacant building plan, to 
remove signs in the interior window of Appellants property that were petitions to redress 
Appellants grievances with Ogden City in violation of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. Appellant is not legally required to defeat Appellant's constitutional 
rights as a matter of law and any law that requires any citizen to do so is not law. Ogden 
City can not deprive any citizen their rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States. Said Ordinance deprived Appellant of numerous constitutional rights guaranteed 
Appellant under the Constitution of the United States and the State of Utah. 
Appellant's buildings were not empty, were occupied on a regular basis and were 
designed for the use that Appellant was using Appellant's property for. Appellant's 
buildings were not "vacant" and therefore did not come within the registration 
requirement of Ogden Municipal Code, Chapter 8, Section 16-8B-3. 
Appellant was convicted of failure to register and failure to file a vacant building 
plan "on or about January 1st through 12th, 2002", when Ogden City by its own written 
notification allowed Appellant to "register the building within ten days of this 
notification" that Appellant received on January 13, 2002. Appellant received the notice 
requiring registration on January 13,2002, the day after Appellant was charged with not 
registering (January 1st thru 12th) denying Appellant his rights of due process guaranteed 
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I , 
Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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Ogden City's motivation for filing the informations against Appellant was 
retaliation against Appellant for having signs on Appellant's property that stated in part 
"Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity", as part of Appellant's petition to Ogden 
City to redress grievances when no other charges against any other parties have been filed 
by Ogden City, for the same violations in violation of Appellant's rights guaranteed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
Ogden City Municipal Code Chapter 8, Title 16 Article B provided for the 
termination of all nonconforming uses, removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and 
anything that would obscure a window which would include curtains, blinds, shades, etc., 
in or on vacant building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable time 
period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in 
the nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Ann. 10-9-408. 
The Court erred in convicting the Appellant for "Failure to register a vacant 
building" and "Failure to provide vacant building plans". Filing a plan is predicated on 
registering and constitutes one criminal activity. 
The Court erred in its order determining "The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is 
granted? b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied." when 
the Second Amended Information filed by the prosecuting attorney, makes no reference 
to a count 3 or 4 and count 3 and 4 of the Amended Information are not the same as count 
1 and 2 of the second page of the Second Amended Information. There is nothing in the 
record or the docket that clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt would identify what 
Appellant was found in violation of. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
-ORDINANCE IS VOID-
THE ADOPTION OF ZONING ORDINANCE WAS ILLEGAL AND VOID 
BECAUSE OGDEN CITY FAILED TO PROVD3E PUBLIC NOTICE AND 
HEARING PRIOR TO ADOBTION OF ZONING ORDINANCE 
PURSUANT TO STATE LAW 
A
- OGDEN CITY CODE 16-8B IS A ZONING ORDINANCE 
Ogden City filed its original information of January 23,2002 charging Appellant 
with "unlawful signs" and "obscuring windows" in that Defendant committed the offense 
of "zoning ordinance violations". Addendum 5, R. 001. 
On March 5,2002 Ogden City amended its information to include two additional 
charges including "Failure to Register a Vacant Building" and "Failure to File a Vacant 
Building Plan" in that Defendant committed the offense of "zoning ordinance 
violations". Addendum 6, R. 006. 
Again on October 2,2002 Ogden City amended its information to infractions in 
that Defendant committed the offense of "zoning ordinance violations" Addendum 7. 
Chapter 9, also known as The Municipal Land Use Development and Management 
Act, is comprised often separate parts, each of which deals with land use regulations. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003 (2003). These parts include the Planning 
Commission (sections 10-9-201 to -205), General Plans (sections 10-9-301 to -307), and 
Zoning (sections 10-9-401 to 409). Together these parts set up a framework for 
governing how land is used and developed within a municipality. 
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10-9-405. Zoning Districts. 
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction 
into zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to 
carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict 
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of 
buildings and structures, and the use of land. 
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class 
or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district 
may differ from those in other districts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405. 
Under Utah Code Ogden City Ordinance, 16-8-B, is provided for under "The 
Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act" or Chapter 9, Zoning (sections 
10-9-401 to-409). 
Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, "regulate(s) and restrict(s) the erection, 
construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings," those of vacant 
buildings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405-LB. 
Ogden City provided Appellant with 2 notices on January 23, 2002,2 notices on 
March 5,2002 and 4 notices on October 2,2002, for a total of 8 notices that stated that 
Appellant, "committed the offense...Ogden City zoning ordinance violations" on 
Appellant's properties. 
Ogden City ordinance § 16-8B is a zoning ordinance. (Emphasis added). 
B. PURPOSE AND INTENT OF VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE 
Ogden City Code Zoning Regulations § 15-1-2 states; 
15-1-2: Purpose: 
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, 
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morals and the general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of Ogden City, 
state of Utah, including, amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in the 
streets, securing safety from fire, panic and other dangers, encouraging energy 
efficient patterns of development, the use of energy conservation, solar and 
renewable energy sources, and assuring access to sunlight for solar energy 
devices, providing adequate light and air, preventing the overcrowding of land, 
avoiding undue concentration of population, facilitating adequate provision for 
transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements, 
providing for the classification of land uses. These regulations shall be made with 
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and 
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value 
of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the city. 
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2. 
Ogden City Code Vacant Buildings § 16.8B-2 states; 
16.8B-2: Purpose and Intent: 
It is the purpose and intent of this article to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare by establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and requiring 
responsible parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to 
remedy any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and 
consequent adverse impact on the value of nearby property, and to establish 
minimum maintenance standards for vacant buildings. To such ends, it is the 
specific purpose and intent of this article: 
A. To minimize the period of time a building is boarded; 
B. To provide alternative procedures for the abatement of dangerous buildings, 
which, if adequately secured and maintained against entry in accordance with the 
requirements of this article, will not constitute an immediate danger to the life, 
limb, health, property or safety of the public; 
C. To prevent vacant buildings from becoming a public nuisance; and 
D. To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings, in order to protect 
surrounding properties. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-2. 
Addendum 1. 
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Clearly the purpose and intent of Ogden City Code § 16-8B, the Vacant Building 
Ordinance, is predicated on and is a significant part of the purpose of Ogden City Code 
§ 15-1-2, Zoning Purpose which is predicated on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102. 
C. PUBIC HEARING AND NOTICE REQUIRED 
Utah Code § 10-9-402 states 
10-9-402. Preparation and adoption; 
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the 
legislative body a proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the 
zoning ordinance and maps, that represents the commission's recommendations 
for zoning all or any part of the area within the municipality. 
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed 
zoning ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission. 
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public 
hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails 
notice of a proposed zoning change to property owners within that municipality 
within a specified distance of the property on which the zoning change is being 
proposed, it shall also mail equivalent notice to property owners of an adjacent 
municipality within the same distance of the property on which the zoning change 
is being proposed. 
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may: 
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed; 
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning 
ordinance as amended; or 
(c) reject the ordinance 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402 (l)-<3) (Emphasis added). 
Ogden City Council failed to hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning 
ordinance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2-A. 
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402-2-B. The notice posted by the City Clerk 
on 30th day of November, 2001, at three public places, provided just 3 days notice of the 
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Ogden City Council meeting that took place on December 4, 2001, instead of the 
minimum 14 days as required by Utah law. 
"Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001, adopted #2001-69 amending 
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the 
Ogden City Code..." Addendum 1. Any amendment or rezoning requires the same 
statutory procedures as Utah Code § 10-9-402 as required by Utah Code § 10-9-403. 
10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings. 
(1) (a) The legislative body may amend: 
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district; 
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or 
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance, 
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this 
subsection unless the amendment was proposed by the planning commission 
or is first submitted to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval, or 
recommendations. 
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section 
§ 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance 
or the zoning map. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-403. 
Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah 
Code Annotated § 10-9-403-2 in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the 
procedure specified in Section § 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the 
zoning ordinance. 
Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing at 
least 14 days before the date of the hearing and failed to have public hearing as provided 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 pursuant to § 10-9-403-2 in amending 
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code. 
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In Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1979), the court stated: 
[w]e hold that because the statute calls for a public hearing our legislature 
contemplated something more than a regular city council meeting held, so far 
as the record here discloses, without specific advance notice to the public that the 
proposed ordinance would be considered. See 1 R. Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning § 4.11 (2d ed. 1976). Notice, to be effective, must alert the public to the 
nature and scope of the ordinance that is finally adopted. Id. at 200. Failure to 
strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it 
invalid. Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975); Anderson at 
199. This well established rule is followed by the great majority of jurisdictions. 
Annot, 96 A.L.R.2d 449 (1964); Town of Beverly Shores Plan Commission v. 
Enright 463 N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) (statute required municipality to publish two 
notices in newspaper within ten days of hearing-ordinance invalidated where first 
notice appeared in newspaper eleven days before hearing); Kalakowski v. 
Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 431 A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development Co. v. 
Tulsa, 596 P.2d 1255 (Okla.1979) (city ordinance establishing flood control 
districts invalidated because of failure to follow statutory requirements). 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
Moreover, the record indicates that the City Council may have accomplished this 
zoning change by circumventing the notice and public participation requirements 
of sections 10-9-303 to -304 and 20-11-24 of the Utah Code. Utah law grants 
citizens the right to be informed of the current permitted uses of land and of 
proposed or actual governmental changes in those uses. They also have the 
right to comment on and, under certain circumstances, negate or affirm those 
changes via the referendum process. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-303 to -304, 20-
11-24. Further, if citizens are dissatisfied with the specific implementation of a 
zoning plan, they have the option of voting out the leaders who implemented it. 
Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 25 1, 253 (Utah 1982) (recognizing that voters may 
control basic policy decisions through the electoral process) (citing Shriver v. 
Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329,313 P.2d 475,479 (1957)). However, citizens cannot 
take advantage of these rights if they are not privy to the activities of their 
elected representatives. 
The trial court must consider adequate notice as a threshold matter when 
petitioners claim that the enacting authority did not give citizens proper 
notice of the zoning change in question. The rationale behind this procedural 
requirement is obvious. Voters are statutorily granted the right to be notified of 
changes and developments in their community's zoning laws. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
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10-9-303 to -304. Furthermore, if a particular zoning change constitutes a 
legislative-type change, voters must be given adequate notice of its enactment so 
that they may institute referendum procedures promptly. See Utah Code Ann. § 
20-11-24. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251.251-52 (Utah 1982) (zoning dispute 
arose after timely referendum petition filed); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 
P.2d 808, 808 (1964). 
Under this requirement, the trial court must determine if the enacting authority 
followed the notice and public participation requirements mandated by sections 
10-9-303 and -304 of the Utah Code. The trial court should also consider whether 
the enacting authority provided sufficient notice of the change through proper 
labeling and an accurate description of the contents of the labels in question. If the 
notice was inadequate, the trial court must invalidate the zoning change, 
leaving the enacting authority free to reinstate the proceedings in proper fashion. 
However, if the trial court concludes that the notice was adequate, it must then 
determine whether the change was legislative or administrative using the three 
policy elements. 
Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah, 1994), 
In Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001) the court 
explained: 
The purpose of section 10-9-402 is to ensure that members of the public receive 
adequate notice of ordinances that may affect their property. In Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
regularly scheduled city council meeting did not meet the "public hearing" 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-25 (1991), a predecessor statute to section 
10-9-402. See Call 727 P.2d at 183. The court stated that "[n]notice, to be 
effective, must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that is 
finally adopted." Id. (emphasis added). 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001). 
The notice that was provided to the public that was posted by the Ogden City 
Clerk, in 3 public places failed to alert the public to the nature and scope of the 
amendment to Chapter 8, Title 16, Article B. Addendum 2. 
This change was not a common, everyday zoning change but was a rare or unusual 
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change that significantly altered the basic nature of the community. The preamble to 
Ordinance No. 2001-69 states "Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001 adopted 
#2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive 
revisions to the Ogden City Code..." In addition to repealing Article B and adopting a 
new article B Ogden City Council modified 16.8A, 16.8-C and 16.8-D. Addendum 1. 
The amendment of Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code was of sufficient 
magnitude to constitute a material variance of Ogden City's Zoning Ordinance. 
D. RECOMMENDATION BY PLANNING COMMISSION 
Submitting the proposed zoning ordinance to the Planning Commission is a 
crucial, mandatory first step. Since there was no referral to the Planning Commission, 
the public was robbed of its initial opportunity to participate in the decision making 
process for a very important public decision, i.e. the enactment of a zoning ordinance that 
regulate(s) and restrict(s) the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or 
use of buildings and structures, those that Ogden City may deem empty, or not used on a 
regular basis and or not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary 
purposes for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted. 
Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-9-403-1-B, in that Ogden City Council failed to submit said amendment 
to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or recommendations 
Since there was no referral, the Ogden City Council did not receive back a 
"recommendation" from the Planning Commission, as contemplated by the Act. Had it 
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received the required recommendation, Ogden City Council was required to either 
approve or disapprove of the proposed vacant building ordinance 
These requirements are manifestly jurisdictional and without absent strict 
compliance, the adoption of the Vacant Building Ordinance would be void. Longley v. 
Leucadia Financial Corp., 9 P 3d 762, 7 66 _ 18 (Utah 2000); Hatch v. Boulder v. Town 
Council 21 P. 3d 245 12, 2001 Utah App.55 (Utah App, 2001). 
E. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ENABLING STATUTE REQUIRED 
In Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 2001 UT App 55 (UTCA, 2001) stated: 
The authority to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is conferred on 
municipalities by the state through enabling statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
401-409 (1999). As such, ff[c]ities must strictly comply with the statute 
delegating them the authority to act." Jachimek v. Superior CU 819 P.2d 487, 
489 (Ariz. 1991). Consequently, "[fjailure to strictly follow the statutory 
requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid." Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180,183 (Utah 1986). Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 950 
P.2d 167,169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("Municipalities must strictly follow the 
statutory procedure to enact a zoning ordinance."); Stockwell v. City of Ritzville, 
663 P.2d 151, 151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding trial court's determination 
that "the ordinance was invalidity enacted due to the Council's failure to comply 
strictly" with the enabling statute). 
In Osborne v. City of Camden, 784 S. W.2d 596 (Ark 1990) the court stated: 
Municipal zoning authority is conferred solely by State enabling legislation. 
Taggart v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570. 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983). Failure to 
comply with a mandatory procedural requirement of the enabling statute 
renders a zoning ordinance invalid. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 224 Ark. 344, 
273 S.W.2d26(1954). A zoning ordinance "shall consist of both a map and a 
text." Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-416(a) (2) (1987). Compliance with this provision 
of the statute is mandatory, and failure to comply with it will render a zoning 
ordinance void. City of Benton v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 961. 88 S.W.2d 828 (1936): 
City [301 Ark. 422] of Searcy v. Roberson, supra. The purpose of this provision 
is to give notice of the city's zoning proposal so that, before adoption, 
residents may object or make suggestions, and after adoption, land 
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purchasers may acquaint themselves with the zoning restriction. City of 
Benton v. Phillips, supra. 
Because municipal zoning authority comes from the state, "the power must be 
exercised within the limits and in the manner prescribed in the grant and not otherwise." 
City ofScottsdale v. Scottsdale [169 Ariz. 319] Associated Merchants, Inc., 120 Ariz. 4, 
5, 583 P.2d 891, 892 (1978) (citing City ofScottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 
439 P.2d 290 (1968)); Hart v. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379,384,346 P.2d 
1101,1105 (1959). Cities must strictly comply with the statute delegating them the 
authority to act. Scottsdale Associated Merchants, 120 Ariz, at 5, 583 P.2d at 892; see 
Hart, 86 Ariz, at 390,346 P.2d at 1109. Any attempt to exercise the zoning authority 
without complying with the statutory conditions is void. Hart, 86 Ariz, at 384, 346 
P.2datll05. 
Ogden City had a statutory duty of notice and public hearing to the public at large. 
This notice and public hearing are jurisdictional, and the ordinance is void, as if it never 
took place. Utah case law supports the conclusion that the ordinance is void for failure to 
strictly comply with statutory notice and hearing requirements. This Court must rectify 
Ogden City's fraud on its citizens and property owners. 
F. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES NOTICE AND HEARING 
Failure of public notice and hearing defeats the purpose of the statutory scheme. It 
deprived the Ogden City Council, of significant information that might well have been 
important in deciding whether to approve, modify or dispose of said ordinance. Failure 
of public notice in addition denies the public its role in the process of equitable zoning 
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ordinances contemplated by the statute. Ogden City Council, failure for strict compliance 
corrupted the entire process. Such actions of the Ogden City Council, understandably 
raised a storm of public protest, created suspicions of favoritism and dishonesty. 
Failure to void Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, would encourage 
concealment-not giving public notice on controversial zoning ordinances. This unsound 
policy would only encourage and reward the non-compliance with statutes. In the end, it 
would surely encourage concealment of the public's business from the public. This Court 
should treat public notice requirements in a similar manner as personal notice where 
individual property rights are at issue. 
This would be good public policy. InW.&G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals explained: 
It is well-established that "[tjimely and adequate notice and an opportunity to 
be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." 
...Notice must be given in compliance with the statutory scheme and must be 
sufficient. 
Id. At 761-2 (quoting Nelson v Jacobsen, 669 P2.d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983), other 
citations omitted; emphasis added). 
If adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard are not given, the 
proceedings are void and those not properly notified are not bound by the 
proceedings because the giving of such notice is jurisdictional. 
W.&G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755. 
Ogden City failed to provide Appellant, property owners and the citizens of Ogden 
City with reasonable notice of proceedings and or an opportunity for a hearing as 
provided by Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402. 
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Every Citizen has two dimensions of rights, private and public. The right to notice 
with respect to a citizen's private property rights is guarded by the Constitutional right of 
procedural due process. However, that same citizen has very important concerns dealing 
with zoning ordinances, that may affect property owned by that same citizen, and those 
rights are protected by statutory notice and public hearings. The passage of such 
regulations and restrictions on private property must be a public process, open to strict 
scrutiny. 
In Toone, v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103 (2002): 
When we interpret a statute, we look first to its plain language; only if the statute's 
language is ambiguous do we rely on other methods of statutory interpretation. 
City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, % 36,28 P.3d 697; State v. Burns, 2000 UT 
56, f 25,4 P.3d 795; Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, % 13, 993 
P.2d 207. Subsection 17-27-305(2)(a) mandates that the county's legislative body 
shall submit a proposal to the planning commission for its review and 
recommendations when "accepting, widening, removing, extending, relocating, 
narrowing, vacating, abandoning, changing the use, acquiring land for, or selling 
or leasing any street or other public way, ground, place, property or structure." 
(Emphasis added.) This language is unambiguous, clearly stating without 
qualification that a proposed sale must be submitted to the planning 
commission before county land is sold. 
Ordinance #2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code, 
adopted by the Ogden City Council on December 4,2001 is void (Toone et al, v. Weber 
County, 2002 UT 103). Ogden City failed to satisfy any of the conditions required under 
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-402 to enact amendments to 16-8B. This language is 
unambiguous, clearly stating without qualification that a proposed zoning ordinance must 
be submitted to the planning commission before the city can amend any zoning ordinance 
that a public hearing be held and reasonable notice be provided to the public at least 14 
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days before the date of the hearing. That the violation of any of the conditions set out in 
Utah State Code would be sufficient to void said ordinance. 
Section §10-9-405 gives cities the authority to zone; section § 10-9-403 mandates 
that zoning amendments be accompanied by certain procedural requirements. Ogden 
City failed to follow the Utah State Code requirements, to amend zoning ordinance 16.8, 
therefore ordinance 16.8B is void. The right to public notice is entitled to protection by 
the law, similar to the type of protection afforded private property rights. That is the 
purpose of statutory notice and public hearings. It is a reflection of the fact that zoning 
ordinances affect us all and affect very important values. We do not want them being 
made in haste or in secret, as this one was. The applicable statutes unambiguously 
required Ogden City, to provide notice and hearing, before adopting the vacant building 
ordinance 16.8B. 
This Court should sustain the integrity of this important public process. Public 
notice and a hearing on the regulation of private property are the public's equivalent of 
individual constitutional due process rights and must be carefully safeguarded. 
POINT II 
-ORDINANCE REQUIRED APPELLANT TO SURRENDER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-
THE ORDINANCE AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT REQUHtED 
APPELLANT TO SURRENDER APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNTBED STATES IN VIOLATION THEREOF. 
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT 
As a condition of the letter of January 9,2002, from Ogden City, to register 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's properties as vacant, Appellant was required to comply with Ogden City 
Maintenance Standard and remove the "unlawful signs" on Appellant's property, in 
violation of the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. Addendum 3. 
The "unlawful signs" were located on the interior of Appellant's building and 
were petitions to redress Appellant's grievances with the Administration of Ogden City. 
Appellant's arraignment was on January 30,2002, before the Second District 
Court, at which time the Court continued the case to February 20,2002, for Appellant to 
obtain counsel. R. 003-004. 
Because Ogden City failed on January 30,2002, to obtain relief to have 
Appellant's signs in Appellant's property removed, Ogden City on February 5,2002, 
filed a civil complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, in the case 
Ogden City v. Bruce Edwards, Civil No. 020900777 before the Honorable Parley R. 
Baldwin, seeking a restraining order against Appellant to remove any and all signs on the 
interior of Appellant's property. 
On February 6,2002, the Winter Olympic torch came down 25th Street Ogden, 
were Appellant's properties are located, and where Ogden City hosted the 2002 Winter 
Olympic party and events. On February 6,2002, a hearing took place in the Second 
Judicial District Court, before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, and the Court entered an 
order that Appellant was restrained from having any sign on any "vacant property" in 
Ogden City and was ordered to remove Appellant's petitions located on the interior of 
Appellant's property located on 25th Street. 
The enforcement of the ordinance and prosecution of Appellant was done in an 
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arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory fashion. 
On October 1st, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court, of Weber County in the 
case Ogden City v. Edwards, Civil No. 020900777 the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, 
ruled on Appellant's then Counterclaim Plaintiffs, motion for partial summary judgment, 
the Court stated that Ogden City sign ordinance 16.8B-9.G OMC was unconstitutional on 
its face and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. In said Memorandum the Court stated the Ordinance was "overbroad and 
content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction." Addendum 9. 
In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah, 1985): 
In any event, good intentions do not justify denying a person those rights 
established by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this 
state. Denial of one's constitutional rights, even though by well-intentioned 
persons sworn to uphold the Constitution, may be as damaging to our institutions 
as the denial of those rights by those who have illicit intentions. 
It is well settled that, Ogden City, has no right to deny Appellant, Appellant's 
constitutional rights. 
"If any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the 
conviction cannot be upheld". Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L. 
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed a two count information against Appellant 
for 2 counts "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations": "1. The windows and glass 
doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs 
visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16.8B-9J OMC, Class 
B", and "2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent 
properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in violation of Section 
32 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16.B-9.G, OMC Class B". Addendum 5. 
Prior to the information filed by Ogden City, Appellant filed a letter on January 
15,2002, with Ogden City stating that Appellant's "unlawful signs", were protected by 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Addendum 4, Tt p. 21. 
Appellant refused to comply with the letter of January 9,2002, from Ogden City 
and register Appellant's buildings and remove the "unlawful signs" in that Appellant's 
property was not vacant and Appellant was certain and assured that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional and Appellant was dismayed at the unconstitutional actions of Ogden 
City. 
On October 1,2003, the Second Judicial District Court, Civil No. 020900777 in 
the case Ogden City v Edwards the court ruled that 16.8B-10.G was unconstitutional on 
its face and stated: 
The sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average 
American, who, given this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect 
for individual liberty and private property, would be surprised to learn that he 
could not display flags, religious symbols, political placards, or even bumper 
stickers from the windows of his vacant building. 
Ogden vs. Edwards Addendum 9, p. 19. 
At the time the original information was filed, charging Appellant with "unlawful 
signs" on January 23, 2002, for the time period of "on or about January 1 thru 12 2002", 
Ogden City was interested only in the "unlawful signs". There was no charge to register 
or file a plan for a vacant building and the charge for failure to do so was not raised until 
March 5,2002, almost 2 months from the time period Appellant is alleged in violation. 
Appellant can not be required as a prerequisite of compliance, with 16.8B to waive 
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Appellant's constitutional rights. Therefore Appellant was not required to register a 
vacant building under 16.8B and remove the "unlawful signs", pursuant to Ogden City 
Code, to assist Ogden City in the depravation of the Appellant's rights, under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Appellant was required by the restraining order of the court to remove the signs on 
the interior of Appellant's property from February 6,2002, to October 1, 2003. At all 
times during the course of the criminal charges pending against Appellant, Ogden City, 
sought to restrain Appellant from petitioning for redress of Appellant's grievance, with 
Ogden City Administration, pursuant to the original charges against Appellant on January 
23, 2002. The charges that Appellant was convicted of are directly related to the charges 
that were filed on January 23,2002, that were unconstitutional and therefore cannot be 
enforced against Appellant, as applied to Appellant. 
The Appellant reviewed the conditions that required registration and concluded 
that the properties in question, did not meet the criteria of being vacant and if they were 
registered that Appellant would be deprived of numerous rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Utah and therefore declined to 
register the building(s) as a vacant building(s). 
POINT III 
-BUILDING(S) WERE NOT VACANT-
APPELLANT'S SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE NOT VACANT AND 
THEREFORE DID NOT COME UNDER THE REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENT OF THE VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE 
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A. DEFINITION OF VACANT 
On December 9,2001, Ogden City enacted a municipal ordinance directing that 
vacant building within the city be registered by their owners, that a vacant building plan 
be filed with Ogden City and that the property meet maintance standards that Ogden City 
set forth. The Appellant is the owner of two adjoining buildings located in the central 
business district of Ogden City. Each building has access from the interior into the 
adjacent building. 
These buildings have been largely used by the Appellant for storage of 
construction materials and personal property, for a wood shop, for office use for himself, 
for special events and as a political forum and were used "on or about January 1st thru 
12th*. Tt Pp. 53-58, 68,126. 
16.8A-3: DEFINITIONS: 
VACANT: 
A. Empty; 
B. Not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or 
C. Not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for 
which a building is designed and lawfully permitted. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8A-3 
B. INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE 
The evidence before the Court did not meet the states burden of proof to find that 
Appellant's building was vacant. The buildings were not empty; the buildings were 
occupied on a regular basis from January 1st thru January 12,2002. Appellant's 
testimony was the buildings were occupied on a daily basis. The buildings were used for 
the usual and customary purposes for which Appellant had designed them for and said 
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use was lawfully permitted. Storing Appellant's personal property in Appellant's real 
property is not a commercial storage unit pursuant to Ogden City's suggestion that it is 
not a lawful use of Appellant's property. 
The only evidence before the court for the time period of January 1st thru 12th was 
the testimony of Mr. Michael McDonald, Ogden City Building Inspector, who stated that 
he inspected 207 25th Street on January 9,2002 between 12-1. Addendum 8, Tt 35-42. 
Mr. McDonald further stated that "Just nobody appeared to be in there...". When asked 
if he inspected the Elborracho (this case) Mr. McDonald stated "yes, I believe I did go by 
that, probably - it should have been around the same time". Mr. McDonald did not have 
any inspection report on the Elborracho. The only violation that the Building Inspector 
stated in his inspection report was "sign in window" which is not a violation. 
There was evidence before the court that one window in one building, the Helena, 
had been boarded up which the court considered significant. The issue was raised only 
after closing arguments and therefore no facts were established as to mitigating 
circumstances. Ttp. 134. 
Ogden City's definition of vacant is vague that it "fails to inform an ordinary 
citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be proscribed", State 
v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975). 
Judge Baldwin in the case Ogden v. Edwards found; 
Ogden argues that, in fact, the ordinance does not prohibit on-site noncommercial 
speech because the ordinance covers only vacant buildings, and, by definition, 
there is no on-site activity at the premises of a vacant building. However, the 
ordinance's broad definition of "vacant" would cover a building where 
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noncommercial activities, for example, perhaps religious or political 
gatherings, may be held sporadically but not regularly. 
Ogden v. Edwards (Utah 2003) Addendum 9. 
Ogden City argues on one hand that the building is vacant because there is no 
occupancy permit or building permit. The definition of vacant is not predicated on an 
occupancy permit or building permit. Ogden City then argues that by definition, there is 
no on-site activity at the premises of a vacant building. It was uncontested that Appellant 
was using Appellant's property for a variety of activities including storage, office, 
woodshop and political forum, all of which are legally permitted. 
In the closing statement prosecuting attorney states "[t]hat he's again maybe there 
on a regular basis, but it's not for the usual and customary purpose for these particular 
buildings and what is set up in the zoning ordinances" and further "Well, I guess there are 
clutter and things in it." Ogden City evidence, pictures taken on February 21,2002, 
showed that there was furniture, building materials, signs and construction equipment. 
Appellant's property has not been used for commercial purposes for over 30 years. 
Tt Pp. 91-92,119. The usual and customary use and historical use of the subject property 
was as a bordello. Tt Pp. 55,91. But the usual and customary use and the historical use 
of the subject property is no longer a "lawful use". Ogden City failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the properties were empty, not occupied on a regular basis, or not 
used for its customary use and vacant. 
If there has been no commercial use in said building(s) for 30 years or any other 
use besides Appellant's use, then the usual and customary use is the use of the Appellant 
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and that use has been used by Appellant for 6 or more years. Tt Pp. 91-92, 119. 
POINT IV 
-BUILDING REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED 
IN 10 DAYS FROM NOTIFICATION-
VACANT BUILDING ORDINANCE REQUIRES 10 DAY NOTICE TO 
OWNER. OGDEN CITY FAILED TO PROVIDE ADQUATE NOTICE. 
16.8B-3.A: OBLIGATION TO REGISTER VACANT BUILDINGS: 
A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, whenever a building 
is vacant for more than ninety (90) days, or whenever any building is 
vacant and such building or premises thereof contains one or more "public 
nuisance violations", as defined herein, then the owner of such building 
shall, within ten (10) days of notification, register such building as a 
vacant building and submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is 
granted under subsection E of this section. 
Ogden City Code § 16.8B-3. Addendum 1. 
On January 9,2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager, Wayne 
Glover, mailed Appellant a written notice to register Appellant's building(s) within 10 
days of Appellant's notification. Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002. 
Addendum 3. 
On January 23,2002, Ogden City filed an information against Appellant for 2 
counts "Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations" "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 
2002". Addendum 5. 
Appellant had not received the required notice under Ogden City Code, 16.8B-
3.A, providing Appellant the 10 day notice when Ogden City charged Appellant with 
Zoning Ordinance Violations", "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 2002". 
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Ogden City original information was filed January 23,2002. Appellant was 
served on January 24,2002. Appellant received the letter from Ogden City pursuant 
16.8B-3.A on January 13,2002. Appellant was served the criminal information for 
failure to file before Appellant, was required to file any plan pursuant to 16.8B-3.A. 
On March 5, 2002, Ogden City filed its Amended Information charging Appellant 
with having violated the zoning ordinances from January 1st through 12th, 2002 and 
included 2 additional charges "Failure to register and provide a vacant building plan in 
violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3" and "Failure to maintain vacant building 
in accordance with the Vacant Building Maintenance Standards OMC, Chapter 8, Section 
16.8B-9.J". 
Again on October 4,2002 Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information 
reducing the charges to infractions with having violated the zoning ordinances from "on 
or about January 1st through 12th, 2002". 
At no time during the trial did Ogden City move to amend the charges pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 d. 
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a defendant is entitled to know 
"the nature and cause of the accusation against him," Utah Const, art. I, § 12, and "to 
sufficient time to prepare adequately for trial." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1221 
(Utah 1984). Rule 4 protects a defendant's rights by requiring an indictment or 
information setting forth the offense and supporting facts and allowing a defendant to 
request a bill of particulars if desired. Utah R. Crim P. 4. 
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In order to protect a defendant's right to know the nature of the accusation, several 
courts have stressed the importance of providing defendants with sufficient notice and 
time to adequately prepare a defense. See, e.g., State v. Seiber, 791 P.2d 18,20 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1989) (noting that amendment of information "must not deprive a defendant of his 
due process right to notice and opportunity to prepare a defense"). 
Appellant was not adequately notified of the theory being used by prosecuting 
attorney until closing argument. At all times the prosecuting attorney claimed by 
of tV» 
information (8 separate informations) that Appellant "on or about January 1 thru 12 , 
2002" committed the offense but in closing argument states "He's never cured that 
particular problem, and therefore we can go forward." Tt p. 17. Thus the court allowed 
Ogden City to change the information to charge a different theory than expressed in the 
information which violated the procedural safeguards in the criminal process. The 
information does not provide for the right to "cure" and Ogden City never expressed that 
if Appellant was to cure that Ogden City would dismiss the charges. 
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he 
was not charged. The reason is apparent: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a 
defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 
Appellant was convicted of a crime which Appellant was not charged. Emphasis Added. 
Although it was not necessary to allege the time of the offense under Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 4(b), the prosecutor did include in the information an allegation that 
the offense took place "on or about January 1st thru 12,2002." This certainly put 
Appellant on notice as to when Ogden City contended the alleged crime(s) had occurred. 
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It would be a mockery of the constitutional rights of Appellant to allow Ogden 
City to falsely state the particulars of the offense charged and then without amendment 
and without giving a Defendant additional time to meet new evidence beyond those 
particulars obtain a conviction founded on said evidence. 
TIME WAS A CRITICAL ISSUE 
Previous cases have permitted a one- to four-day variance where the 
approximation "on or about" is used. E.g., In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333,1335 (Utah 
1979); State v. Wadman, 580 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Utah 1978); State v. Middelstadt, 579 
P.2d 908,910 (Utah 1978). A greater variance is permissible where time is not a critical 
issue at trial. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 540-41, 201 P.2d 764, 769-70 (1949) (ten-
day variance permitted where alibi defense not asserted and where no danger of double 
jeopardy existed). 
Time was a critical issue at trial. Time is an express statutory element of 16.8B-3. 
Appellant was provided with actual notice, letter dated January 9, 2002, that Appellant 
received on January 13,2002 that expressly stated that Appellant had 10 days from 
notification to register Appellant's properties. 
The information(s) charged Appellant with "on or about January 1st thru 12th, 
2002" committed "zoning ordinance violations" when in fact Appellant would not have 
been in default under the terms of the ordinance until January 24, 2002. Even if the 
prosecution was liberally given the benefit of the doubt and a variance often days were 
applied Ogden City is still outside the time frame when Appellant could have been in 
violation of the vacant building ordinance. 
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The testimony of Wayne Glover, Building Service Manager, stated that Appellant 
was not required to register Appellant's buildings until January 23,2002. Tt p. 114. 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed... by any applicable 
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of 
time begins to run shall not be included When the period of time prescribed or 
allowed . . . is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
Appellant received the notice on Sunday, January 13,2002 and therefore the 
vacant building plan would not be due till Friday, January 25,2002 or Monday 28, 2002 
pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ogden City failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was in 
violation of the Vacant Building Ordinance. Ogden City failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Appellant's properties were vacant. Ogden City Amended Ogden 
City's information on two occasions and Appellant relied on the information in 
establishing Appellant's defense to Ogden City's accusations against Appellant. 
Ogden City failed to carry its burden of proof as to the time of the offense; 
McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (Utah 1983). In McNair, the Court stated that "time is 
always an essential element of a crime" id. 
McNair limited this phrase by stating that time is an element only "in the sense 
that due process requires that an accused be given sufficiently precise notification of the 
date of the alleged crime [so] that he can prepare his defense." 
There was a prejudicial variance between the dates alleged in the information and 
the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial. By definition, the right to 
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constitutionally adequate notice requires that the information given by the prosecution 
must be such that the defendant can confidently rely on it in preparing for trial. 
Therefore, an essential corollary of the defendant's right to obtain information on the 
alleged offense from the prosecution is some rule or doctrine which assures that the 
information given is reliable. 
Due process requires that an accused be given sufficiently precise notification of 
the date of the alleged crime so that he can prepare his defense. Another and more 
specific source of a notice requirement is Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
which provides that an accused has the right "to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof." This provision has been held to 
require that the accused be given sufficient information "so that he can know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his defense." 
State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260,262 (Utah 1985); State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 107,108-09, 
378 P.2d 352, 353 (1963); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276,280 (1956). 
The crux of both theories is that a criminal defendant must be sufficiently apprised 
of the particulars of the charge to be able to "adequately prepare his defense." State v. 
Burnett, 712 P.2d at 262; McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d at 326. 
Appellant was apprised by the information(s) of the allegations of Ogden City that 
Appellant was in violation of Ogden City Zoning Ordinance "on or about January 1st thru 
12*2002". 
Appellant had no notice that there may exist a defect in said information or any 
amended information. If the information was defective Appellant had no duty to inform 
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the prosecution or to incriminate himself. If the information was defective, the defect 
was only established after the fact, after the prosecuting attorney changed Ogden City's 
allegations against Appellant in the prosecuting attorney's closing statement. 
The prosecution's failure to sufficiently notify Appellant of the factual basis for its 
allegations contained in the information left Appellant unable to make pretrial 
preparation for a defense or to counter the Ogden City's evidence and arguments at trial. 
The right of the nature and cause of the accusation against Defendant, is not just a 
right of notice of the prosecution's evidence; more importantly, it is the right of a 
defendant not to be confronted with a case that presents a moving target. 
The right to adequate notice in the Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to 
state the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple 
prosecutions for the same crime and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to 
prepare a defense. Id. at 1214; State v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425,427 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Bundy, 684 P.2d 58,62 (Utah 1984); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 371, 302 P.2d 276, 
279 (1956). 
POINT V 
-RETALIATION— 
OGDEN CHARGES AGAIST APPELLANT WERE FOR RETALIATORY 
PURPOSES BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS PETITIONING OGDEN FOR 
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AND PROTESTING IN VIOLATION OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
Appellant is the only party to be charged with any violation under 16.B. Appellant 
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
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that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 
Ogden City entered into an agreement in Second District Court ,whereby 
Appellant agreed to remove the signs petitioning Ogden City for redress of grievances for 
at period of 60 days. Tt Pp. 139 & 141. Instead of acting in good faith Ogden City, 
attempted to suppress and oppress Appellant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution of the United States and State of Utah. Ogden City passed a zoning 
ordinance without following the statutory procedures, because Ogden City could not do 
so before Appellant's deadline of December 12,2001. 
Appellant had one sign that stated "Why would anyone do business in Ogden" as 
part of Appellant's petition to redress Appellant's grievances to boycott Ogden City. 
Said sign was protected by the Constitution of the United States and of Utah. 
Because Appellant's properties were located were the 2002 Winter Olympic party 
was taking place in Ogden, the Administration of Ogden retaliated against Appellant, for 
Appellant's petition for redress directed at the Administration of Ogden City. 
Ogden City irrationally and arbitrarily enforced and prosecuted Appellant for 
Appellant's, petition for redress with the Administration of Ogden City in violation of 
Appellant's rights of equal protection and right to petition guaranteed by the Constitution 
of the United States. Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
POINT VI 
-NONCONFORMING USES AND STRUCTURES-
OGDEN CITY ORDINANCE PROVIDED FOR THE TERMINATION OF 
ALL NONCONFORMING SUES AND FAILED TO PROVIDE A 
FORMULA ESTABLISHING A REASONABLE TIM PERIOD DURING 
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WHICH THE OWNER CAN RECOVER OR AMORTIZE THE AMOUNT 
OF HIS INVESTMENT IN THE NONCONFORMING USE AS PROVIDED 
IN UTAH CODE 10-9-408 AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
In addition the ordinance is in violation of Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408, 
Nonconforming uses and structures. 
Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming uses and structures 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure 
may be continued 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, 
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for the 
purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to 
a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions 
set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by 
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which the 
owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring 
the billboard and associated property rights through: 
(i) gift; 
(ii) purchase; 
(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 (l)-(2). 
That Ogden City's ordinance provided for the termination of all nonconforming 
uses, including the use, removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and anything that 
would obscure a window which would include curtains, blinds, shades, tenting, partitions 
etc., in or on vacant building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable 
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time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment 
in the nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408. 
Ogden City's ordinance failed to provide that a nonconforming use may be 
extended through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building is 
proposed or made for the purpose of the extension. 
That the termination of Appellant's use, signs and window covering that became a 
nonconforming use on or about December 9,2001, were not acquired by Ogden City by 
either gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent domain. 
That Ogden City's ordinance required Plaintiff to remove all signs, on the interior 
of Appellant's property including anything that would obscure any window without 
providing compensation as provided by Utah Code Annotated. 10-9-408. 
Ogden City Code 16.8-B is in violation of Utah Code Annotated. 10-9-408, the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
POINT VII 
-PLAN CONDITIONED ON REGISTERING-
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF MULTD7LE VIOLATIONS 
OF CODE FOR SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
On October 18,2002, Appellant was found guilty of "Failure to register a 
vacant building in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-3, an infraction," and of 
"Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC, Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-
5, an infraction". R. 023-025 
Filing a Vacant Building Plan is predicated on registering a Vacant Building. 
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The conduct for each offense is identical and or is so closely related in time and was 
incidental to any criminal objective. Therefore failure to register a Vacant Building 
would subject the party to multiple punishments. 
Proof of failure to file a plan is clearly established by proof of failing to register. 
Appellant's violation constitutes a single criminal episode pursuant to 76-1-402. 
POINT IIX 
-COURT DISMISSED CHARGES-
THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSED CHARGES ONE & TWO. THERE 
WAS NO CHARGE THREE & OR FOUR IN OGDEN CITY'S SECOND 
AMENDED INFORMATION THAT IS THE CONTROLLING 
DOCUMENT. 
On October 2, 2002, Ogden City filed a Second Amended Information that was 
served on Appellant's counsel the day of the trial, (Tt Pp.1) charging Appellant with 
having violated the zoning ordinances, from "January 1st through 12th, 2002" and 
changing the charges to infractions. In addition the Second Amended Information, was a 
2 page information with 2 charges on each page that were identified as 1 & 2 on each 
page, eliminating the fourth charge from the Amended Information and amending the 
third charge of the Amended Information into two separate charges. Addendum 7. 
On November 10, 2003 a review sentencing hearing took place and the court 
docket states: 
This is the time set for Review of Sentencing after the decision from Appeal Court 
received. City will comply with Court of Appelee, Memorandum Decision. By so 
doing City moves to dismiss counts 1 and 2. Motion granted. Count 1 and 2 
dismissed. 
The Memorandum Decision the Court relied on in dismissing count 1 and 2 surely 
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must be the Memorandum Decision of Judge Baldwin. This case is replete with errors, 
lost documents, errs of the court, amended informations that do not reflect the docket as 
to what Appellant was charged with. 
On November 26, 2003 the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
Vacate and the Order of the Court was: 
In the case of #0219000315 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 and 4 is denied. 
R. 098, Addendum 11. 
Ogden City's Second Amended Information, the final information, is the 
controlling document that informs Appellant and the public of Appellant's crimes against 
society. Because Appellant was charged with two "count l's" and 2 "count 2's on two 
cases and the Court dismissed count 1 and 2 on both cases and Appellant convictions as 
to "count 3 and 4" were denied when there was no count 3 or 4 in the Second Amended 
Information the Court erred. Since there is no count 3 or 4 and count 1 and 2 of "page 2 
of 2"of the Second Amended Information are not the same as count 3 or 4 of the 
Amended Information there is no information in the docket that clearly, without a 
reasonable doubt would identify the "crime9' Appellant was alleged to have committed, 
therefore this Court should dismiss count 1 and 2 for pages 1 and 2 of the Second 
Amended Information. Failing to clearly establish what Appellant was convicted of 
clearly denies Appellant of due process and denies Appellant, Appellant's rights under 
the Constitution of the United States. 
The prosecuting attorney on October 17,2002, explained to the Court that 
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MR JUNK: maybe I can just explain-
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JUNK:- a little bit, maybe make it a little clearer. We did file both of 
the informations on 315 and 420. They have four counts, but we've 
separated those counts. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JUNK: Two on-and it may not be clear because we have as one and 
two, and then one and two, and we probably should have had them as -
THE COURT: Three and four? 
MR. JUNK: -three and four, but-
The court having failed to adequately inform Appellant, from the order of the 
court, as to the charges and the Second Amended and final information as to Ogden City 
Charges against Appellant denies Appellant, Appellant's rights under the Constitution of 
the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully request that this Court 
strike Ogden City's Vacant Building Ordinance, Ogden City Code 16.8B, as void and 
vacate the order of the District Court finding Appellant in violation of Ogden City's 
Vacant Building Ordinance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i s /^ay of June 2004. 
Bruce C. Edwards 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Bruce Edwards, Appellant, hereby certify that on June 14, 20041 served two copies of 
the attached Appellants Brief upon Attorney Paul Junk, Counsel for the Appellee in this 
matter, by personally hand delivering it to him at the following address: 
Mike Junk 
Ogden City Attorney 
2525 Grant Ave, 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dated: June 14,2004 
^ 
Bruce Edwafcts 
Appellant 
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ORDINANCE NO. 2001-69 
AN ORDINANCE OF OGDEN CITY, UTAH, AMENDING CHAPTER 8, TITLE 16 OF THE 
OGDEN MUNICIPAL CODE MAKING EXTENSIVE REVISIONS TO THE OGDEN CITY CODE 
FOR THE ABATEMENT OF DANGEROUS BUILDINGS, AND, IN PARTICULARLY, 
REPEALING ARTICLE B, CONCERNING TEMPORARY BOARDING OF BUILDINGS AND 
TEMPORARY BOARDING PERMITS, AND ADOPTING A NEW ARTICLE B REQUIRING THE 
REGISTRATION OF VACANT BUILDINGS AND THE SUBMISSION AND APPROVAL OF A 
VACANT BUILDING PLAN, ADOPTING STANDARDS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF 
VACANT BUILDINGS, AND IMPOSING ADDITIONAL FEES FOR REREGISTRATION WHEN 
THE OWNER DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE PLAN AND FOR EACH MONTH THAT A 
VACANT BUILDING IS BOARDED; BY REVISING SUBSECTION 16-12-3 REGARDING 
CIVIL PENALTIES FOR UNFIT PREMISES VIOLATIONS TO REFLECT THE CHANGES IN 
THE REGULATION OF BOARDED BUILDINGS AND VACANT BUILDINGS, AND 
INCREASING THE CIVIL PENALTIES TO BE THE SAME AS OTHER FIT PREMISES 
VIOLATIONS; AND PROVIDING THAT THIS ORDINANCE SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE 
IMMEDIATELY UPON PUBLICATION AFTER FINAL PASSAGE. 
The Council of Qqden City hereby ordains: 
SECTION 1. Section amended. Section 16-8A-3 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended by amending the definitions of "Building Official" and "Boarding or Boarded" to 
read and provide as follows: 
BUILDING OFFICIAL: The Manager of the [Inspection] Building Services Division of the 
Community and Economic Development Department of the City or 
the Manager's duly authorized representative. 
BOARDING OR BOARDED: The secured covering of openings to a building or structure to 
prevent entrance pursuant to the provisions and standards of 
[Article B of] this Chapter due to the nonoccupancy of the building 
or structure, which openings are boarded up or secured bv any 
means other than conventional methods used in the design of the 
building or permitted for new construction of similar type. 
SECTION 2. Section amended. Section 16-8A-3 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended by adding the following definitions to read and provide as follows: 
OPEN: The condition of a building or structure when not secured against unauthorized 
or unlawful entry. 
VACANT: fA) Empty: (B) Not occupied on a regular basis bv an occupant: or (C) Not used 
bv a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for which a 
building is designed and lawfully permitted. 
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SECTION 3. Section amended. Section 16-8A-5 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
16-8A-5. [Enforcement; Inspections; Right of Entry.] 
A. [Enforcement] The Building Official is hereby authorized to enforce the 
provisions of this Chapter. The Building Official shall have the power to render interpretations of 
the provisions of this Chapter and to adopt and enforce rules and supplemental regulations in 
order to clarify the application of its provisions. Such interpretations, rules and regulations shall 
be in conformity with the intent and purpose of this Chapter. 
B. [Inspections.] The Building Official, [tho Building Offioiaro duly authorized 
representative,] the Fire Marshal, assistant fire marshals, and health officers of the [Wobor 
Morgan] County Health Department are hereby authorized to make such inspections and take 
such actions as may be required to enforce the provisions of this Chapter. 
C. [Right of Entry.] When it is necessary to make an inspection to enforce the 
provisions of this Chapter, or when the Building Official [or tho Building Official's outhorizod 
roprooontativo] has reasonable cause to believe that there exists in a building or upon a 
premises a condition which is contrary to or in violation of this Chapter which makes the building 
or premises unsafe, dangerous or hazardous, the Building Official* may enter the building or 
premises at reasonable times to inspect or to perform the duties imposed by this Chapter, 
provided that if such building or premises be occupied that credentials be presented to the 
occupant and entry requested. If such building or premises be unoccupied, the Building Official 
shall first make a reasonable effort to locate the owner or other persons having charge or 
control of the building or premises and request entry. If entry is refused or the Building Official 
has been unable to locate the owner or other persons having charge or control of the building or 
premises to reouest entry, the Building Official shall have recourse to the remedies provided by 
law to secure entry. None of the above requirements are intended to restrict or limit the power 
of the Building Official from inspecting or acting upon conditions observed within plain view. The 
Building Official may enter a building or premises to abate public nuisances pursuant to the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
SECTION 4. Subsection amended. Subsection 19 of Section 16-8A-6.B of the Ogden 
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
19. Whenever any building or structure, or portion thereof, is vacant [and] or 
open [to unauthorized or unlawful ontry, GO as to constitute ouch building or portion thoroof] and: 
a. One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are missing 
or broken; 
b. One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are 
boarded up or secured bv anv means other than conventional methods used in the design of the 
building or permitted for new construction of similar type, unless boarded in accordance with an 
approved vacant building plan pursuant to Article B of this Chapter: or 
c. In such condition that it constitutes an attractive nuisance or 
hazard to the public. 
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SECTION 5. Section amended. Section 16-8A-10 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
16-8A-10. [Standards for Repair, Vacation and Demolition.] The following standards shall 
be followed by the Building Official, or by the Board of Building and Fire Code Appeals in 
hearing an appeal, or in ordering the repair, vacation^ [OF] demolition, or securing of any 
dangerous building or structure: 
A. Any building or structure declared a dangerous building under this Chapter shall 
be made to comply with one of the following: 
1. The building shall be repaired within a reasonable time in accordance 
with the current Building Code or other current code applicable to the type of substandard 
conditions requiring repair. 
2. The building shall be demolished: 
a. At the option of the building owner; 
b. If the owner has failed to repair within a reasonable period of time; 
c. If the owner has failed to adequately secure the building against 
entry or has failed to [board tho building in aocordanco] comply with the requirements of Article 
B of this Chapter^, or 
d. If the building constitutes an immediate danger to the life, limb, 
health, property or safety of the public and it is either unfeasible, or the owner has failed to 
present plans, to repair the building within a reasonable period of time.{r9f] 
3. If the building does not constitute an immediate danger to the life, limb, 
health, property or safety of the public, it may be vacated, temporarily secured and maintained 
against entry; provided, however, that the building shall be secured and maintained in 
accordance with the [boarding] requirements of Article B this Chapter. 
B. [Boarding shall not bo concidorod to bo a moans of abatement oxcopt for 
buildings determined to bo dangorouo only by roooon of subooction 16 8A 6.B.1Q of this Article. 
Otherwise, boarding] Boarding shall be considered to be only a temporary or interim means of 
abatement, until such time as the building is repaired or demolished^ [as required horoin] or 
otherwise brought into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. 
C. If the building or structure is in such condition as to make it immediately 
dangerous to the life, limb, health, property or safety of the public or its occupants, the building 
shall be ordered to be vacated in addition to any other order to repair or demolish. 
SECTION 6. Section amended. Section 16-8A-14 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
16-8A-14. [Enforcement of Orders to Repair, Demolish, and/or Secure.] 
A. If, after any unappealed order of the Building Official becomes final or thirty (30) 
days after a final decision of the Board made pursuant to this Chapter becomes final, the person 
to whom such order is directed shall fail, neglect or refuse to obey such order within the required 
time, the Building Official, in addition to any other remedy herein provided or otherwise available 
at law, may: 
1. Cause the building to be repaired to the extent necessary to correct the 
conditions which render the building dangerous as set forth in the notice and order, in 
accordance with Section 16-8A-15 of this Article^ [r^f] 
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2. Cause the building to be demolished and the materials, rubble and debris 
therefrom removed and the lot cleaned, in accordance with Section 16-8A-15 of this Article, if: 6-
8A-15 of this Article, if: 
a. The notice and order required demolition; or 
b. The notice and order required repair or demolition and repair by the 
City is determined to be unfeasible., [ret] 
3. Cause the building to be secured against entry [in acoordanco with tho 
provisions of Article B of thio Chapter], if the notice and order required that the building be 
secured,, [ t] 
4. Cause such person to be prosecuted under Section 16-8D-1 of this Chapter, [t 
w] 
5. Refer the matter to the City Attorney to institute any appropriate action to 
abate the nuisance. 
B. Whenever the required repair or demolition work is not commenced within thirty 
(30) days after any final notice and order issued under this Chapter becomes final, the Building 
Official may cause the building described in such notice and order to be vacated, unless 
previously ordered under the provisions of this Chapter, by posting at each entrance thereto a 
notice to vacate which shall be in the same form as required under Section 16-8A-11 of this 
Article. 
C. [Standards for Boarding.] If the Building Official determines that a building is to 
be boarded in order to secure the building against entry, the boarding shall be performed in 
accordance with the standards imposed in Section 16-8B-9 of this Chapter. 
CL [Costs.] If the City causes the building to be repaired, demolished, or secured 
against entry, the City shall charge the following costs against the property or the property 
owner, which costs shall be recovered as provided in Article C of this Chapter: 
! A one hundred dollar ($100.00) fee to partially recover the City's costs in 
administering the abatement action: and 
2. The actual costs of repair, demolition, or securing the building against entry. 
SECTION 7. Subsection amended. Subsection A. 1 of Section 16-8A-15 of the Ogden 
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
1. When any abatement work by repair or demolition is to be performed by 
the City pursuant to Section 16-8A-14 of this Article, except in emergency situations under 
Section 16-8D-2 of this Chapter, [and temporary boarding under Section 16 8B 1 of this 
Chapter,] the Building Official shall petition the Mayor to hold a hearing and order the property 
owner to show cause why the City should not abate by repair or demolition a substandard of 
dangerous building or structure constituting a public nuisance. The provisions of this Section 
shall specifically not apply to actions taken bv the Building Official in securing a building against 
entry. 
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SECTION 8. Article adopted. Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code is hereby 
amended by repealing Article B in its entirety and adopting a new Article B (entitled "Vacant 
Buildings") to read and provide as follows: 
16-8B-1. [Applicability.] This Article shall apply to all vacant buildings or structures within 
the City now existing or hereafter becoming vacant. 
16-8B-2. [Purpose and Intent] It is the purpose and intent of this Article to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare bv establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and 
requiring responsible parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to remedy 
any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent adverse impact on 
the value of nearby property, and to establish minimum maintenance standards for vacant 
buildings. To such ends, it is the specific purpose and intent of this Article; 
A. To minimize the period of time a building is boarded; 
B. To provide alternative procedures for the abatement of dangerous buildings, 
which, if adeouatelv secured and maintained against entrv in accordance with the requirements 
of this Article, will not constitute an immediate danger to the life, limb, health, property or safety 
of the public; 
C. To prevent vacant buildings from becoming a public nuisance; and 
D. To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings, in order to protect 
surrounding properties. 
16-8B-3. [Obligation to Register Vacant Buildings.] 
A. Except as provided in Subsection B. whenever a building is vacant for more than 
ninety (90) davs. or whenever any building is vacant and such building or premises thereof 
contains one or more public nuisance violations, as defined herein, then the owner of such 
building shall, within ten (10) davs of notification, register such building as a vacant building and 
submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is granted under paragraph E below. 
B. Whenever any building designed as a single-family dwelling is vacant and such 
building or premises thereof contains one or more public nuisance violations, as defined herein, 
then the owner of such building shall, within ten (10) davs of notification, register such building 
as a vacant building and submit a vacant building plan, unless a stay is granted under 
paragraph E below. 
C. Notification of the registration reouirement shall be made in writing to the owner 
of such property either personally or bv mailing notice first class, postage prepaid, addressed to 
the owner at their last know post office address, as disclosed bv the records of the County 
Assessor, or at such other address as is known bv the Building Official. 
D. For purposes of this Article, "public nuisance violations" includes: 
1. A building or structure in violation of one or more provisions of Subsection 
16-8A-6.B of this Chapter; and 
2. Property maintenance violations pursuant to Chapters 4. 5 and 8. Title 12 
of this Code. 
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E. If repair or demolition of the building is reguired under a notice and order issued 
pursuant to Section 16-8A-7 of this Chapter, the Building Official mav grant a stay of the 
registration requirement for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed ninety (90) days, while 
the owner diligently investigates abatement options and prepares plans for abatement The 
maintenance standards imposed in Section 16-8B-9 shall be applicable during the stay period. 
F. It is not the intention of this Article to require the initial registration of a building 
being actively and dilligentlv constructed or renovated, pursuant to valid building permit issued 
by the City, where persons responsible for such construction or renovation are present in the 
building on a regular basis; provided that the commencement of repair or rehabilitation pursuant 
to a vacant building plan shall not eliminate the continuing reguirement for registration. 
16-8B-4. [Registration of Vacant Buildings.] 
A. The owner registering a vacant building shall supply the following information on 
a form provided by the Building Official: 
1. The address of the vacant building; 
2. The name, address, and telephone number of the owner; 
3. The name, address and telephone number of a person authorized to act 
as an agent for the owner for performing the owner's obligations under this Chapter, who lives 
within forty (40) miles of the City; 
4. Legal description and tax parcel identification number of the premises on 
which the building is situated. 
5. Date on which the building became vacant; 
6. The vacant building plan; 
7. A description of the condition of the building and the landscaping of the 
surrounding property. 
B. The initial vacant building registration shall be accompanied bv a filing fee of one 
hundred dollars ($100.00). together with anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8. 
C. Registration of a vacant building shall be valid for a period of six (6) months. 
D. If the building is vacant at the expiration of anv registration period and 
reouirements of the vacant building plan are not completed, or have not otherwise been met, 
then the owner shall re-register such building and oav a re-reaistration fee of five hundred and 
seventv-one dollars ($571.00). together with anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8. If 
the building is vacant at the expiration of anv registration period and the reouirements of the 
vacant building plan are completed and otherwise met, the owner shall re-reoister such building, 
paving anv mitigation fees due under Section 16-8B-8. without filing a new vacant building plan 
or paving a filing fee. 
16-8B-5 [Vacant Building Plan J 
When a building is registered as required herein, the owner or agent shall submit a vacant 
building plan. The plan shall contain the following; 
A. A plan of action to repair anv doors, windows, or other openings which are 
boarded or otherwise secured bv anv means other than conventional methods used in the 
design of the building or permitted for new construction of similar type. The proposed repair 
shall result in openings secured bv conventional methods used in the design of the building or 
bv methods permitted for new construction of similar type. 
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B. For building and premises which are identified as being or containing public 
nuisance violations unrelated to improperly secured openings, a plan of action to remedy such 
public nuisance violations. 
C. For each required plan, a time schedule shall be submitted identifying a date of 
commencement of repair and date of completion of repair for each improperly secured opening 
and identified public nuisance violations. 
D. If the owner proposes to demolish the vacant building, then the owner shall 
submit a plan and time schedule for such demolition. 
E. If the owner proposes to repair the vacant building, then the owner shall submit a 
plan and time schedule for such repair. 
F. A plan of action to maintain the building and premises thereof in conformance 
with the provisions of this Article. 
G. A plan of action to maintain the building against unlawful entry. 
16-8B-6. [Review, Approval or Modification of Vacant Building Plan; Appeal.] 
A. The Building Official shall have sole discretion to approve the vacant building 
plan in accordance with the standards and reouirements of this Article, and Article 8A of this 
Title. 
B. The Building Official shall, upon notice to the vacant building owner or agent, 
have the authority to modify the vacant building plan bv altering the dates of performance or the 
proposed methods of action. 
C. If the owner or agent of the vacant building objects to the modifications made bv 
the Building Official, such owner shall have the right to appeal to the Board for final 
determination. Such appeal shall be filed with the Building Official within ten (10) days of receipt 
of the Building Official's notice of modification. 
D. The Board, after considering the testimony of the Building Official, the building 
owner, and any other interested person, shall render its decision on the owner's appeal of the 
Building Officiars modifications to the proposed vacant building plan. The Board shall have the 
authority to fashion its own vacant building plan or approve the plan submitted bv the owner or 
the plan as modified bv the Building Official. The decision of the Board shall be final and 
constitute the approved vacant building plan. 
16-8B-7. [Standards Governing Review.] 
In considering the appropriateness of a vacant building plan, the Building Official and the Board 
shall consider the following: 
A. The purpose and intent of this Article to minimize the period of time a building is 
boarded or otherwise vacant. 
B. The affect of the proposed plan on adjoining property. 
C. The general economic conditions of the community. 
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D. The financial resources of the owner. 
E. The cost to implement the proposed plan. 
F. The length of time the building has been vacant. 
G. The presence of anv public nuisances on the property. 
H. The relative hardship on or gain to the public as contrasted and compared to the 
hardship or gain of the owner resulting from approval or modification of the proposed plan. 
16-8B-8. [Mitigation Fees.] 
A. The owner shall pay, along with the registration fee, a boarded building fee of 
fifty-five dollars ($55.00) for a single-family dwelling or one hundred dollars ($100.00) for anv 
other type of vacant building, for each month that a building is boarded, which fee shall be due: 
1. At initial registration: 
a. for each month during the registration period that the building is proposed 
to be boarded under the vacant building plan. 
b. for each month, after notification of the registration reguirement that the 
owner failed to register as reguired herein: 
2. At re-registration: 
a. for each month that the building was boarded during the prior 
registration period, for which fees were not previously paid. 
b. for each month during the registration period that the building will be 
boarded under the approved vacant building plan 
c. for the entirety of the upcoming registration period, if the vacant 
building plan is not completed in accordance with the plan. 
3. If the owner fails to register, at the end of each month, after notification of the 
registration reguirement that the owner fails to register as reguired herein. 
(X [Refunds.] The Building Official shall refund anv of the above amounts 
applicable to future months, if the building is not boarded in anv respect for the entirety of such 
month. In no event shall the owner be charged more than once for the same month. 
(X [Failure to Pay Fees.] If the property owner fails to register or pay the 
boarded building fee, the City may take legal action to collect anv amounts owed. 
16-8B-8. [Change of Ownership.] The approved vacant building plan shall remain in 
effect notwithstanding a change in ownership. The new owner is reguired to file a revised 
registration form with the Building Official for the applicable registration period, and supply the 
name and address and telephone number of the new owner(s), agent or local representative. 
The revised registration shall be in the same form as the original registration and shall remain in 
effect for the remainder of the registration period applicable to the original registration. No filing 
fee is required for the filing of the revised registration form. 
16-8B-9. [Maintenance Standards.] Anv vacant building, whether or not subject to a 
vacant building plan, shall be maintained in accordance with all of the following maintenance 
standards: 
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A, [Boarding.] If a building is boarded, the building shall be boarded in the 
following manner: 
1. [Plywood Sheathing; Exterior-Grade Chipboard.] All openings in 
the structure on the first two (2) floors, other openings easily accessible from the ground, and 
openings with broken glass, shall be secured either bv erecting a single one-half inch (1/2") 
thick layer of plywood sheathing, or exterior-grade chipboard, covering over all exterior 
openings, overlapping the opening on every edge bv three inches (3"). nailed along the edges 
bv eight-penny common nails or egual spaced even/ six inches (6"); 
Z [Wood-Frame Construction.] Alternately, the openings may be 
secured bv conventional wood-frame construction. The frames shall use wood studs of a size 
not less than two inches bv four inches (2" x 4") (nominal dimension) placed not more than 
twenty four inches (24") apart on center. The frame stud shall have the four inch (4") sides or 
the wide dimension perpendicular to the face of the wall. Each side of the frame shall be 
covered with plvwood sheathing of at least one-half inch (1/2") thickness or eouivalent lumber 
nailed over the opening bv using eight-penny common nails or egual spaced every six inches 
(6") on the outside edges and every twelve inches (12") along intermediate stud supports: 
3. [Painting.] All coverings shall be painted with the same color as the 
building or its trim and maintained in accordance with paragraph D below. 
EL [Exterior Doors; Secured.] Exterior doors or windows of a vacant building shall 
be adeguatelv locked to preclude entry of unauthorized persons, or shall be covered as an 
opening described in subsection A.1 or A.2 of this Section. 
CX [Landscaping; Lawn.] Existing landscaping and lawn on the premises of a 
vacant building shall be maintained in the manner otherwise reouired bv law. 
[X [Exterior Walls; Surfaces.] Exterior walls and surfaces of a vacant building 
must be properly maintained. Any exterior surface which has previously been treated with a 
weather coating material such as paint or stain shall be maintained in good condition free from 
faded or peeling paint or other coating material. Severely weathered, peeling or unpainted 
wood or damaged siding or roofing must be replaced or repaired with similar materials and 
colors. 
E. [Snow Removal.] Snow must be removed from public sidewalks surrounding 
the premises of a vacant building in the manner otherwise reouired bv law. 
F. [Utility Connections.] Although service may be discontinued and meters locked 
off during vacancy, all pre-existing meters and service lines for water, sewer, electric and oas 
shall be maintained on the premises of a vacant building, unless eliminated or replaced as part 
of the approved vacant building plan. 
a [Signage.] 
1. The owner of a vacant building shall remove all signage relating to 
persons or businesses no longer occupying the premises, in accordance with the reouirements 
of Subsection 18-1-9.B of this Code, except that signs having historic significance, as provided 
in subsection 3 below, may be retained. 
2. A vacant building and the premises shall be kept free of all interior or 
exterior signs, displays or graffiti visible from adjacent public streets, sidewalk or adjacent 
properties, except for: 
a. Property sions. as defined in Section 18-1-3 of this Code and 
complying with the reguirements of Title 18 of this Code; 
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b. Signs depicting the building address; 
b. Signs having historic significance, as provided in subsection 3 
below; and 
c. Off-premise signs, installed and maintained on the building or 
premises in accordance with the provisions of Title 18 of this Code. 
3. wSions having historic significance" shall mean a sign: 
a. Related to a building either designated as a historic resource or 
located within a historic district, pursuant to Title 17 of this Code; and 
b. Determined bv the Ooden City Landmarks Commission as 
significantly contributing to the historic character of such building or district. 
4. For purpose of this subsection, "signs, displays or graffiti" shall include 
anv presentation of words, letters, figures, designs, pictures or colors, which are not a part of 
the architectural design of the building. 
K [Interior Maintenance.] The interior of a vacant building shall be kept free from 
any accumulation of rubbish or garbage, and shall be maintained in a clean and sanitary 
condition. 
I [Property Maintenance Violations.] The exterior premises of a vacant building 
shall be maintained in accordance with all ordinances of the City regarding the maintenance of 
property, including, but not limited to. the recuirements of Chapters 4. 5 and 8. Title 12 of this 
Code. 
J . [Obscuring of Windows.] The windows and glass exterior doors of a vacant 
building shall not be painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the 
interior of the building; provided that the Building Official mav order that windows or glass doors 
are to be obscured with a solid coat of paint as part of maintenance work to be performed bv the 
City under Section 16-8B-10: 
1. If the Building Official determines such action is necessary in order to 
temporarily obstruct the view of interior conditions otherwise in violation of this Section, until 
such time as such conditions can be remedied under an approved vacant building plan; and 
2. The Citv cannot readily access the interior of the vacant building in order 
to correct such conditions. 
16-8B-10. [Failure to Maintain.] 
A^  [Notice; Action By City.] If the Building Official determines that a vacant 
building is not being maintained in accordance with Section 16-8C-9 of this Article, either in 
whole or in part, the Building Official shall send a notice to the owner or the owner's agent bv 
first class mail, prepaid, reguirino compliance with the building maintenance standards within 
ten (10) davs. If the maintenance work is not performed within the required time, the Building 
Official mav cause the maintenance work to be done bv Citv personnel or bv a contractor hired 
bv the Citv. Such notice mav occur whether or not the vacant building is subject to an approved 
vacant building plan, and mav be sent in conjunction with a notice to register the building as a 
vacant building under Section 16-8B-3. 
EL [Charges To Property Owner.] If the Building Official causes maintenance 
work to be done pursuant to Subsection A above; 
1. The Citv shall charge the property owner: 
a. An administrative fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) to partially 
re cover the City's costs in administering or contracting for the maintenance of the building 
and/or premises; and 
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b. The actual costs of maintaining the building and/or the premises. 
2. The costs shall be collected as provided under Article C of this Chapter. 
16-8B-1! [Existing Boarded Buildings.] 
Au [[Compliance Required.] Owners of vacant buildings who obtained a 
boarded building permit from the Citv. prior to . 2001. [insert date of passage] 
pursuant to the former provisions of this Article, shall register the building and comply with the 
new reouirements of this Article bv the expiration date of such permit; provided, that the owner 
of anv such vacant building shall still be subject to the maintenance standards imposed in 
Section 16-8B-9. 
E3L [Notification To Owners.] The Building Official shall take reasonable actions 
to notify the owners of buildings subject to a boarded building permit as of . 2001. 
[insert date of passage] informing the owner of the enactment of this new Article, the revised 
maintenance standards, and the reguirement to register as a vacant building upon expiration of 
the permit. 
16-8B-12. [Appeals.] Anv person aggrieved bv a decision of the Building Official 
pursuant to the provisions of this Article, may appeal the decision in accordance with the appeal 
procedures provided in Section 16-8A-12 of this Chapter. 
16-8B-13. [Building Permits and Inspections Required.] Whenever a property owner, 
agent of the owner, manager or tenant intends to clean, repair, renovate, reopen or reoccupv a 
building that is registered as a vacant building, the building is to be inspected and a permit must 
be issued bv Building Official prior to the building owner, agent, manager, or tenant initiating anv 
of the above actions. Anv person conducting anv work on a building that is registered as a 
vacant building must have a copy of the permit on the site at all times. Anv person conducting 
work without a permit on the site, will be evicted from the premises. 
16-8B-14. [Enforcement of Other Laws or Notice and Orders.] 
A. This Article shall not be construed to prevent the enforcement of other laws, 
codes, ordinances, and regulations which prescribe standards other than are provided herein. 
and in the event of conflict, the most restrictive provision shall apply. 
B. Registration of a vacant building shall not stay enforcement of anv existing notice 
and order reouirino repair or demolition of the building: or prevent issuance of subsequent or 
supplemental notice and orders, requiring the securing, repair or demolition of the building in 
accordance with the provisions and standards of this Chapter. 
16-8B-15. [Distribution of Vacant Building Registry.] The Building Official shall provide 
a registry of vacant buildings to the police department, the fire department, and to other officials 
in the Citv who may provide services to owners of vacant buildings. 
SECTION 9. Subsection amended. Subsection A of Section 16-8C-1 of the Ogden 
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows; 
A. [Account Of Expense And Filing Of Reports; Contents.] The Building Official 
shall keep an itemized account of expenses incurred by the City in the performance of 
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abatement [by] work authorized [by an ordor of the Mayor undor this Chapter or boarding undor 
Soction 16 8B 1] under the provisions of this Chapter. Within ten (10) days of the completion of 
[the] such abatement work [of demolition or repair as ordered by tho Mayor, or tho boarding 
undor Section 16 8B 1 of this Chapter], the Building Official shall prepare and file with the City 
Treasurer a report specifying the work done, the itemized and total cost of the work to be 
reimbursed, a description of the real property upon which the building or structure is or was 
located, and the name and addresses of the property owner joined as a party in the abatement 
proceeding or otherwise entitled to notice pursuant to this Chapter. 
SECTION 10. Section amended. Section 16-8D-1 of the Ogden Municipal Code is 
hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
A. [Nuisances.] It shall be unlawful for any owner or occupant of any lot, tract or 
parcel of land to cause or permit any nuisance as defined in Section 16-8A-6 of this Chapter to 
be created or remain, upon such premises; and it shall be the duty of such owner or occupant to 
abate and remove any such nuisance from such premises. 
B. [Buildings In Violation.] It shall be unlawful for any person to erect, construct, 
enlarge, alter, repair, move, improve, remove, convert or demolish, equip, use, occupy or 
maintain any building or structure or cause or permit the same to be done in violation of this 
ChapterfGedel. 
C. [Unlawful Entry.] No person shall remain in or enter any building which has 
been posted pursuant to Section 16-8A-11 of this Chapter or subsection 16-8A-14B of this 
Chapter, except that entry may be made to repair, demolish or remove such building under 
permit. No person shall remove or deface any such notice after it is posted until the required 
repairs, demolition or removal have been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued 
pursuant to the provisions of the Building Code, if applicable. 
D. [Refusal To Comply.] It shall be unlawful for any person to fail, neglect or refuse 
to obey any order made pursuant to this Chapter. 
E. [Interference With Authorized Representative.] No person shall obstruct, 
impede or interfere with any officer, employee, contractor or authorized representative of the 
City or with any person who owns or holds any estate or interest in any building which has been 
ordered repaired, vacated or demolished under the provisions of this Chapter, whenever such 
officer, employee, contractor or authorized representative of the City or person having an 
interest or estate in such building or structure is engaged in the work of securing, repairing, 
vacating [and repairing,] or demolishing any such building, pursuant to the provisions of this 
Chapter, or in performing any necessary act preliminary to or incidental to such work or 
authorized or directed pursuant to this Chapter. 
jR [Non-compliance With Vacant Building Requirements.] It shall be unlawful for 
an owner of a vacant building to fail to: 
1. Register or reregister such building in accordance with the requirements 
of Article B of this Chapter. 
2. Comply with the approved vacant building plan for such building, in 
accordance with the requirements of Article B of this Chapter, or 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Maintain such building in accordance with the standards imposed under 
Section 16-8B-9. 
SECTION 13. Subsection amended. Subsection 16-12-3.C.2 of the Ogden 
Municipal Code is hereby amended to read and provide as follows: 
2. Ogden City Code For Abatement Of 
Dangerous Buildings (Chapter 8 of this 
Title): 
Causing or permitting any 
dangerous building nuisance to be 
created or remain, or failure to 
abate such nuisance as provided 
under subsection 16-8D-1A of 
this Title 
Failure to register or reregister a vacant building 
in accordance with the requirements of Article B. 
Chapter 8 of this Title fFailuro to obtain a oormit 
for o boordod building, undor Section 16 8B 2 
of thioTitlo] 
Failure to comply with an approved vacant building 25.00 [50.00] 100.00 
plan in accordance with the reouirements of Article 
B. Chapter 8 of this Title [proporlv socuro a boordod 
building under Soction 16 8B 5 of this 
Title]. 
Failure to maintain a [boarded] vacant 25.00 [50.00] 100.00 
building [undor] in accordance with the 
reouirements of Section 16-8B-[§]9 of this Title 
SECTION 14. Effective date. This ordinance shall become effective immediately 
upon publication after final passage. 
PASSED, ADOPTED AND ORDERED PUBLISHED by the Council of Ogden 
City, Utah, this 4 th day of December , 200.1.. 
£% 
25.00 100.00 
25.00 [§0£Q] 100.00 
-Acl 
John W. 
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ATTEST: 
Jjl J2±L 
City Recorder 
qAA&tt 
TRANSMITTED TO THE MAYOR ON: /cS/co/oi 
MAYOR'S ACTION: / ^ A P P R O V E D _VETOED 
"I 
atthew R. Godfrey,\}flayor 
ATTEST: 
7 
Jbna Berrett/Cifv RernrHor Glori  f City co de  
PUBLICATION DATE: 1 */*/<>< 
EFFECTIVE DATE: Jd*J$/o/ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
LEGAV 'DATE 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT B 
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Agenda and Minutes: Detail 
Ogden City Council 
Tuesday, December 4, 2001 
Council Chambers - Third Floor 
Municipal Building, 2549 Washington Boulevard 
December 4, 2001 - 5:00 p.m. 
City Council Chambers - Third Floor Municipal Building, 
2549 Washington Blvd. 
1. Roll call. 
2. Pledge of Allegiance. 
3. Moment of silence. 
4. Introduction of guests. 
5. Request to be on the Agenda 
a. Shelleice Stokes, Top of Utah Committee - presentation of Olympic flag and banners 
6. Reports from the Planning Commission 
a. Consideration of Proposed Ordinance #2001-69 amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden 
Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden City Code for the abatement of 
dangerous buildings, and, in particularly, repealing Article B, concerning temporary boarding of 
buildings and temporary boarding permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration 
of vacant buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan, adopting 
standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing additional fees for re-registration 
when there the owner does not comply with the plan and for each month that a vacant building is 
boarded; by revising Subsection 16-12-3 regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to 
reflect the changes in the regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and increasing 
the civil penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations. (Adopt/not adopt ordinance - roll 
call vote) 
7. New Business 
a. Fleet Division Management Audit Contract (Approve/not approve contract- voice vote) 
8. Administration Reports 
a. Proposed Resolution #2001-34 considering an amendment to the Annual Action Plan: 
(Adopt/not adopt resolution - roll call vote) 
9. Comments 
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a. Administration 
b. Councilmembers 
c. Council Staff 
10. Public Comments: This is an opportunity to address the Council regarding your concerns or 
ideas. Please limit your comments to three minutes. In this form of government, all City personnel 
are the responsibility of the Administration, not of the Council. Please discuss any concerns you 
may have regarding staff with the Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer, or Department Directors. 
11. Adjournment 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, persons needing auxiliary communicative 
aids and services for these meetings should call Wayne Parker at 629-8701, giving him at least 
48 hours advance notice. Hearing impaired individuals may call the TDD# 629-8949. 
CERTIFICATE OF POSTING 
The undersigned, duly appointed City Recorder, does hereby certify that the above notice and 
agenda was posted in three public places within the Ogden City Limits on this 30th day of 
November, 2001. These public places being: 1) City Recorder's Office on the 2nd floor of the 
Municipal Building; 2) 2nd floor foyer of the Municipal Building; and 3) the Weber County Library. 
GLORIA J. BERRETT, 
MMC OGDEN CITY RECORDER 
Visit the Ogden City Web Site ©www.ogdencity.com 
Ogden City Council Information Hot Line - 629-8159 
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Community and Economic Development 
Building Services Division 
January 9,2002 
Westland Development L.L.C. 
2962 N. 725 W. 
Layton,Ut 84041 
•p 
RE: 205 25th St. 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Recently the Ogden City Council adopted a new ordinance regulating vacant buildings. The main purpose of 
the new ordinance is to prevent vacant buildings from becoming a public nuisance or a dangerous building 
due to neglect The ordinance requires the owner of a vacant building to register as a vacant building and to 
submit a vacant building plan for die approval of the City. The ordinance also imposes minimum 
maintenance standards applicable to all vacant buildings whether registered or unregistered. 
As the building official of Ogden City, I have determined that the building, located at 205 25th St is a vacant 
building subject to the requirements of the ordinance. As the owner of that building you are required to 
register the building within ten days of this notification, and otherwise begin to comply with the 
requirements of the ordinance. A copy of the ordinance is attached for your information. 
Initial registration will require the submission of a vacant building plan, meeting the requirements of Section 
16-8B-5, and a registration fee in the amount of $100.00, along all other information required in the 
ordinance (See Section 16-8B-4). You should be aware that additional fees will be applicable to vacant 
buildings that remain "boarded." Re-registration of the building is required every six months and fees will 
be determined based upon compliance with the vacant building plan and whether the building continues to be 
boarded. 
You should also be aware that we have identified the following violations) of the maintenance standards, 
which should be corrected immediately: 
1. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a 
manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-
9J of the Ogden Municipal Code. 
2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed 
in the windows of the building, in violation of section 16-8B-9J. 
Failure to correct the above violations within the required time period may result in the City correcting 
the violations and imposing a tax lien against the property to recover its costs. Failure to comply is also 
a Class B misdemeanor and may result in the imposition of civil and/or criminal penalties. 
Offden 
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My staff and I are eager to assist you with the registration process and in preparing the vacant building plan. 
We are also available to discuss any questions you may have about the maintenance standards and the other 
requirements of the ordinance. 
Sincerely, 
Wayne Glover, CBO 
Manager, Building Services 
2549 Washington Boulevard Suite 240 
Ogden, Utah 84401-3102 
Phone: 801 629-8950 
Fax: 801 629-8902 
Email: wayneglover@ei. ogden. ut. us 
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January 15,2002 
Ogden City 
2549 Washington Blvd., Suite 240 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dear Mr. Glover 
I received your letter of January 9,2002 on January 13,2002. Please be informed 
that the ordinance regulating vacant buildings is defective. 
The "unlawful signs" under said ordinance are protected under the First 
Amendment: of the United States Constitution. "Congress shall make no law...abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances". Said signs under the First 
Amendment do not constitute a public nuisance. Ogden City is not above the 
Constitution even though there are many within the Ogden City Administration that 
believes they are. 
If for any reason, any party enters any property, I will seek criminal recourse with 
the appropriate Federal Agency and will file civil action for violating my Civil and 
Constitutional Rights against each and every party for each occurance. 
Bruce Edwards 
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OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
's. 
EDWARDS 
Defendant. 
BRUCE 
INFORMATION 
CRIMINAL NO. C&\%01?& 
U.B.I NO. 
DOB: 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED 
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st , t h r u . . l 2 t h , 2002 , A T 
»05 25TH S T 
WTHIN T H E CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE 
DFFENSE OF: 
COUNTS OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS: 
. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility 
ito the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B 
Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in 
olation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B 
:nesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based; 
icer(s) G L O V E R 
PRESENTED AND FIUED THIS: 
Wednesday, January 23,2002 
MAGISTRATE 
CLERK 
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-MO i mo i U U U R i . o i A i t t u I A M , VVLbbK COUNTY, Ov JEN DEPARTMENT 
OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
EDWARDS 
Defendant 
.BRUCE 
A M E N D E D 
INFORMATION 
CRIMINAL NO. flj/tf£03/^5 
U.B.I NO. 
DOB: 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED 
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT 
205 25th St. 
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF: 
4 COUNTS OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS: 
1. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility 
into the interior of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B 
2. Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in 
violation of Section 16.8B-9. J OMC Class B 
3. Failure to register and provide a vacant building plan in violaiton of OMC Chapter 8 Section 16-8B-3 Class B 
4. Failure to maintin vacant building in accordance with the Vacant Building Maintenance Standards OMC Chapter 8, Section 16-
8B-9.J Class B 
Witnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based; 
Officer(s) G L O V E R 
PRESENTET^ND FILED THIS: 
Tuesda}, March 05, 2002 
MAGISTRATE 
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OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
. - — * * i i \ I I V I L . I 1 I 
Page 1 of 2 
A M E N D E D 
INFORMATION 
EDWARDS 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
.BRUCE 
i, CRIMINAL NO. 021900315 
l< J 
U.B.I NO. 
• ^ j ' -wo-BCGu'f i r 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED 
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT 
205 25th St . 
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF: 
OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS 
I. The windows and glass exterior doors on the building are painted or otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into 
tie interior of the building in violations of Section 16-8B-10.J OMC Infraction 
I Unlawful signs visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows of the building, in 
n'olation of Section 16.8B.10.G OMC Infraction 
tnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based; 
Rcer(s) GLOVER 
by Ogden City Prosecutor 
PRESENTED AND FILED THIS: 
Wednesday, October 02, 2002 
%
 MAGISTRATE ^A 
CLERK 
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OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
EDWARDS 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
.BRUCE 
Page 2 of 2 
A M E N D E D 
INFORMATION 
CRIMINAL NO. 021900315 
U.B.I NO. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS REASON TO BELIEVE AND STATES UNDER OATH THAT THE ABOVE NAMED 
DEFENDANT, ON OR ABOUT January 1st thru 12th, 2002 , AT 
205 25th St. 
WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF: 
OGDEN CITY ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS 
1. Failure to register a vacant building in violation of OMC Chapter 8 Section 16.8B-3 Infraction 
"..(*• 
2. Failure to provide vacant building plans in violation of OMC Chapter 8, Section 16.8B-5 Infraction 
, fir a > 
/( 4,' 
Witnesses on whose evidence this INFORMATION is based; 
Officer(s) Glover 
Authorized for filing by Ogden City Prosecutor 
PRESENTED AND FILED THIS: 
Wednesday, October 02, 2002 
MAGISTRATE I 
CLERK 
A -I n 
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Ogden City 
Heart of the Golden Spike Empire 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Inspection Division 
2549 Washington Blvd., 1st Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 Phone 629-8950 Fax 629-8924 
BUILDING & ZONING COMPLIANCE 
INSPECTION REPORT 
ASSIGNED INSPECTOR. r^ikrh, 
PROPERTY USE 
>^: Commercial 
LJ Residential 
U Garage/Carport 
LJ Addition/Remodel 
• Vacant/Board 
INSPECTION CATEGORY 
O Building 
Q ' Plumbing 
LJ Mechanical 
U Electrical 
U Demolition Moving 
D Zoning 
D Sign 
D Housing (existing) 
Q Business License 
U Rental Licensing 
G Manufactured Homes 
D Boarding 
D Consultation 
Other y ^ C x 
INSPECTION LEVEL 
D Footings 
Q Foundation 
Underground 
D Sewer & Water 
D Rough 
D Roof Deck 
D Roof Covering 
LJ Frame 
D Drywall 
• Firewall 
Q Power to Panel 
1
 i Insulation 
U Suspended Ceiling 
LJ Bond Beam 
LJ Ex. Sheathing 
! I Progress 
! Final 
JOB ADDRESS 
CONTRACTOR OWNER 
BUSINESS/PROJECT _ 
^21 ^ 5 ^ Sr L k: d Jll PERMIT N RMITNOATS-M-OOOtft 
APPT. TIME 
INT 
REASON FOR INSPECTION: __ Called L i Routine __ Complaint Phone. 
ARRIVAL TIME: 
COMMENTS: 
Llzl . PERSON CONTACTED: 
*? 
hJ'i 
^ijM /N WIEm2 
p/i^p/weo \^ih^h-
Exhibit i l 
Date Freceived 
REPORT LEFT 
INSPECTOR 
mjM^L 
WORK 
APPROVED 
Work passes - authorized to proceed 
Prior violations corrected 
Items listed in comments will be reinspected at the next regular inspection 
UNABLE TO 
MAKE 1NSP. 
Cannot locate property 
Work not ready 
Approved plans not available as required 
Building locked 
Reinspection fee 
No person on site 
Make necessary corrections 
Prior violations uncorrected 
'Work must be completed with a call for inspection 
STOP WORK 
Investigative fee 
OUR BUSINESS IS PUBLIC SERVICE 
For assistance call: 
Building or Zoning 629-8950 Planning 
Neighborhood Development 629-8940 Engineering 
Animal Services 629-8244 Health 
Streets or Garbage Collection 629-8271 Oaden Fire Deoartmont 
,.629-8930 
,629-8980 
.399-8381 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
OGDEN CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, 
BRUCE EDWARDS, an individual, 
and WESLAND DEVELOPMENT 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company, ] 
Defendants and ] 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, ] 
v. J 
OGDEN CITY and MATTHEW ) 
GODFREY, Mayor of Ogden City, ) 
Counterclaim Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. 020900777 PR 
1 Honorable Parley R. Baldwin 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, Ogden City ("Ogden"), initiated this action against 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Bruce Edwards and Wesland Development LLC 
("Edwards"), the owners of vacant buildings located on 25th Street in Ogden. Ogden Municipal 
Code § 16-8B-10(G) (2003) bans the owner of a vacant building in Ogden from displaying any 
sign at that vacant property. Ogden seeks a preliminary injunction against Edwards, who at 
various times since the adoption of the ordinance, has used his property to display signs that 
criticized Ogden City government. Edwards claims that the ordinance violates the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he seeks summary judgment declaring the 
ordinance unconstitutional on its face and enjoining its enforcement. Because the ordinance is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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over-broad and content-based and fails as a time-place-manner restriction, the Court grants i 
Edwards summary judgment. 
I. THE ORDINANCE. 
In December 2001, the Ogden City Council passed Ordinance 2001-69, 12-4-2001, to 
address the increasing menace of vacant buildings, which the ordinance says can become 
attractive nuisances, fire hazards, health hazards, places of retreat for criminal or immoral 
purposes and a visual blight, detracting from the aesthetics of the city and the surrounding 
properties.1 The ordinance defines a vacant building as a building that is "(A) Empty; (B) Not 
occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or (C) Not used by a person on a regular basis for the 
usual and customary purposes for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted." § 16-8A-
3. It requires the owner of a vacant building to register the building, § 16-8B-4, file a plan to 
maintain or repair the building, § 16-8B-5, and keep the building secured, § 16-8B-10(B), and its 
windows not obscured, § 16-8B-10(J). 
The ordinance also requires the owner to remove all signs relating to former occupants of 
the building and to keep the premises free of "all interior or exterior signs, displays, or graffiti 
visible from adjacent public streets, sidewalk or adjacent properties," except property signs, 
street address signs, historical signs, and off-premises signs. §16-8B-10(G). 
The Municipal Code defines "property signs" as: 
A sign related to the property upon which it is located and offering such property 
for sale or lease, or announcing the destruction, construction or remodeling of a 
building, or announcing the enterprise to be allocated in a building under 
construction, or announcing the name and address of the architect, contractor, or 
Although Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff elsewhere alleges that Ogden had additional, 
improper motives in adopting the ordinance, the parties have stipulated to limit this challenge to 
the ordinance on its face, and the Court will consider the ordinance in light of its stated aims. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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other professional involved in the design or construction of the building, or the 
owner thereof. 
OGDEN MUN. CODE § 18-1-3. 
For a historical sign to qualify for the exemption, the building on which it is located must 
be designated as a historic resource or located in the city's historic district, and it must 
significantly contribute to the historic character of the historic building or district, as the Ogden 
City landmarks commission determines. § 16-8B-10(G)(3). 
The Municipal Code defines "off-premises sign" as a sign "which directs attention to a 
use, products, commodity or service not related to the premises on which [the sign] is located." 
§ 18-1-3. Effective August 20, 2001, Ogden banned new off-premises signs, although it allowed 
the continued use, maintenance, and restoration of then-existing off-premises signs. § 18-3-27. 
In 2002, Ogden amended the ordinance to allow the building official to either grant 
further exceptions for window dressings in vacant buildings that are part of temporary film sets 
for filming purposes, or to deny applications for such exceptions if the window dressings are, in 
the building official's discretion, inconsistent with the purposes and intent of the ordinance's 
vacant buildings article. 
II. FACIAL CHALLENGE BASED ON OVERBREADTH 
The parties have stipulated for the purposes of summary judgment that Edwards 
challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face. Ogden contends that much of 
Edwards' argument is inapplicable and that, in order "[t]o prevail on a facial challenge brought 
on overbreadth grounds, 'the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the [challenged legislation] would be valid.'" Countercl. Def.'s Resp. Countercl. PL's 
Supplemental Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 7-8 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Salerno speaks not of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge but rather 
of a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(e), a portion of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984.2 
However, Faustin v. Citv and County of Denver. 268 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2002), which 
Ogden cited in accord with Salerno, sets forth a different standard for a facial challenge based on 
overbreadth grounds: 
To prevail on a facial attack, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged 
law either could never be applied in a valid manner or, even though it may be 
validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it may 
inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. There must be a 
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized 
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially 
challenged on overbreadth grounds. 
Id. at 948 (emphasis added)(internal quotes and citations omitted). 
Thus, in this facial overbreadth challenge, the Court examines Ogden's ordinance to 
determine whether there is a realistic danger that the ordinance itself will significantly 
compromise First Amendment protections either of Edwards or of parties not before the Court, 
without examining the actual application of the ordinance to Edwards. 
III. TIME-PLACE-MANNER RESTRICTION 
2The quoted material along with the two sentences following it clarify that Salerno has no 
applicability: 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail 
Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not 
recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First 
Amendment. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Ogden's invocation of Salerno in the First Amendment context misstates the law. 
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Ogden contends that the ordinance is justifiable as a time-place-manner restriction. For 
such a restriction to meet constitutional muster, it must be content-neutral and narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant government interest while leaving open adequate alternative means of 
communication. Edwards argues that the Ogden ordinance is content-based and overbroad, does 
not advance the City's stated interest, and almost entirely forecloses a medium of speech. The 
Court analyzes each of those arguments in turn. 
A. Content-Neutrality 
Clearly, a content-neutral ordinance may not discriminate against speech because of the 
viewpoint of the speaker. However, the parties dispute the extent to which an ordinance may 
examine content in order to classify speech. 
Edwards argues that where it is necessary to examine the specific content of speech in 
order to determine whether that speech violates a regulation, that regulation is content-based. 
Ogden argues that, where an ordinance makes only a viewpoint-neutral precursory examination 
of sign content in order to classify speech into one of several regulatory categories, that 
ordinance is content-neutral. 
A governmental restriction of speech may violate the Constitution either by prohibiting 
too much protected speech, see City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994), or by prohibiting 
too little speech, see id., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. 453 U.S. 490, 512-17 (1981).3 
3The notion that an ordinance may impermissibly ban too little speech is somewhat 
misleading. "[W]e do not imply that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not abridge 
enough speech." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. More accurately, such an ordinance carries 
too great a risk of governmental discrimination. Justice Stevens explained: 
While surprising at first glance, the notion that a regulation of speech may be 
underinclusive is firmly grounded in basic First Amendment principles. Thus, an 
exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a 
governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Edwards argues that the distinctions between the categories of signs that are permitted or banned 
are specious and that, therefore, the ordinance's exceptions make it unconstitutional. Ogden 
argues that, under the holdings of Metromedia, Wheeler v. Comm'r of Hwvs. 822 F.2d 586 (6th 
i 
Cir. 1987). cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988), and Rappa v. New Castle County. 18 F.3d 1043 
(3d Cir. 1994), the exceptions are all based on a permissible distinction between messages with 
on-premises significance and messages with off-premises significance. 
Rappa and a line of cases following it, including Wheeler and Messer v. City of 
Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1992), stand for the proposition that ordinances allowing 
on-site signs but not similar off-site signs regulate signs "not based on the viewpoint of the 
speaker, but based on the location of the signs." Messer, 975 F.2d at 1509. Such ordinances may 
in fact be viewpoint-neutral. However, where an ordinance treats two signs at the same location 
differently solely because their messages are different, the ordinance is neither based on the 
location of the signs nor content-neutral. 
"An ordinance is content-based if it 'prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the 
basis of the subjects the speech addresses,' that is, where the municipal officer must examine the 
content of the speech to determine the applicability of the ordinance." Savago v. Village of New 
Paltz. 214 F. Supp. 2d 252, 257 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 
377, 381 (1992) (holding St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance unconstitutional on its face) 
and citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 (invalidating as content-based an ordinance prohibiting 
in expressing its views to the people. Alternatively, through the combined 
operation of a general speech restriction and its exemptions, the government 
might seek to select the permissible subjects for public debate and thereby to 
control the search for public truth. 
T,adue. 512 U.S. at 51 (internal quotes, citations and notes omitted). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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noncommercial signs except for certain classes of signs)). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) ("The First Amendment's hostility to content-
based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition 
of public discussion of an entire topic."); Whitton v. City of Gladstone. 54 F.3d 1400, 1403-04 
(8th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has held that a restriction on speech is content-based when 
the message conveyed determines whether the speech is subject to the restriction."); Nat'l Advert. 
Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F. 2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1990) (exceptions for political signs, inter 
alia, were content-based; Sugarman v. Village of Chester, 192 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302 (S.D.N. Y. 
2002) ("The First Amendment proscribes municipal favoritism of one form of speech over 
another...."); Outdoor Svs.. Inc. v. City of Merriam, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1258,1264 (D.Kan. 1999) 
(Where determining whether a sign was banned by an ordinance required consideration of the 
message that the sign carried, the ordinance was content-based.). 
Although the Supreme Court has never followed the Third Circuit's decision in Rappa, 
and neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Utah Supreme Court has adopted Rappa, the present Court 
still would be free to apply Rappa's reasoning were it persuasive. However, the Court believes 
that Savago more accurately interprets Metromedia and is both better reasoned than the Rappa 
cases and more closely analogous to the present case. Therefore, because Savago correctly 
follows Metromedia, it provides a proper analysis of whether Ogden's ordinance is content-
based. 
The determination of whether Ogden's ordinance is content-neutral focuses on the 
exceptions to the ordinance's otherwise complete ban on all signs on vacant buildings. If the 
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ordinance banned all signs, without exception, it would be content-neutral. However, Ogden 
chose instead to allow some signs and ban others based solely upon their content. 
The Court holds that, because the ordinance requires an official to examine the content of 
signs to determine whether they fit under an exception to the ordinance, it is content-based. 
B. Serving a Significant Government Interest 
In order for a time-place-manner restriction to be upheld, the government must show that 
the regulation serves a significant governmental interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 
U.S. 781,791(1989). 
Here, Ogden claims that its ordinance is intended "to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare . . . to remedy any public nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and 
consequent adverse impact on the value of nearby property, and to establish minimum 
maintenance standards for vacant buildings." § 16-8B-2. The ordinance further states, "[I]t is the 
specific purpose and intent of this article:... D. To improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant 
buildings, in order to protect surrounding properties." Id 
Aesthetics alone has never been determined to be a compelling government interest 
sufficient to justify a content-based ordinance. However, aesthetics would be a sufficiently 
substantial interest to support a content-neutral time-place-manner regulation. See Members of 
the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806-807 (1984) (holding that 
aesthetics justified time-place-manner restriction). Moreover, Ogden does not offer aesthetics 
alone to justify the ordinance, but also the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, which 
are certainly significant government interests, and even rise to the level of compelling interests. 
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However, it is not enough that the interest be sufficiently significant, but the ordinance 
must also serve that interest. Otherwise, any onerous regulation might be justified by citing the 
most vital government interest, whether or not the regulation actually related to achieving that 
interest. Here, a regulation banning signs is reasonably related to achieving the City's aesthetic 
interest but may be only marginally related to public health, safety, and welfare. For example, 
Ogden argues that vacant buildings pose health and fire hazards and are attractive nuisances, 
either by deterioration or by serving as a place of retreat for criminal or immoral purposes. It is 
unclear how the absence of a sign could lessen any of these hazards. On the contrary, to the 
extent that a vacant building poses an easy target for illegal entry, a "space available" or "for 
sale" sign (allowable under the ordinance) likely would attract more potential lawbreakers than 
would a "protected by ABC Security" sign or one bearing a political message (both forbidden 
under the ordinance). 
To serve a significant government interest, an ordinance need not take every possible step 
toward accomplishing that interest, so long as there is a direct relationship between the steps that 
the ordinance does take and the end it intends to accomplish. The fact that the ordinance does not 
take other steps does not make the ordinance illegitimately underinclusive. However, the steps 
that the ordinance does take must be directly related to that interest. Thus, the signs that Ogden 
does ban must tend to bring Ogden closer to achieving the stated goals of the ordinance. 
The Court finds that the sign ordinance does serve significant government aesthetic 
interests, but it is not reasonably related to the interests of public health, safety, and welfare, not 
withstanding §16-8B-2's vague assertions to the contrary. 
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Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Metromedia, aesthetic judgments are i 
necessarily subjective and defy objective evaluation, 453 U.S. at 510, and, where made in the 
discretion of the government, may conceal discrimination. With this principle in mind, this Court 
carefully considers the exceptions to the ordinance. 
Under Metromedia and the cases following it, in order for an exception to be legitimate, 
the exception must further an interest that is at least as great as the governmental interest that the 
regulation furthers. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047 ("Such exceptions must also be substantially 
related to advancing an important state interest that is at least as important as the overall goal 
advanced by the underlying regulation, be no broader than necessary to advance the special 
interest, and be narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible on the overall goal."); 
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (allowing San Diego to conclude that a commercial enterprise had a 
stronger interest in identifying its place of business and the products or services available there 
than the city had in traffic safety and aesthetics). See also Outdoor Svs., 67 F. Supp.2d at 1267-
1268 (M[I]f a commercial message overrides the city's aesthetics and safety interests, any message 
that is at least as important in the First Amendment hierarchy also must override those interests.") 
(quoting Ackerley Communications of Mass.. Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 517 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (holding the city, because it made exceptions for commercial signs "could not decide 
that its aesthetic and safety interests were outweighed by the need to express commercial 
messages but not by the need to express noncommercial messages" because "noncommercial 
speech is entitled to a higher degree of protection than commercial speech.")). 
Before weighing the interests of the exceptions against the interest of the regulation and 
the speech it affects, the Court notes that some First Amendment interests weigh more strongly 
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than others. Generally, noncommercial speech outweighs commercial speech, see Metromedia 
453 U.S. at 513, a speaker has a weightier right to speak on the speaker's own property than he 
does on public property or the property of another, see Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58, and a commercial 
business has a greater interest in on-premises speech promoting itself than in a sign promoting an 
off-premises entity, see Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Further, a person has a greater interest in 
speech at his residence than at his vacant commercial building, and more there than on his free-
standing billboard in a field adjacent to a highway. 
The Supreme Court consistently has held that noncommercial speech deserves a greater 
degree of First Amendment protection than does commercial speech. See id., 453 U.S. at 513. In 
fact, prior to 1975, purely commercial advertisements were outside the protection of the First 
Amendment. See id. at 505. Although the Supreme Court now recognizes the need for greater 
protection of commercial speech, see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) 
(holding that a court must still weigh the First Amendment implications of a regulation, even 
though the regulated speech was categorized as "commercial"); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Citizens Consumer Council 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not 
"wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment"); Linmark Associates v. Township of 
Willingoboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) ("[T]he societal interest in the free flow of commercial 
information is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the commercial information here 
is realty" instead of abortions or drugs); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 419 (1993) ("In our view, the city's argument attaches more importance to the distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously 
underestimates the value of commercial speech."), there is still a difference in the greater 
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protection given to noncommercial speech and the lesser protection given to commercial speech, 
see Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 426 (holding that the interest in preventing commercial harms is a 
typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than 
noncommercial speech). 
While the distinction between the protection of commercial speech and that of 
noncommercial speech is not as great as it once was, the trend has been to afford more protection 
to commercial speech rather than lessening the protection afforded noncommercial speech. In the 
face of this trend, the Metromedia court warned against allowing the narrowing distinction to 
diminish the protection of noncommercial speech: 
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of 
the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. 
Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have 
afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with 
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing 
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial 
expression. 
453 U.S. at 506 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
Now that courts are recognizing the societal interest in the free flow of commercial 
information, courts must also zealously preserve the time-proven societal interest in the free flow 
of ideas. Particularly in today's world, where purveyors of commercial speech likely will have 
greater resources and abilities to protect their rights than will the advocate of an unpopular 
noncommercial message, Courts have good reason to ensure that noncommercial speech receives 
at least as much First Amendment protection as does commercial speech. 
1. Property Signs 
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The exception for property signs under the ordinance is vulnerable to challenge because it 
has the effect of allowing on-site commercial speech where noncommercial speech of the same 
type is prohibited. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 ("[TJhe city may not conclude that the 
communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a 
particular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages."). 
Ogden argues that, in fact, the ordinance does not prohibit on-site noncommercial speech 
because the ordinance covers only vacant buildings, and, by definition, there is no on-site activity 
at the premises of a vacant building. However, the ordinance's broad definition of "vacant" would 
cover a building where noncommercial activities, for example, perhaps religious or political 
gatherings, may be held sporadically but not regularly. Under those circumstances, the ordinance 
would ban signs pertaining to those activities. Thus, even under Rappa, the Ogden ordinance 
impermissibly would prefer on-site commercial speech over on-site noncommercial speech. 
Further, the Eleventh Circuit, developing Rappa's line of reasoning, has held that "all 
noncommercial speech is on-site. A sign bearing a noncommercial message is on-site wherever 
the speaker places it." Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow. 112 F.3d 1114 
(1 lth Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 820 (1998). 
Moreover, the Metromedia plurality struck down the billboard regulation in that case not 
merely because it preferred on-site commercial speech over similarly on-site noncommercial 
speech, but rather because it preferred on-site commercial speech over noncommercial speech of 
any type. 453 U.S. at 513. 
By exempting property signs, Ogden City must have concluded that its interests in 
aesthetics and public health, safety, and welfare were not important enough to justify banning all 
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commercial speech in the form of property signs. In light of such a conclusion, Ogden cannot i 
conclude that those same interests justify banning all noncommercial speech where they are not 
strong enough to ban all commercial speech; if some commercial speech is too important to ban, 
then noncommercial speech is too important to ban. 
2. Address Signs 
In exempting address signs from the ban, Ogden implicitly concluded that address signs 
are more important than the both the government interest furthered by the ordinance and the 
speech foreclosed by the ban. Considering the obvious importance of address signs, the Court 
concludes that this exception is reasonable. 
3. Historical Signs 
In accordance with the principle, advanced by Rappa, that signs bearing messages 
relating to the property where the sign is located enjoy greater First Amendment protection than 
both (1) signs bearing the same messages located elsewhere, and (2) signs located on the same 
property bearing messages that are not related to that property. The city has allowed exceptions 
for signs on the premises of a building that is located within the historic district or that is 
designated a historic resource, so long as the sign relates to that location and is determined by the 
Ogden City landmarks commission to significantly contribute to the historic character of the 
building or the historic district. §16-8B-10(G)(3). 
In exempting approved historical signs from the ban, Ogden again implicitly concluded 
that the content of those signs was more important than both the aesthetic interests that the 
ordinance serves and the noncommercial speech that the ordinance banned. 
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The fact that historical signs are meaningless and have no value away from the premises 
to which they refer tends to support Ogden's decision. The ordinance values city-approved 
historical signs, at those locations at least, more highly than all other forms of speech. In light of 
the absence of objective guidance to cabin the discretion of the Ogden City landmarks 
commission in approving the signs and the subjective aesthetic interests that the ordinance 
serves, Ogden's preference for approved signs is highly suspect. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Ladue, "An exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a 
governmental 'attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing 
its views to the people.'" 512 U.S. at 51 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 
765,785-86(1978)). 
The only criteria in the ordinance for the landmarks commission to consider is, whether 
in the committee's own judgment, the sign is "significantly contributing to the historic character" 
of the building or district. §16-8B-10(G)(3)(b). Ogden has not shown that the landmark 
committee's discretion is restricted by any applicable standard. See Acorn v. City of Tulsa, 835 
F.2d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 1987) (Holding that municipal Park Board's own intuitive judgment, 
"however well exercised, is an insufficient standard to be applied in determining the 
permissibility of first amendment activities."); Outdoor Svs., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 (striking 
down ordinance similar to Ogden's where it gave municipal committee discretion to approve or 
deny a sign permit application). 
Further, such exemptions may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for 
restricting speech in the first place. See Ladue, 512 U.S. at 52. In other words, the government's 
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justification for the ban certainly can be no stronger than the weakest interest to which the 
government grants an exemption. 
Because the ordinance gives the city officials too much discretion in excepting historical 
signs, and because the ordinance impermissibly favors city-approved messages over all other 
forms of speech on private property, the historical sign exception is unconstitutional. 
4. Grandfathered Off-Premises Signs 
The Ogden ordinance allows exempts off-premises signs that legally existed on August 
20, 2001. §§16-8B-10(G)(2)(d) and 18-3-27(A). Ogden claims that the ordinance required this 
exemption in order to comply with state law, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-408, to avoid a taking 
under eminent domain, which could subject the city to costly and time-consuming litigation. The 
text of the key subsection of that law reads: "(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company 
from maintaining, repairing, or restoring a billboard structure . . . the municipality's actions 
constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent domain M §10-9-408(3) (emphasis added). 
Tailoring municipal action to avoid an eminent domain taking and thus avoiding 
inadvertent, involuntary, and prohibitively costly eminent domain proceedings outweighs 
Ogden's stated aesthetic interest in the ordinance and would justify a narrow exemption to 
comply with state law. However, the exemption goes too far. 
That chapter of state law defines "billboard" as "a freestanding ground sign located on 
industrial, commercial, or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to direct 
attention to a business, product, or service that is not sold, offered, or existing on the property 
where the sign is located.4 
4By defining billboards as "free-standing ground signs" and excluding signs on buildings 
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The Municipal Code defines "off-premises signs" as "A sign which directs attention to a 
use, product, commodity or service not related to the premises on which it is located." OGDEN 
MUN.CODE§ 18-1-3. 
Thus, by exempting off-premises signs in legal existence on August 20, 2001, Ogden 
grandfathers not only free-standing ground signs,5 but all commercial signs with off-site 
messages. The Court finds that this exemption of commercial messages where there is no similar 
exemption for noncommercial messages is unconstitutional. Further, it would be unconstitutional 
even under Rappa because it exempts off-site commercial messages while prohibiting off-site 
noncommercial messages. 
5. Temporary Filming Activities 
Since the filing of this action, Ogden has amended its ordinance to allow temporary signs 
on vacant buildings in the context of window dressings for film sets. While it is reasonable for 
Ogden to conclude that allowing signs to be displayed for filming purposes does not detract from 
the purposes of the ordinance, it is not clear how the signs displayed for filming purposes pose 
less of a threat to the city's aesthetics than the signs that the ordinance prohibits, or what purpose 
this exemption serves that is greater than Ogden's stated aesthetic interest. 
billboards. Such a distinction may favor a holding that a property owner has a greater interest in 
speech on his building than on a billboard. If that is the case, then perhaps some of the principles 
of billboard law cited in this case may not strictly apply. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 ("Each 
method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself and that law must reflect the 'differing 
natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.") (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77, 
97(1949)). 
5The state law might also arguably restrict the statutory eminent domain taking to 
billboard companies rather than individuals or companies other than billboard companies. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-408(3). However, the statute does not define "billboard company," and 
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Ogden's arguments in support of the exemption illustrate the problem with regulations 
that require an examination of a sign's message to determine whether or not the sign violates the 
regulation. Ogden not only would have the Court examine sign content to determine whether a 
sign's message is on-site or off-site, commercial or noncommercial, but also to determine 
whether the sign is fictitious. Ogden argues that, because the film set signs are fictitious, they are 
not communicative under the First Amendment. Further, the fictitious signs convey no message 
until they are published in the resulting production. This specious argument defies reason. 
The Court finds that the exception for film set signs is an impermissible content-based 
discrimination between forms of noncommercial speech. 
C. Narrow Tailoring 
To be narrowly tailored toward serving a significant government interest, an ordinance 
regulating speech need not be the least restrictive means available toward achieving that interest. 
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 ("[Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are 
not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome 
on speech.") (internal quotations omitted). The regulation need only promote a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. See id. at 799. 
However, if a substantial portion of the regulation's burden on speech does not serve to advance 
its goals, that regulation is not narrowly tailored. See id. 
Arguably, Ogden has shown that its stated purpose - improving the aesthetics of vacant 
buildings - would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Now, driving through 
Ogden, one notes that vacant buildings look bare instead of cluttered, although the prevalence of 
"for sale" or "available" signs is striking. 
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The fact that Ogden's ordinance prohibits only signs on vacant buildings, not occupied 
buildings, does not impugn the ordinance in light of the stated purpose of the ordinance - "to 
improve the aesthetic appearance of vacant buildings," OGDEN MUN. CODE §16-8B-2(D) 
(emphasis added), and in light of Title 18 of the Municipal Code, §§ 18-1-1 to 18-5-1, which 
regulates signs on occupied buildings and includes a ban on the construction of new off-premises 
signs after August 20, 2001. Thus, the Municipal Code does not appear to target signs on vacant 
buildings while ignoring signs on occupied buildings. 
However, while the means chosen to regulate speech need not be the least restrictive, if 
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to a restriction on speech, that is 
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between the ends and means is 
reasonable. See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 418 n. 13. 
Significantly, Ogden chose to ban signs outright rather than regulating the size, height, or 
typeface of the sign, or describing a maximum percentage of window space allowable for signs, 
or mandating maintenance or removal of signs that have become deteriorated or faded, as other 
cities have done. Absent a satisfactory reason for an outright ban, such size or format restrictions 
are more appropriate for a time-place-manner restriction. 
Further, Ogden has not justified its complete ban by showing that each activity with in 
the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. The 
sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average American, who, given 
this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect for individual liberty and private 
property, would be surprised to learn that he could not display flags, religious symbols, political 
placards, or even bumper stickers from the windows of his vacant building. 
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Because a substantial portion of the ordinance's burden on speech does not advance its 
goals, the Court holds that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to achieve its legitimate 
purpose. 
D. Ample Alternatives 
Even a content-neutral regulation may be invalid if it does not leave open ample 
alternatives of communication. See Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55 ("Although prohibitions foreclosing 
entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose 
to the freedom of speech is readily apparent - by eliminating a common means of speaking, such 
measures can suppress too much speech.") 
Here, the Ogden ordinance completely forecloses the owner of a vacant building from 
posting signs on his own property. Edwards argues that this will effectively remove such an 
owner from the public debate. A sign on a building is a particularly cheap and expressive form of 
communication. In particular, a sign on a vacant building explaining the owner's opinion of the 
political reasons that the building is vacant could not have the same impact on a reader anywhere 
else. Further, no other medium is as effective as communicating the building owner's message to 
those who live, work, or frequent the immediate vicinity of the vacant building. Handing out 
handbills is not as effective, nor is contacting neighboring merchants or passers by one at a time. 
A building owner cannot control his access to or coverage in a newspaper. Building signs are 
unique in the context of their location, audience, and impact, and a regulation that bans them 
completely denies a building owner an unequaled opportunity to participate in the public debate 
in the neighborhood and city where his building is located. 
IV. SEVERABILITY 
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The remaining issue is whether to strike the content-based exceptions of paragraphs 
(G)(2) and (3), all sign regulations of subsection 10(G), or the entire vacant building ordinance of 
Article 16-8B. 
In determining whether an unconstitutional portion of an ordinance is severable from the 
remainder of the ordinance, Utah's Supreme Court has said that "we look to legislative intent." 
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at f 19. "Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is 
primarily a matter of legislative intentf,] which generally is determined by whether the remaining 
portions of the act can stand alone and serve a legitimate legislative purpose." Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted, alteration in original). The 
Supreme Court has also said, "[T]he test fundamentally is whether the Legislature would have 
passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts are so dependent 
upon each other that the court should conclude the intention was that the statute be effective only 
in its entirety. Frequently the courts are aided in the determination of legislative intent by the 
inclusion within a statute of a 'saving clause.'" Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P.2d 190, 193 
(1949). 
The Municipal Code contains such a "saving," or severability, clause,6 which indicates 
the City Council's intent that any unoffending portions of an unconstitutional ordinance should 
6 
If any section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase of this Code 
is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, invalid or ineffective by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the 
remaining portions of this Code. The City Council hereby declares that it would have 
passed each section, subsection, subdivision, paragraph, sentence, subdivisions, 
paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases thereof irrespective of the fact that any one or 
more sections, subsections, subdivisions, paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases be 
declared unconstitutional, invalid or ineffective. 
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survive. However, to do so, the remaining portions of the enactment must be able to stand alone 
and serve a legitimate legislative purpose. Removal of the exemptions of 16-8B- 10(G)(2) and (3) 
would drastically alter the effect of subsection (G). Without the exceptions, subsection (G) would 
completely ban all signs on vacant buildings and, as shown above, would constitute too great an 
infringement of free speech rights on private property and would not leave open ample 
alternatives of communication. The remaining application of subsection (G) would be overbroad 
and burden more speech than necessary to accomplish the legitimate governmental purpose of 
improving the aesthetics of vacant buildings. 
However, after the removal of subsection (G) in its entirety, the remaining portions of 
Ogden's vacant building ordinance would stand alone and would be consistent with the legitimate 
legislative purposes for which they were enacted. Further, the remaining portions of the vacant 
building ordinance are not challenged here. Therefore, the Court strikes down the entire sign 
regulation of subsection (G) as unconstitutional, but in doing so, severs subsection (G) from § 
16-8B-10, leaving the remainder of Article 16-8B intact. 
It is so ordered. 
DATED this / day of October, 2 0 0 3 . ^ - - ^ 
Parley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce Edwards 
Pro Se 
P. O. Box 1886 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: (801>603-9094 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT-OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
OGDEN CITY, a governmental entity, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. ; 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS 
DEFENDANT 
I Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
1 and Vacate 
> Case No: 021900315 and 
> 021899315 
) Judge: CITY JUDGE 
Plaintiff, Bruce Edwards, pro se, respectfully requests this Court for entry of an 
Order dismissing Plaintiffs informations and vacating the previous order of the Court 
and granting such other and fiirther relief to which this Court finds the Defendant 
otherwise entitled. Grounds for this Motion are stated in Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate. 
1. DATED this 21 day of October, 2003 
Plaintiff 
ProSe 
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Bruce Edwards 
ProSe 
P.O. Box 1886 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: (801)-603-9094 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT-OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
OGDEN CITY, a governmental entity, ] 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. ; 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS ) 
DEFENDANT 
) Memorandum in Support of 
) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
I and Vacate 
1 Case No: 021900420 
l Judge: CITY JUDGE 
Defendant, Bruce Edwards, pro se, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Vacate. 
In short, the Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Vacate should be granted because 
Ogden City failed to follow Utah State Code to enact ordinance #2001-69 amending 
Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code and that the Second District Court ruled 
that 16-B-10-J is unconstitutional on its face. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. That; 
Ogden City Council, on December 4,2001 adopted #2001-69 amending Chapter 
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code making extensive revisions to the Ogden 
City Code for the abatement of dangerous buildings, and, in particularly, 
repealing Article B, concerning temporary boarding of buildings and temporary 
boarding permits, and adopting a new Article B requiring the registration of 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vacant buildings and the submission and approval of a vacant building plan, 
adopting standards for the maintenance of vacant buildings, and imposing 
additional fees for re-registration when there the owner does not comply with the 
plan and for each month that a vacant building is boarded; by revising Subsection 
16-12-3 regarding civil penalties for unfit premises violations to reflect the 
changes in the regulation of boarded buildings and vacant buildings, and 
increasing the civil penalties to be the same as other fit premises violations. 
2. That the notice amending Chapter 8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal code was posted 
on 30th day of November, 2001 by the Ogden City Recorder, Gloria J. Berrett 
3. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16 was approved as to form by Andrea 
W. Lockwood, Chief Deputy City Attorney Civil Division, on December 5,2001. 
4. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16, was transmitted to the Matthew 
Godfrey, Mayor of Ogden, and approved on December 6,2001. 
5. That the amended ordinance Chapter 8, Title 16; was published on December 9,2001 
and became effective on December 9,2001. 
6. That no other notice other than the posting on the 30th day of November, 2001, by the 
City Recorder, of said amended ordinance was provided to the public. 
7. That Ogden City filed multiple violations for having "unlawful signs" and "obscuring 
windows" which were amended on numerous occasions against Defendant in that 
Defendant committed the offense of zoning ordinance violations. 
8. That Ogden City ordinance 16-8B is a zoning ordinance. 
9. That Utah Code Annotated, Zoning Districts 10-9-405; 
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction 
into zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to 
carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and 
structures, and the use of land. 
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one 
district may differ from those in other districts. 
10. That under Utah Code Annotated Ordinance 16-8-B is provided for under Cities and 
Towns, Municipal Land Use Development and Management, Zoning or section 10-9-4. 
11. That Ogden City new zoning ordinance has attempted to have vacant buildings 
determined as a separate class. 
12. That Ogden City Vacant Building Ordinance, "regulate(s) and restrict the erection, 
construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings,55 those of vacant 
buildings. 
13. That Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402, Preparation and adoption; 
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the legislative 
body a proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the zoning 
ordinance and maps, that represents the commission's recommendations for 
zoning all or any part of the area within the municipality. 
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning 
ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission. 
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public hearing 
at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails 
notice of a proposed zoning change to property owners within that 
municipality within a specified distance of the property on which the zoning 
change is being proposed, it shall also mail equivalent notice to property 
owners of an adjacent municipality within the same distance of the property 
on which the zoning change is being proposed. 
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may: 
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed; 
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as 
amended; or 
(c) reject the ordinance. 
14. That Ogden City Council failed to hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning 
ordinance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402. 
15. That Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16. That Ogden City Council failed to have the planning commission prepare and 
recommend to the legislative body the proposed zoning ordinance. 
17. Utah Code Annotated 10-9-403, Amendments and rezonings. 
(1) (a) Hie legislative body may amend; 
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district; 
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or 
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance. 
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this 
subsection unless the amendment was proposed by the planning 
commission or is first submitted to the planning commission for its 
approval, disapproval, or recommendations. 
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section 10-
9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance or the 
zoning map. 
18. That Ogden City Council, voted to pass the ordinance, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated 10-9-403-1 -B in that Ogden City Council failed to submit said amendment to 
the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or recommendations. 
19. That Ogden City Council voted to pass the ordinance and failed to comply with Utah 
Code Annotated 10-9-403-2 in that Ogden City Council failed to comply with the 
procedure specified in Section 10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the 
zoning ordinance. 
20. That Ogden City Council failed to provide a reasonable notice of the public hearing 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 10-9-402 pursuant to 10-9-403-2 in amending Chapter 
8, Title 16 of the Ogden Municipal Code. 
21. That Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408, Nonconforming uses and structures; 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure 
may be continued 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, 
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for 
the purpose of die extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to 
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a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, 
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and 
conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by 
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which 
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring 
the billboard and associated property rights through: 
(i)gift; 
(ii) purchase; 
(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain* 
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining, 
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or 
vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by 
eminent domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v)» 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove a 
billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with 
reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the 
legislative body finds that 
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading 
statement in his application; 
(b) the billboard is unsafe; 
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or 
22. That Ogden City's ordinance provided for the termination of all nonconforming uses, 
removal of all signs, with limited exceptions and anything that would obscure a window 
which would include curtains, blinds, shades, tenting, partitions etc., in or on vacant 
building(s) and failed to provide a "formula establishing a reasonable time period during 
which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use", as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408. 
23. Ogden City's ordinance failed to provide that a nonconforming use may be extended 
through the same building, provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or 
made for the purpose of the extension. 
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24. That the termination of Plaintiffs signs and window covering that became a 
nonconforming use on or about December 9,2001, have not been acquired by Ogden 
City by either gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent domain. 
25. That Ogden City's ordinance required Plaintiff to remove all signs and or billboards, 
on the interior of Plaintiff s property including anything that would obscure any window 
without providing compensation as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408. 
26. That Ogden City failed to provide Plaintiff with reasonable notice of proceedings and 
or an opportunity for a hearing as provided by Utah Code Annotated 10-9-408. 
27. That Ogden City would not have been able to find the facts necessary to remove 
Plaintiffs sign(s) and or "obscuring of windows" in that no permit was required in that 
the sign(s) were located in the interior of Plaintiff s property, the sign(s) and or window 
covering were not unsafe nor were the sign(s) and or "obscuring of windows" in an 
unreasonable state of repair. 
28. That on February 6,2002, Ogden City, filed in the Weber County District Court 
Civil No. 020900777 an action against the Defendant 
29. That on October 1, 2003, the Second Judicial District Court Civil No. 020900777 in 
the Weber County District Court ruled that 16-8B-10-G was unconstitutional on its face. 
A true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
30. That" The sweeping inclusion of the ban understandably would dismay the average 
American, who, given this nation's proudly proclaimed history of special respect for 
individual liberty and private property, would be surprised to learn.... (Ogden vs 
Edwards Page 19). 
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On December 9,2001, Ogden City enacted a municipal ordinance directing that vacant 
building within the city be registered by their owners, that a vacant building plan be filed with 
Ogden City and that the property meet maintaince standards that Ogden City setforth. The 
Appellant is the owner of two adjoining buildings located in the centeral business district of 
Ogden City. These buildings have been largely used by the defendant for storage of construction 
materials and personal property, for a wood shop,for office use for himself and as a political 
forum. On January 9,2002, Ogden City through its Building Services Manager mailed 
defendant a written notice to register his building within 10 days of defendants notification. 
Appellant received said letter on January 13,2002. As a condition of registering Ogden city had 
determined that the signs on the interior of Appellant's property, that stated "Ogden City 
Administraton has no integrity" etc., were "unlawful" and had to be removed and any window 
that was obscured had to be unobscured. Appellant personally delivered to Ogden City on 
January 15,2002 a letter that stated that Appellant's signs were "protected by the Constitution of 
the United States". On January 23,2002 Ogden City filed an information charging Appellant 
with "2 counts Ogden City Zoning Ordinance Violations: 1. The windows and glass doors on 
the building are painted or otherwise obsecured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the 
interior of the building, in violation of Secton 16-8B-9.J OMC, Class B, and 2. Unlawful signs 
visible from adjacent public street, sidewalk or adjacent properties are displayed in the windows 
of the building, in violation of Section 16-8B-9.J OMC Class B". The Appellant reviewed the 
conditions that required regristration and concluded that the properties in question did not meet 
the criteria and if they were registered that Appellant would be deprived of numerous rights 
guaranteed under the Constitutions of the United States and of Utah and therefore declined to 
register the building as a vacant building. On March 5,2002, and again on October 2,2002, 
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In addition Defendant knew said ordinance was unconstitutional and Plaintiff 
knew or should have known that the ordinance and actions of Plaintiff were 
unconstitutional. That on October 1,2003, the Second Judicial District Court Civil No. 
020900777 in the Weber County District Court ruled that 16-8B-10-G was 
unconstitutional on its face. That Defendant can not be required as a prerequisite of 
compliance with 16-8B waive Defendant's constitutional rights. Therefore Defendant 
was not required to register a vacant building under 16-8B and remove the "unlawful 
signs" pursuant to Ogden City Code to assist Ogden City in the depravation of the 
Defendant's rights under the Unites States Constitution and the Constitution of the State 
ofUtah. 
In addition the ordinance is in violation of Utah State Cod Annotated 10-9-408, 
Nonconforming uses and structures and raises other constitutional issues but because said 
ordinance is void Defendant refrains from further wasting this Court's time with other 
arguments on the unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs informations must be dismissed and the 
order of the court vacated. 
Respectfully submitted* 
DATED this 2 day of October, 2003. 
Plaintif 
ProSe 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, 
Plaintiff (s), 
vs. 
BRUCE EDWARDS, 
Defendant (s). 
ORDER 
Case No.: 021900315 
021900420 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and vacate the convictions. 
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Memorandum of Law and 
having heard oral arguments from both parties, enters the following 
ruling: 
In the case of #0219000315: 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 
and 4 is denied. 
In the case of #021900420: 
a. The Motion to Dismiss count 1 and 2 is granted. 
b. The Motion to Vacate the convictions as to count 3 
and 4 is denied. 
Dated this
 yj2_JL_day of 2003. 
c c : f i l e 
EH&TE W. JONES 
D i s t r i c t Court tJudge Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution 
United States Constitution, Amendments 1 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendments V 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendments XIV 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of 
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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Utah Constitution Article I, § 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. 
Utah Code 
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-102. Purpose. 
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in order to provide for the health, safety, 
and welfare, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, 
comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of the municipality and its present and future 
inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, secure economy in governmental 
expenditures, foster the state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and 
nonurban development, and to protect property values, municipalities may enact all 
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and 
development of land within the municipality, including ordinances, resolutions, and rules 
governing uses, density, open spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and 
air, air quality, transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, 
public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those ordinances, 
resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401. General powers. 
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use 
and development that furthers the intent of this chapter. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-402. Preparation and adoption 
(1) The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the legislative body a 
proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and 
maps, that represents the commission's recommendations for zoning all or any part of the 
area within the municipality. 
(2) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed zoning ordinance 
recommended to it by the planning commission. 
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 
days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails notice of a proposed zoning 
change to property owners within that municipality within a specified distance of the 
property on which the zoning change is being proposed, it shall also mail equivalent 
notice to property owners of an adjacent municipality within the same distance of the 
property on which the zoning change is being proposed. 
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may: 
(a) adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed; 
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as 
amended; or 
(c) reject the ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403. Amendments and rezonings. 
(1) (a) The legislative body may amend: 
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district; 
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or 
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance, 
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by this subsection 
unless the amendment was proposed by the planning commission or is first submitted to 
the planning commission for its approval, disapproval, or recommendations. 
(2) The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section 10-9-402 in 
preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance or the zoning map. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-404. Temporary regulations. 
(1) (a) A municipal legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an ordinance 
establishing a temporary zoning regulation for any part or all of the area within the 
municipality if: 
(i) the legislative body makes a finding of compelling, countervailing public 
interest; or 
(ii) the area is unzoned. 
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(b) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (l)(a) may prohibit or regulate the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of any building or structure or 
subdivision approval. 
(c) A temporary zoning regulation under Subsection (l)(a) may not impose an impact fee 
or other financial requirement on building or development. 
(2) The municipal legislative body shall establish a period of limited effect for the 
ordinance not to exceed six months. 
(3) (a) A municipal legislative body may, without a public hearing, enact an ordinance 
establishing a temporary zoning regulation prohibiting construction, subdivision 
approval, and other development activities within an area that is the subject of an 
Environmental Impact Statement or a Major Investment Study examining the area as a 
proposed highway or transportation corridor. 
(b) A zoning regulation under Subsection (3)(a): 
(i) may not exceed six months in duration; 
(ii) may be renewed, if requested by the Utah Transportation Commission created 
under Section 72-1-301, for up to two additional six-month periods by ordinance 
enacted before the expiration of the previous zoning regulation; and 
(iii) notwithstanding Subsections (3)(b)(i) and (ii), is effective only as long as the 
Environmental Impact Statement or Major Investment Study is in progress. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405. Zoning districts. 
(1) (a) The legislative body may divide the territory over which it has jurisdiction into 
zoning districts of a number, shape, and area that it considers appropriate to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter. 
(b) Within those zoning districts, the legislative body may regulate and restrict the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and 
structures, and the use of land. 
(2) The legislative body shall ensure that the regulations are uniform for each class or 
kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ 
from those in other districts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure may be 
continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, provided no 
structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device to a building is 
not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment for: 
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(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration, expansion, or 
substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and conditions set forth in the zoning 
ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by providing a formula 
establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner can recover or amortize the 
amount of his investment in the nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by acquiring the billboard 
and associated property rights through: 
(Ogift; 
(ii) purchase; 
(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining, repairing, or 
restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, or vandalism, the 
municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by eminent domain under 
Subsection (2)(c)(v). 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove a billboard 
without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with reasonable notice of 
proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the legislative body finds that: 
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading statement in his 
application; 
(b) the billboard is unsafe; 
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or 
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months. 
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school district property 
when the property ceases to be used for school district purposes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode 
— Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is 
so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit 
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
Ogden City Code 
Ogden City Code § 15-1-2: Title 15 Purpose, Zoning Regulations. 
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals 
and the general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of Ogden City, state of Utah, 
including, amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in the streets, securing safety 
from fire, panic and other dangers, encouraging energy efficient patterns of development, 
the use of energy conservation, solar and renewable energy sources, and assuring access 
to sunlight for solar energy devices, providing adequate light and air, preventing the 
overcrowding of land, avoiding undue concentration of population, facilitating adequate 
provision for transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements, 
providing for the classification of land uses. These regulations shall be made with 
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its 
Ogden City Code § 16-8A-3. Definitions. 
VACANT: 
A. Empty; 
B. Not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant; or 
C. Not used by a person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes for 
which a building is designed and lawfully permitted. 
Ogden City Code § 16-8B-2: Vacant Buildings Purpose and Intent. 
It is the purpose and intent of this article to protect the public health, safety, and welfare 
by establishing a registration process for vacant buildings and requiring responsible 
parties to implement a vacant building plan for such buildings to remedy any public 
nuisance, prevent deterioration, unsightly blight and consequent adverse impact on the 
value of nearby property, and to establish minimum maintenance standards for vacant 
buildings. To such ends, it is the specific purpose and intent of this article: 
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c. Signs having historic significance, as provided in subsection G3 of this section; 
and 
d. Off premises signs, installed and maintained on the building or premises in 
accordance with the provisions of title 18 of this code. 
3. "Signs having historic significance" shall mean a sign: 
a. Related to a building either designated as an historic resource or located within 
an historic district, pursuant to title 17 of this code; and 
b. Determined by the Ogden City landmarks commission as significantly 
contributing to the historic character of such building or district. 
4. For purpose of this subsection, "signs, displays or graffiti" shall include any 
presentation of words, letters, figures, designs, pictures or colors, which are not a part of 
the architectural design of the building. 
Ogden City Code § 16-8B-9-J: Maintenance Standards. 
J. Obscuring Of Windows: 
The windows and glass exterior doors of a vacant building shall not be painted or 
otherwise obscured in a manner which obstructs visibility into the interior of the building; 
provided that the building official may order that windows or glass doors are to be 
obscured with a solid coat of paint as part of maintenance work to be performed by the 
city under section 16-8B-11 of this article: 
1. If the building official determines such action is necessary in order to temporarily 
obstruct the view of interior conditions otherwise in violation of this section, until such 
time as such conditions can be remedied under an approved vacant building plan; and 
2. The city cannot readily access the interior of the vacant building in order to correct 
such conditions. 
Utah Rules of Procedure 
Rule 6. Time. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, 
by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the 
day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it 
is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection 
(e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
excluded in the computation. 
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Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. Criminal procedure 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or 
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or 
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need 
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified 
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained 
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice 
need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or 
information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be 
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare 
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion 
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the 
court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of 
particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to 
such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained 
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the 
statute creating or defining the offense. 
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(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless 
they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or 
information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based 
shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity 
but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon 
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the 
names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before 
the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a 
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
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OGDEN, UTAH; THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002/ 11:30 A.M. 
HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G 
THE CLERK: This is the time set for disposition on 
Ogden City vs. Bruce Edwards, case number 011904365, case 
number 021900506, and the time set for trial on case number 
021900315 and case number 021900420. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Knowlton, you're here on 
behalf of Mr. Edwards? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yes, I am, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to proceed, 
then? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I want address a small item 
before we do, if I can. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, we're here on an information. 
I've just apparently been given two pages of an amended 
information. On the first page there's an allegation of 
violating zoning ordinances regarding windows and glass 
exterior doors and railings being painted, et cetera. 
THE COURT: Which case number are you looking at? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'm looking at 021900315. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: And there's a count 1 and a count 2 on 
the first page — 
1 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - one dealing with windows and glass, 
two dealing with unlawful signs visible from the adjacent 
street. On the second page, there are two more counts, 
numbered 1 and 2, and counsel tells me there's yet two other 
counts that bring us here today, although I haven't seen that. 
MR. JUNK: Well, it's on there, a different case. 
There's two different cases. They're both -
MR. KNOWLTON: We were here before, Judge Taylor, and 
we agreed to continue the trial as to counts 1 and 2 on the 
first page of the criminal number I just gave you. And one of 
the reasons we agreed to continue that, Judge, was because 
there are some issues in litigation, I suppose, between 
Mr. Edwards and the city dealing with the constitutionality of 
the ordinances in question, and that specifically deals with 
some sign ordinances that the city has, and I think that 
relates in a similar way to count 1 as well. 
And as I rethought this, this — obviously that's been 
continued until after the signage litigation and the 
constitutional issues are resolved. I don't know if it makes 
any sense for us to be proceeding to trial on the other counts 
at the same criminal information. They're not necessarily the 
same, but it seems to me, instead of piecemealing this out, if 
Mr. Edwards were convicted today of a couple of counts of 
failure to register a vacant building and failure to make 
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plans, then you would impose sentence, and then we come back 
here in a couple of months, depending on what happens with the 
other litigation, and then we'll be trying a couple of more 
infractions that Mr. Edwards is charged with regarding 
[unintelligible] property. And if he were to lose that, then 
we'd ask this Court to sentence him yet again. And so it 
doesn't make any sense for us to ask the Court to 
[unintelligible]. 
THE COURT: Does that just apply to case -315, 
though, or — 
MR. JUNK: No. Actually it's both of them. 
THE COURT: Does it apply to the case, for example, 
that ends in 420? 
MR. JUNK: Yes. 
THE COURT: - or 0506? 
MR. JUNK: The other cases, we're just — let's see. 
Let me make sure. 
THE COURT: See, there's two that are on just for 
disposition. Just two for trial? Is that how it works? 4365 
is just on for disposition, as well as 0506, right? 
MR. JUNK: Right. 
THE COURT: And then you've got two that are set for 
trial, 0315 -
MR. JUNK: Right. And -
THE COURT: - and 0420. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. JUNK: - 0420. And part - maybe I can just 
explain — 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JUNK: - a little bit, maybe make it a little 
clearer. We did file both of the informations on 315 and 420. 
They have four counts, but we've separated those counts. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JUNK: Two on — and it may not be clear because 
we have as one and two, and then one and two, and we probably 
should have had them as — 
THE COURT: Three and four? 
MR. JUNK: - three and four, but -
THE COURT: So it looks like the counts are the same 
on both of these cases, right? 
MR. JUNK: They are. 
THE COURT: And the only difference, I guess, is the 
building. One is the building at address 205, and the other is 
207, right? 
MR. JUNK: Exactly. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Adjacent buildings. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUNK: They are next to each other. And what is 
happening, we did originally file four counts. Two of the 
counts, the counts dealing with the window and glass and the 
visible signs, there has been a civil claim brought by 
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1 Mr. Edwards against the city asking that this ordinance is 
2 unconstitutional. 
3 THE COURT: Right. 
4 MR. JUNK: And that is being litigated, and we agreed 
5 that we're willing to, in a sense, sit back and see what 
6 happens before we move forward. 
7 THE COURT: But the resolution of that case is not 
8 going to resolve the second page, right? 
9 MR. JUNK: Right. Those — the registration and the 
10 providing a building plan, there's no claim in the civil case 
11 that deals with those — that portion of it, and our theory was 
12 we had asked is why — if we're waiting on the other two, why do 
13 we have to wait on the two that are not part of that particular 
14 lawsuit. We feel that we still want to move forward and have a 
15 resolution on that part of the particular case. 
16 We made that motion to Judge Taylor, and that's why 
17 we actually separated the information, because we wanted to 
18 make it clear how we were actually proceeding. So they are the 
19 same case — that is true, as Mr. Knowlton indicates — but they 
20 are quite different in how they're proceeding. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. I notice, too, you'd filed a 
22 demand for a jury trial on this. 
23 I MR. KNOWLTON: That's been resolved. 
24 | THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
25 MR. JUNK: We amended those to -
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THE COURT: Right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: And then it comes back to the same 
court down the road, or maybe a different court, and then the 
court has to hear allegations regarding the same building, 
violations of ordinance or building codes from the city. And 
then they ask the — that court is asked to impose sentence on 
Mr. Edwards again for the very same buildings. 
THE COURT: But the problem is is the civil matter 
doesn't resolve the second page at all. I mean even if we sit 
back and wait for you to resolve the questions as to the 
constitutionality — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, I agree it's different. 
THE COURT: - then we still end up having to try the 
second page, don't we? 
MR. KNOWLTON: They're different subject matters. 
It's just that I'm suggesting, Your Honor, that maybe it seems 
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unusual that we would cut up sentencing — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - in the event there is - that the 
court would find against us. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess my thinking is it's not 
going to make any difference, because if I wait, you're still 
going to be back here to try page 2 of the information, 
regardless of what happens on your civil suit, right? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I think so. 
THE COURT: I'm inclined to just go ahead and deny 
your motion to continue, and let's try the second page, I 
guess, of the information on these two. Okay? 
MR. KNOWLTON: That's my request, and that's your 
decision. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: So we're just going to try page 2, right? 
MR. JUNK: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: On each building? 
THE COURT: Right, On each building. And the two 
cases we're looking at are 0315 and 0420. 
All right. Is the city ready to proceed, then? 
MR. JUNK: We are. I'll call Wayne Glover. 
MR. KNOWLTON: We would like to exclude any witnesses 
7 
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not testifying. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there more than one 
witness for the city? 
MR. JUNK: We may call Mike (inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Let's have your other witness 
come up and be sworn and excluded, then. 
I assume that applies to the defense, too. Any other 
witnesses for the defense? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Just Denise, and I won't be calling 
her. 
THE COURT: Just witnesses, then. And so the 
allegation is the two counts on page 2, failing to register a 
vacant building in violation of the OMC Chapter 8, 
Section 16-8, and failure to provide a vacant-building plan in 
violation of that same section. Is that correct? 
MR. JUNK: That is correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, let me ask you. Do you 
want, to try both buildings at the same time or do you — 
MR. JUNK: Yes. 
THE COURT: - want to try these separately? 
MR. JUNK: I think they're both -
THE COURT: The same evidence? 
MR. JUNK: They're just - it's the same 
evidence there. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any objection to that, 
8 
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Mr. Knowlton? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. That's all right. 
THE COURT: Okay. So it's the same allegation, and 
the only difference, one applies to a building located at 205, 
and the other is 207. All right. Go ahead. 
(Whereupon the witnesses were sworn.) 
THE COURT: All right, sir. If you want to have a 
seat up here. 
WAYNE GLOVER, 
having been first duly sworn, called 
at the instance of the plaintiff, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q State your name and your occupation. 
A My name is Wayne Glover. I'm the manager of building 
services for Ogden City. 
Q And what — as that particular role at Ogden City, 
what does that entail? 
A Generally that involves the development building and 
business licensing activities of Ogden City. 
Q And as part of one of your roles, have you been given 
the - I guess the burden or the role of monitoring vacant 
buildings in Ogden City -
A Yes, sir. 
9 
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Q — based on the vacant-building ordinance? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q And what is it that you do in that particular, 
specific role? 
A When we become aware that a building is vacant and 
meets the definition in the ordinance, we then notify the owner 
that they are obligated to come forward and register the vacant 
building in accordance with that ordinance. 
Q Okay. And what do they need to do in order to 
register a building? 
A Generally come in, make application for the 
registration, identify those things that are outlined in the 
ordinance for property location, the time that the building 
became vacant, their ownership relationship, for example, and 
then submit a vacant-building plan that relates to that 
building, what it is that they intend to do with the structure 
in the future, and to pay a registration fee of a hundred 
dollars for commercial buildings. 
Q What's that? 
A The rate's a hundred dollar fee for commercial 
buildings. 
Q All right. Now, are you familiar with buildings that 
are located on 205 and 207, and I believe 209, 25th Street? 
A Yes, sir, I am. 
Q And do those particular buildings have some specific 
10 
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name that is used or something that... 
A I equate the name El Buracho to the building known as 
205 25th, and the other building at 207 through 211 I refer to 
as the Helena Hotel. 
Q Okay. Now, what does this have reference to? 
A Pardon me? 
Q What do these names have reference to? 
A Well, I think the El Buracho, in my recollection, was 
the name of a tavern that was located there in the past. 
Q Okay. 
A The Helena is the name of the hotel, and it's 
emblazoned on the face of the building. 
Q All right. And are you familiar with the individual 
that is the owner of those particular buildings? 
A I'm familiar with the person who alleges he's the 
owner of building, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And that is? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I'm going to object, your Honor, 
as to who alleges they're the owner. He either has some 
foundation for that, or he doesn't. 
THE COURT: Maybe you can rephrase the question — 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
THE COURT: - or the -
MR. JUNK: All right. 
THE COURT: The answer is a little... 
11 
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1 Q (BY MR. JUNK) Have you had contact with somebody, an 
2 agent or somebody, who has expressed responsibility for those 
3 buildings? nj 
I" 
4 A Yes, sir, I have. [ 
5 Q And who is that individual? 
6 A Bruce Edwards. 
7 Q And -
8 THE COURT: Go ahead. I'm sorry. What was his 
9 answer? I don't know if I heard it. 
10 Q (BY MR. JUNK) Okay. Go ahead. What was your 
11 answer? 
12 A The - the person that you refer to is someone I call 
13 Bruce Edwards. 
14 Q All right. That's the individual seated here? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And you've talked with Mr. Edwards on occasions about 
17 the vacant building? 
18 A Yes, sir, I have. 
19 Q And also about other related type matters dealing 
20 with the buildings? 
21 A Yes, sir. 
22 Q Okay. Now, at some point did you — do you have a 
23 regular process that when you find that there is a vacant 
24 building of notifying the owner of the ordinance and what needs 
25 to be done in order to bring the building into compliance? 
12 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q And what is it that you do? 
A One of my field staff inspects the building, verifies 
that it — 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'm going to object. The question is 
what you do. He's talking about this witness. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Okay. What do you do in your role as 
a supervisor? 
A I have one of my staff go investigate and verify the 
building is vacant and prepare then a letter of notification. 
Q Okay. Now, have you also observed the Helena and the 
El Buracho? Are these buildings located at 205 and then 207 
through 211? 
A Have I observed that? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q You've gone and have done some field viewing 
yourself? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And was it — did you determine whether or not they 
were vacant? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Object. It's leading, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that it suggests the 
answer. 
MR. JUNK: Yeah. I don't know that it does. 
13 
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THE COURT: I think it's probably an appropriate 
question. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Did you determine that the buildings 
were vacant? 
MR. JUNK: I didn't - that wasn't what I asked. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think he asked him whether he 
determined whether they were vacant. 
MR. JUNK: Or not. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, how would he make that 
determination unless he — 
THE COURT: Well, I guess we need to find out. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, maybe I'm premature. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and answer the 
question. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Did you make a determination about 
these buildings? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q What was your determination? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Do we have a foundation when? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Approximately when did you go - have 
you been around the — these two buildings, or do some 
investigation of these two buildings? 
A Recollection, we started in September of 2001 on 
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another action regarding those two buildings. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, I don't think the witness is 
responding. The question is when did you go. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: He said we started looking. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Okay. Just couch it in terms of when 
you actually did, Mr. Glover, go to that building. 
A I don't recall the exact dates. 
Q Right. But a time frame. 
A The first time would have been probably late fall of 
2001. That would be November, thereabouts. 
Q Okay. 
A Without referring to the file regarding the action 
that we had, I couldn't tell you the exact date. 
Q All right. But have you been there more than the 
time that you went in this November period? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q When else have you been? 
A Could I refer to my file? 
Q If it will help you, yes. 
A I would suspect that it would have been sometime 
after - between January 9th and January 13th, 2002. 
Q And you indicated that you made a determination about 
the buildings. What was your determination? 
A This building is not occupied. 
15 
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Q What did you make that - what did you base that on? 
A I've been inside of those buildings, both of them. 
No one is there. The building is partially constructed. Both 
the El Buracho and the Helena, the last time that I was 
physically inside the building, were under construction, had 
been renovated, and there was no indication that anyone was 
there. 
Q Okay. When you say had been renovated, what do you 
mean by that? 
A There was — there was work that had been going on 
construction-wise. There had been framing, for example, in 
both of those buildings, and some structural elements added to 
the building at 205, which is the El Buracho. 
Q All right. But was it in a — what you would consider 
a habitable condition? 
A They were not finished at that time. No, sir, they 
were not habitable buildings. 
Q Okay. Now, you were — after — you were explaining 
the process. After you or another individual from your office 
views the property and makes a determination that the buildings 
are vacant, what then is the next step in that process? 
A Once a determination has been made, my staff is 
responsible for obtaining pictures of the building, making an 
inspection to verify that that is the case, and then preparing 
a letter of notification to the owner. 
16 
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1 Q Okay. Did you prepare a letter of notification to 
2 the owner? 
3 A I did not, no, sir. 
4 Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's 
5 Exhibits No. 1 and No. 3. Are you familiar with those — 
6 A Yes, sir. 
7 Q - particular exhibits? 
8 A Yes, sir. 
9 Q What do those exhibits represent? 
10 A These represent the letters of notification to the 
11 owners of vacant buildings. 
12 Q Okay. Now, is that - in this particular case, is 
13 that something that you would have written? 
14 A No, sir. These are letters that the staff prepares 
15 for me. 
16 Q Okay. But are they signed by you? 
17 A I have signed the original letter, yes, the standard 
18 letter that they fill in, the blanks, if you will. 
19 Q Okay. And was this particular letter sent out on 
20 the two vacant buildings, the 205 and the 207? 
21 | A Yes, sir. These letters read — one is addressed to 
22 the owner regarding 207 25th. Another is addressed to the 
23 owner of building known as 205 25th. 
24 I Q Okay. And what date were those letters sent out? 
25 A The dates of these letters -
17 
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MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, can I voir dire with this 
witness? 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Did you mail these letters? 
A Did I mail them? 
Q Did you mail either of these letters? 
A I didn't personally mail them, no, sir. 
Q All right. You didn't put them in an envelope, and 
you didn't put a stamp on the envelope? 
A I did not, no, sir. 
Q And you didn't put the envelope in the mail? 
A I did not, no, sir. 
Q And you didn't see it done? 
A No, sir. I did not see that. 
Q And did you actually sign each one of these letters, 
or is it just a stamp signature? 
A It's a — a letter that I had signed in — I guess it's 
a facsimile signature. 
Q So this isn't a — you didn't actually sign it. You 
just signed a form letter — 
A Yes, sir. 
Q - and they've used of that letter to go to different 
places, different people? 
18 
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A 
Q 
either 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
didn't 
deliver 
A 
Yes, sir, that is the case. 
So you have never prepared — you nothing 
one of these letters as far as — 
Other than directing their preparation — 
Oh, I see. 
— no, sir. I did not personally prepare 
to do with 
them. 
You didn't prepare either of these letters; you 
sign either of these letters; you didn't do 
either of these letters? 
I did not personally, no, sir. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. Thank you. That's 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Junk. 
anything to 
all. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed) 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's 
Exhibit No. 2 for identification. Are you familiar with what 
that represents? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what does that represent? 
A A letter signed by Bruce Edwards acknowledging 
receipt -
MR. KNOWLTON: Now, just a moment, Judge. Well, if 
we've got to use this as an exhibit, may I also voir dire on 
this? 
THE COURT: Sure, go ahead. 
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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Are you familiar with the signature of Bruce Edwards? 
A Yes, sir. I've seen his signature. 
Q How many times have you seen his signature? 
A Three or four. 
Q When? 
A Once when he came in to file a notice that he was 
objecting to signs at the Ogden City Mall. 
Q So how long ago was that? 
A Must have been about the first part of January of 
this year. 
Q So how many other times have you observed him sign 
his name? Did you see him sign his name in January of this 
year? 
A Yes, sir, he signed it in front of me. 
Q And how many other times have you observed 
Mr. Edwards sign his name? 
A Well, the three requests for information records 
that — in the last three weeks. 
Q Did you see him sign those? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q So in the last three weeks you've seen him sign his 
name. So did you see him sign his name to the document before 
you? 
20 
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A I'm sorry? 
Q Did you see him sign his name to the document before 
you? 
A I don't recall, sir. 
Q Did he deliver it to you? 
A Did he deliver it? 
Q Yes, sir, 
A Yes, sir, he did. 
Q He handed that document to you? 
A Yes, he did. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. That's all. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Junk. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed) 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q And maybe you could just - what is that letter? 
A Well, the letter is — is a letter addressed to me, 
signed by Bruce Edwards, that indicates that 
"I have received your letter of 
January 9th, 2002, on January 13th, 2002. 
Please be informed that the ordinance 
regulating vacant buildings is defective." 
Q Okay. Then he goes on with — 
A Definitions about signs and the First Amendment 
issues, yes, sir. 
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Q Okay. He delivered this particular letter to you? 
A Yes, sir, he did. 
MR. JUNK: At this point, your Honor, I'm going to 
move to admit Exhibits 1 through 3. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Object to the two letters, the 
January 9 letters. That's insufficient foundation. I don't 
know that they're described by Bruce's letter in sufficient 
detail that you can say these are the same letters that 
counsel - 1 and 2 — 
THE COURT: P-l and P-2? When were they dated? Is 
there a date on the letters? 
MR. KNOWLTON: They're both dated January 9. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUNK: And Mr. Edward's letter specifically 
indicates receipt of the letter on January 9th. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, no. It specifically says, "I 
received your letter of January 9th.'' It doesn't say which 
letter. And this is addressed to Ogden City, "Dear 
Mr. Glover." 
THE COURT: Right. But didn't he say that these were 
prepared at his direction — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well -
THE COURT: - even though he didn't actually type the 
letters, 1 and 2? 
22 
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MR. KNOWLTON: - this is his staff. He thinks his 
staff prepared and sent out these letters. 
THE COURT: Well, I thought I heard him say that 
these were prepared at his direction. 
Didn't you? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That is what I said. 
THE COURT: That's what he said. I'm going to allow 
Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 at this point. Even though he may not 
have prepared the letters, they clearly were done at his 
direction. And then the letter P-3 is a letter from the 
defendant back to Mr. Glover, so... 
All right. Those exhibits are admitted. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 received) 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Now, you are familiar with the records 
of Ogden City when an individual actually registers an 
abandoned building? Are you familiar with those records? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And has Mr. Edwards filed any type of registration or 
the registration that is requested in the ordinance for 
building 205 -
A No, sir. 
Q - 25 t h S t r e e t ? 
A No. 
Q Has he filed a registration that is indicated in the 
23 
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ordinance for the buildings from 207 through 211, the Helena? 
A No, sir. 
Q And with that, the ordinance also indicates that a 
plan must be submitted? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And has Mr. Edwards filed a plan for 205 25th? 
A No, sir. 
Q And has he filed a plan for 207 through 211? 
A No, sir. 
Q Have you had discussion with Mr. Edwards after he 
dropped off this letter about submitting - registering or 
submitting a plan? 
A He and I have about that several times, yes, sir. 
Q And when you say you've talked to him on several 
times, approximately how many times have you talked with 
Mr. Edwards about that? 
A At least two. 
Q Okay. And on those occasions, have you indicated 
that he needed to continue to register his buildings? 
A That was the substance of our conversations, yes, 
sir. 
Q And how did he respond to those? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, could we have a foundation as 
to the time of these two discussions? 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
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Q 
occasions 
(BY 
you 
MR. JUNK) You indicated 
have talked with 
registration of the buildings. 
A 
Q 
Yes 
Can 
discussions? 
A One 
January 13th. 
1/15/2002 
» 
that at least 
L Mr. Edwards about 
you give an approximate time frame 
would have been 
My notes on the 
f" with my initials, 
probably 
Exhibit 
at which 
somewhere 
2 indicate 
the 
for 
aft< 
on two 
those two 
r^ 
"Received 
time — I reca. 11 the 
conversation. "Bruce, what do we have to do to get your 
building registered?'' The second occasion was in the last week 
or two, as Mr. Edwards was requesting information or records 
from my office. Again I asked him, "Bruce, when are going to 
get your building registered?7' 
Q And how did he respond to each of those 
different requests? 
A "No." The word no. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'm sorry? 
THE WITNESS: "No." 
MR. JUNK: All right. I believe that's all the 
questions I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Any cross? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yes, please. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
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1 Q Mr. Glover, how long have you worked for Ogden City? 
2 A Pardon me, sir? 
3 Q How long have you worked for Ogden City? 
4 A Almost twenty-five years now. 
5 Q Okay. Twenty-five years ago, was there a business at 
6 205 25th Street called the El Buracho? 
7 A I have no idea, sir. I don't — I — 
8 Q Do you remember a business actually operating at 
9 205 25th Street. 
10 A Vaguely remember a tavern there, yes, sir. 
11 Q Well, I mean do you know? Did you ever walk in there 
12 and see if there was some actual — 
13 A No. I've never been in that building when it was 
14 doing business. 
15 Q So you don't know whether there ever was, during your 
16 j tenure anyway, an actual operating business at 205 25th Street? 
17 A I have seen some folks operating a business in that 
18 building. The owner of the building used to sit out in front 
19 I of the door. That's all I know. 
20 Q When? When did you see this business in operation? 
21 A Pardon me? 
22 Q When? 
23 A I did not see a business in operation. I just said 
24 I — I assumed there was one. There was a gentlemen there, 
25 people going outside the door. 
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Q Oh, all right. So you don't know what it was, but 
that was the name that was on the building. 
A Yes, sir. That was the name of the business that was 
there, yes. 
Q Twenty-five years ago. It was called El Buracho? 
A El Buracho, yes. 
Q Now, was there ever an actual hotel, in your 
recollection, at 207 25th Street? 
A I don't recall one, sir. 
Q There's a sign on the structure that says "Helena" or 
"Helena Hotel"? 
A Yes, sir. It's a historic sign is on it. 
Q You don't, in your tenure at least, you don't 
remember there ever being a business operating there by that 
name? 
A Not that I can recall, sir. 
Q Okay. Or any other name, for that matter? 
A Not that I can recall. 
Q You haven't seen any other businesses operated at 
either of these locations, have you? 
A Not at - 207-211 I don't recall. 
Q Have you checked the registration on these two 
buildings to see who actually owns these two buildings? 
A Yes, sir, we have. 
Q I mean have you gone over to the county assessor's 
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office, the county recorder's office? 
A We have access to those records, yes, sir. 
Q When I look at your letters, they're both addressed 
to Westland Development, LLC — a limited liability company, I 
suppose — and an address in Layton. Is that your understanding 
of the ownership of these two buildings? 
A Yes, sir. According to records we derived from Weber 
County that is it. 
Q Have you checked with the Secretary of State and 
ascertained who the owners or members of the LLC are, Westland 
Development Corporation? 
A No, sir, I have not. 
Q You don't know who they are, they being the owners? 
A That's the address. 
Q You talked with Mr. Bruce Edwards. I think the 
question was put to you by Mr. Junk: "Who have you talked with 
who represented responsibility for this building?" You said 
Bruce Edwards. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q So Bruce Edwards obviously was not an LLC. He's a 
real, living person, I assume. Yes? 
A That would be a fair assumption, yes. 
Q The owners of these two buildings happen to be legal 
fictions called a limited liability corporation, in both 
instances, to your knowledge, Westland Development, LLC, of 
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1 Layton. 
2 MR. JUNK: Your Honor, at this time, I guess I would 
3 ask if I could just interrupt. I would just ask the Court to 
4 take judicial notice that one of the cases that we have for 
5 disposition today is a zoning case dealing with both — or at 
6 I least 207 -
7 MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, if counsel wants to 
8 interrupt to -
9 MR. JUNK: Well, I just -
10 MR. KNOWLTON: - introduce evidence -
11 MR. JUNK: No. All I'm asking is the Court -
12 MR. KNOWLTON: - he's going to have to do it during 
13 his opening. 
14 MR. JUNK: Well, I'm just asking the Court to take 
15 judicial notice that Mr. Edwards has pled guilty — 
16 MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, he's out of -
17 MR. JUNK: - to -
18 MR. KNOWLTON: Counsel's out of order at this point. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you hold off -
20 MR. JUNK: Okay. 
21 MR. KNOWLTON: If he wants to -
22 THE COURT: Let's just finish the cross. 
23 MR. KNOWLTON: If the Court to judicially note 
24 something — 
25 THE COURT: All right. 
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MR. KNOWLTON: - he's asked the Court to take 
evidence — 
MR. JUNK: Well, I think -
MR. KNOWLTON: His turn to take evidence is when I'm 
not cross-examining. 
MR. JUNK: Then I will object in that this isn't 
irrelevant because we have — the ownership of these particular 
buildings has already been determined on other cases that have 
been before the court. Mr. Edwards has pled guilty — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, that's -
MR. JUNK: — to zoning violations at both of these 
properties as the owner, and therefore I would ask — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, counsel's not objecting to 
any question — 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let's -
MR. KNOWLTON: - that's pending before this witness. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. I'm objecting in the — I'm 
objecting — 
THE COURT: I'm not sure it makes any difference at 
this point. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, he's -
THE COURT: I mean what I have - what I have so far 
by way of evidence is that the defendant claims responsibility 
for the buildings. I don't care who they're registered to or 
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1 OGDEN, UTAH; THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002; 11:30 A.M. 
2 HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G 
4 THE CLERK: This is the time set for disposition on 
5 Ogden City vs. Bruce Edwards, case number 011904365, case 
6 number 021900506, and the time set for trial on case number 
7 021900315 and case number 021900420. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Knowlton, you're here on 
9 behalf of Mr. Edwards? 
10 MR. KNOWLTON: Yes, I am, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to proceed, 
12 then? 
13 MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I want address a small item 
14 before we do, if I can. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, we're here on an information. 
17 I've just apparently been given two pages of an amended 
18 | information. On the first page there's an allegation of 
19 violating zoning ordinances regarding windows and glass 
20 exterior doors and railings being painted, et cetera. 
21 THE COURT: Which case number are you looking at? 
22 MR. KNOWLTON: I'm looking at 021900315. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 | MR. KNOWLTON: And there's a count 1 and a count 2 on 
25 the first page — 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - one dealing with windows and glass, 
two dealing with unlawful signs visible from the adjacent 
street. On the second page, there are two more counts, 
numbered 1 and 2, and counsel tells me there's yet two other 
counts that bring us here today, although I haven't seen that. 
MR. JUNK: Well, it's on there, a different case. 
There's two different cases. They're both -
MR. KNOWLTON: We were here before, Judge Taylor, and 
we agreed to continue the trial as to counts 1 and 2 on the 
first page of the criminal number I just gave you. And one of 
the reasons we agreed to continue that, Judge, was because 
there are some issues in litigation, I suppose, between 
Mr. Edwards and the city dealing with the constitutionality of 
the ordinances in question, and that specifically deals with 
some sign ordinances that the city has, and I think that 
relates in a similar way to count 1 as well. 
And as I rethought this, this — obviously that's been 
continued until after the signage litigation and the 
constitutional issues are resolved. I don't know if it makes 
any sense for us to be proceeding to trial on the other counts 
at the same criminal information. They're not necessarily the 
same, but it seems to me, instead of piecemealing this out, if 
Mr. Edwards were convicted today of a couple of counts of 
failure to register a vacant building and failure to make 
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what name they're in at this point. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: All the evidence I have from Mr. Glover 
is that the defendant told him he was responsible for the 
buildings. So go ahead. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I appreciate that. Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) I think you said that you observed 
these two buildings on at least two occasions. You actually 
personally went down and looked at them? 
A Yes, sir, I have. 
Q All right. And you told Mr. Junk that the first time 
you went down and made a personal observation would have been 
in the fall of I guess last year, November of 2001? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q So what did you do? Just walk down and look at it 
from the sidewalk? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. What was your observation? 
A I could see through the windows. It didn't look like 
there was anybody there. 
Q I see. So November — do you know what day of 
November that was? 
A No, sir, I don't recall. 
Q Do you know how long you were there? 
A Five, ten minutes maybe. 
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Q Why were you there? 
A Why was I there? 
Q Yeah. I mean did you make a special trip to go down 
and look at these buildings? 
A Well, part of it is — was the prelude to the actual 
ordinance itself — 
Q I see. So — 
A — and trying to get some background on the numbers of 
buildings perhaps that we would be affecting by the ordinance. 
Q In November of last year there wasn't even an 
ordinance in effect, not at least a — 
A No, sir. 
Q — building ordinance? 
A No. 
Q Okay. So you went down there, and you looked at the 
building, and you looked in some windows, you didn't see 
anything. Is that your testimony? 
A Yes, sir, I think it would be. 
Q How long were you there? Five or ten minutes? 
A About that, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And then your next observation was January 9th 
or 13th, sometime between the 9th and the 13th of this year? 
Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q How long were you there that time? 
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A About the same, and I walked past probably five, ten 
minutes maybe. 
Q Five to ten minutes. I mean, so what? You just 
went — you didn't go inside the building on either occasion? 
A No, sir. The buildings were locked. 
Q Did you check to see if the doors were locked? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And you looked in the building on — do you 
know what day it would have been between the 9th and the 13th? 
A No, sir. I don't recall the exact date. I 
unfortunately don't keep — keep a journal, so... 
Q All right. So it could have been — it could have 
been any one of those dates? 
A Yes, sir, it could have. 
Q Could have been the 13th? Yes? 
A Could have been, yes, sir. 
Q Well, why do you think it would the 9th or — through 
the 13th? Could it have been the 14th? 
A No. I'm referring to or relying on the letter from 
Mr. Edwards and my notes therein, so that was about the time 
frame that we would have been involved. 
Q I see. So on one of these days you were there for 
five minutes. You didn't enter the premises, and you just 
looked in the window and you didn't see anybody there? 
A Yes, sir, that's true. 
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Q Okay. And that could have been anytime — no sooner 
than the 9th, I guess you would say, or later than the 13th? 
A Yes, sir, that's right, about right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have for you, 
Mr. Glover. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other redirect? 
MR. JUNK: I just have... 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q Now, between the period of time of November of 2001, 
the time that you first have testified looking through or 
looking at the building, up to then the January 9th through 
13th, when you looked at the building on those two occasions, 
what would be the differences that you observed in the 
buildings from the two different times? 
A I don't suspect there would have been any real 
difference, sir. They would have looked substantially the same 
on both occasions. 
Q Is that what you're saying — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, he's just speculating if 
he's saying he suspects. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: If he knows, he can tell us. If he 
doesn't know... 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) From what you recollect and what you 
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observed, was there a difference? 
A No, sir. 
Q The buildings were in the same condition on November 
that they were in January? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. JUNK: That's all the questions I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other questions? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Glover, you can step 
down. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you want to call your next witness? 
MR. JUNK: Yes. If I can just confer with Mr. Glover 
for just one second. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
MICHAEL MCDONALD, 
having been first duly sworn, called 
at the instance of the plaintiff, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q State your name and your occupation. 
A Michael McDonald, building inspector for Ogden City. 
Q And, Mr. McDonald, are you familiar with the 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
buildings located at 205 and at 207 25th Street? 
A Yes. 
Q And were you — did you do some inspecting of those 
particular buildings at some time? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And from those - from those inspections, did you also 
send out — or at the direction of Wayne Glover did you send out 
letters to the individuals that were listed as owners on it? 
A Yes. My — I was to make the initial inspection, go 
through Weber County, find the ownership through Weber County, 
generate letters, and then mail those letters out. 
MR. JUNK: And, your Honor, if I could approach. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) I'm going to show — I'm going to show 
you what's been marked as City's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 3 for 
identification. Are you familiar with those letters? 
A Yes, I am. These are the letters that we generate 
and have — that are sent out, and this is a copy of the 
abstract of ownership from Weber County. 
Q Okay. Are you the one that actually generated 
those letters? 
A Yes. I generated those letters and sent — and mailed 
those out. 
Q Okay. And those were for the properties listed as 
the guardian on those? 
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A Correct. 
Q Okay. And did you actually physically go inspect 
those — that property? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And did you generate some type of notification or 
something that you do, or notice of inspection? 
A Yes. 
Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as City's 
Exhibit No. 4 for identification. Are you familiar with that 
particular document? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And what does that represent? 
A That represents that on January 9th that I went by 
207 25th and did a vacant-building inspection, determining 
whether it was vacant, if there were any violations to the 
ordinance that we have. 
Q And in looking at that building, did you determine 
whether or not it was vacant? 
A From all indications, yes, it appeared to be vacant. 
Q What did you observe? Did you — 
A There was no activity. The doors were locked. Signs 
in the window. Just nobody appeared to be in there, about, 
around, or anything of that nature. 
Q Okay. That was for the 207 that you've indicated. 
Did you also look at 205, which is sometimes termed El Buracho? 
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A Yes, I believe I did go by that, probably — it should 
have been around the same time. I would have done both 
buildings at the same time. 
Q Okay. Did you see any activity or anything going on 
in that building? 
A At the time I went by, I did not. 
Q Okay. Did you make a determination of whether or not 
they were vacant? 
A I made the determj^ation tJB^MiSXJSSJ^ -
Q Okay. And tha t was — based on tha t i s what then 
generated the l e t t e r ? 
A Correct. 
MR. JUNK: That's all the questions I have of this 
witness, your Honor. I will move to admit Exhibit No. 4. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: [Unintelligible.] 
THE COURT: You bet. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 received) 
/// 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Mr. McDonald, let me ask you about Exhibit 4. And 
you say that this is a work order or this inspection report, 
you only went down looked at this building, at least one of the 
buildings? 
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A Correct. 207 25th is the communication on this piece 
of paper. 
Q So this doesn't say both, though; it says you went on 
the job address and inspected 205 25th Street. 
A 207 25th. 
Q I'm sorry. 207 25th Street. 
A Yes. 
Q And then it's dated, the date you did it, I guess 
J a n u arx*$**,f*L-
A Yes. 
Q — of this year. What time of the day was it you were 
there? Can you tell from this report? 
A Yeah, it would have been between the hours of 12:00 
and 1:00 that I was down around the area. 
Q What day of the week was that? Do you know? 
A I don't. 
Q And so you looked at that business, and you — and you 
deemed it to be commercial property, apparently. That's the 
check mark you used. And then you thought it was vacant 
because of what? Because the door was locked? 
A Yes, the doors were locked. There's was no 
indication of any activity in there. 
Q What do you mean? You looked in the windows and 
couldn't see anybody? 
A Well, the areas that could look through, yeah, that's 
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what I did. I mean I'd go by and look in and see if there's 
any kind of counter tops, personnel secretaries. 
Q So you looked inside the windows. There were some 
signs in the windows that obscured much of the — 
A Yes. 
Q — vision; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And so that you couldn't look into every room? 
A No. No, I couldn't. 
Q But where the windows were not covered or had a sign, 
you were able to peek in and didn't see anybody inside? 
A No, I did not. 
Q So based on that — of course this is during the lunch 
hour, too — 
A Yes. 
Q — when people typically go to lunch. 
A I guess it would be. 
Q Between 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock during the working day, 
it wouldn't be surprising if they locked the door 
[unintelligible]? 
A Well, I would hope they would hang a sign on the 
window stating "Out for lunch. Be back at 1:00 o'clock." I 
mean... 
Q Did you ever actually go inside the building? 
A No, sir, I did not. 
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Q You've never been inside that building? 
A No. I've never been in that building. 
Q Now, do you have another work order for building 205? 
A I would assume that there would be, but I'm not sure 
where that would be at this time. 
Q So the exhibit you've got there only talks about 207? 
A Right. 
Q That's the Helena Hotel. 
A Correct. 
Q Counsel asked you if you'd looked at 205 that same 
day, and if you did, I'd assume you'd made out a work order for 
the separate address, right? 
A I normally would have, yes, but where they were owned 
by the same owner, I might not have made a work order for that. 
Q So you don't know if you made a work order for that 
one — 
A No. 
Q — or whether you inspected the other one or not? 
A Correct. Well, I did — I did look — I did look at 
it. I walked down the sidewalk. I looked at it and made the 
same determination of it too. 
Q What was that? You just couldn't see anybody inside? 
A Correct, and it appeared to be vacant to me. 
Q How many windows were you able to look in? 
A I don't recall at this time. There would have a 
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1 couple at least. I would have gone into, you know, one window 
2 per building at least and peered in one of them. 
3 Q So you'd have looked on the ground floor on this? 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q All of these are multistoried buildings? 
6 A Yes. 
7 MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. That's all. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else? 
9 MR. JUNK: Yes. 
10 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 I BY MR. JUNK: 
12 Q Well, what did you see in the buildings when you 
13 looked in? 
14 A Just vacant, open space, some lumber. Other than 
15 that, nothing. No — 
16 Q When you say lumber, what do you mean by that? 
17 A There was just some plyboard, lumber, boards laying 
18 around. I didn't see anything that would indicate that there 
19 was anything businesslike going in that. 
20 Q Were there finished rooms, or... 
21 J A Not that I could tell from where I was looking. It 
22 just looked like an open area. 
23 MR. JUNK: All right. That's all the questions I 
24 J have. 
25 THE COURT: Anything else? 
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1 MR. KNOWLTON: No. 
2 THE COURT: All right, sir, you can step down. 
3 Anything else from the city? 
4 MR. JUNK: No, your Honor. We'd rest at this time. 
5 MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, we'd move to dismiss both 
6 counts for failure of any evidence on the city to show beyond a 
7 reasonable doubt at this point that either of these buildings 
8 were empty or vacant under the definition provided under the 
9 ordinance on the dates in question. 
10 The dates in question, of course, are alleged in the 
11 information of January 1st through the 12th. We have this last 
12 witness. He said he went to 207 and filled out a report, and 
13 he said he looked in the windows, didn't see any people or 
14 activity. I don't know that that's really the same thing as 
15 the ordinance requires. The ordinance defines vacant as: 
16 "A, empty, B, not occupied on a regular 
17 basis by an occupant, or, C, not used by a 
18 person on a regular basis for the usual and 
19 customary purposes for which a building was 
20 designed and lawfully permitted." 
21 And then he says that he thought he looked into 205 
22 and then went to 207, where he filled out his report. When he 
23 looked in there, and he says he couldn't see all of it, but he 
24 looked in places where he could because there were — the view 
25 was obstructed by signs. And during the lunch hour on this 
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day, the 9th, he didn't see any persons or activity. 
I don't know that the Court could conclude, based 
on — beyond a reasonable doubt on that evidence alone. That's 
the only evidence really we have except for Mr. Glover whose 
testified that he went down there during that time, either the 
9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, or 13th. And it could well have been the 
13th as easy as the 9th from his testimony, and that would be on 
the day after the information, which is the 1st through the 
12th. 
So based on the testimony of Mr. McDonald, I don't 
see how this Court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the cursory inspection during the lunch hour would 
establish empty or vacant by that definition beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
THE COURT: Any response? 
MR. JUNK: Well, your Honor, if we did rely 
completely on Mr. McDonald I may tend to agree with 
Mr. Knowlton, but I think if you look at Mr. Glover's 
testimony, he's actually been into the property and gave a 
description on the property. He also gave a description from 
November and then tied that up up into January. And he had 
indicated, yes, it was somewhere between the 9th and 13th, but 
he also testified that the property had not changed during that 
period of time. 
So the Court can make the obvious inference that if 
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he inspects it before the filing of the information, and 
inspects it either right during the time frame of when we filed 
or just barely after, he's been in the property, looked at 
before, looked at it after, then I think the inference is there 
that it has been the same throughout that period of time. 
We use those same inferences all the time as far as, 
you know, testing machinery, if it's functioning on a date in 
November and a date in January, then the inference obviously is 
that it's the same and functioning the same during the interim. 
So that would be our argument on this particular. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: But in response, Judge, Mr. Glover 
says that he didn't inspect the building on those two 
occasions, that he didn't go inside. He says, "I was down 
there in the fall, in November of 2001, before there even was 
an ordinance passed. I was there for five minutes, and I just 
looked in the windows, and I didn't see anybody from the 
sidewalk," is my recollection. 
And then he says on January 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, one of 
those days, he doesn't know which, he just knows it was before 
Bruce's letter, which is dated the 13th. He says, "I was there 
for five minutes and made a - on the sidewalk looking into the 
windows on the ground floor." He does not inspect inside on 
either of those occasions. That's the essence of his testimony, 
at least is my recollection. 
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THE COURT: All right. Well, my understanding from 
the testimony of Mr. Glover was that he was there between the 
9th and the 13th of this year. He testified the buildings were 
not occupied, that there was no one there in either one of the 
buildings. In fact, he said in one of the buildings it 
appeared that there was some partial construction going on, and 
that it was his opinion it was not habitable, which means there 
couldn't have been anybody there, at least in his opinion. 
Then you had Mr. McDonald saying in his opinion — he 
was there on the 9th — he said the buildings appeared to be 
vacant. There was no one there. There was no activity. The 
doors were locked. It appeared to be that there was a lot of 
open space. There was lumber, plywood inside, but no 
activities. 
I think based on that, I'll deny your motion. 
MR. KNOWLTON: All right. I'd call Bruce Edwards to 
the stand. 
THE COURT: All right. 
BRUCE EDWARDS, 
having been first duly sworn, called 
at the instance of the defendant, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Tell us your name, please. 
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A Bruce Edwards. 
Q Where do you live, Mr. Edwards? 
A 4695 Birch Creek, South Ogden. 
Q Now, do you have any connection with these properties 
that we're talking about, 205 25th Street? 
A I do. 
Q Who's the owner of these properties? 
A Westland Development. 
Q That is an LLC, is it not? 
A It is. 
Q And if I recall, your parents were — and/or your 
mother or both your parents were members of that LLC. 
A That is correct. 
Q They're both now deceased? 
A They are. 
Q You have been in control and/or management of these 
two properties, at least during the times talked about in the 
information, January 1st through January 12th of this year; is 
that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q Okay. Let me talk about — let's talk about 
205 25th Street. That's the first of these two buildings. Is 
that the corner? 
A It is. 
Q These are — are they adjoining buildings? 
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1 A They're adjacent to each other. They are adjoining, 
2 yes. 
3 Q Can you access one from the other? 
4 A You can. 
5 Q So they're really one as far as being contiguous 
6 properties? 
7 A They are in that — in that context. 
8 Q What's the history on 205? Was there - what is 
9 there? 
10 A 205 is a brick, two-story building that was built in 
11 I 1896. 
12 I Q Well, wait. Is this on the historic register in 
13 Ogden? 
14 A Yes, it is. 
15 Q Okay. Keep going. 
16 A The building has been — was originally built as a bar 
17 on the main level and a brothel on the upstairs. 
18 Q A brothel. You mean a brothel as in a home of ill 
19 repute? 
20 A That is correct. 
21 Q Okay. What was the year of construction of this 
22 property? 
23 A The El Buracho was built in 1896. 
24 [ Q 1896. Okay. And during your recollection, has 
25 either - has there been a bar operating on that business? 
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1 A I have never — I have never seen a business occupied 
2 in the El Buracho doing business on — a retail business on a 
3 day-to-day basis. 
4 Q All right. How about the other building? Describe 
5 the other building for me, 207 25th Street. 
6 A 207 is a three-story brick building that was built in 
7 1906. It's on the National Historic Register. It's commonly 
8 referred — historically referred to as the Helena Hotel. 
9 Q And do you know what that building was designed for? 
10 A Storage of property and people. 
11 Q Okay. And let's talk about - let's talk about 
12 January 1st through the 9th. Were these properties vacant 
13 during that period of time? 
14 A No, they were not. 
15 Q What use was being made by the owners of this 
16 property at 205 25th Street? 
17 A 205 25th Street, there is all kinds of personal -
18 storage of personal property. There is building materials. 
19 Q Let me stop you there for a minute. First of all, 
20 during the dates between January 9th and January 12th of this 
21 year, and relating to 205 only, was that premises empty during 
22 that time frame? 
23 A No, it was not. 
24 Q I mean empty meaning no people, no property in it. 
25 A No. That - that property has never been empty in the 
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last three or four years. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I don't care about that. During those days — 
But during those days, no, it was not empty. 
So what was inside of it? 
There was — January there — I probably had moved — 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I'm building a deck on my house, and so I'm — I had the 
materials was being stored for the deck. There is restaurant 
equipment for the property across the street. The historic own 
a basis in the El Buracho. 
Q On what floors? 
A On the main level. 
Q All right. What else? 
A There is refrigerators and a fry — restaurant 
equipment. There is my son's toys and things like — and 
clothing that he's grown out of I have stored there. 
Q So were you using it for storage? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that a legal use of that property, to your 
knowledge? 
MR. JUNK: It calls - I'll object. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) To your knowledge, storage is a 
legal use of that property? 
A Yes. 
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Q All right. Now, how about upstairs? What would have 
been upstairs during 1 through 12 of January? 
A In the 205 25th Street? 
Q Yeah. On the corner. 
A Probably just a few tools. There's a — there's a 
table that I plan on using in an addition to my house that I'm 
doing. 
Q A table. 
A A table. It's a — kind of a breakfast table that has 
a — the built-in chairs. 
Q Were you working on it? 
A Excuse me? 
Q Were you working on it? 
A No. 
Q Was it being stored there? 
A Just stored there. 
Q All right. 
A Actually, there's — there wasn't a whole lot on the 
second floor. 
Q All right. 
A There's — oh. There's a huge amount of HVAC 
equipment stored on the building. 
Q What is HVAC? 
A Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning. 
Q Who put it there? 
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1 A Who put it there? I did. 
2 Q And what is that material? 
3 A Material to be used for heating and air conditioning 
4 and ventilation for that building, for the Helena Hotel, and 
5 for other projects I'm involved in. 
6 Q Is that a lawful use of this property, to your 
7 knowledge? 
8 A It would be. 
9 Q Okay. Now, let me read you this definition, and I'm 
10 going to talk to 205 only. 
11 A Okay. 
12 Q Tell me if this property was not occupied on a 
13 regular basis by an occupant during January 1st through 
14 January 12th. 
15 A It was. 
16 Q Was it occupied on a regular basis? 
17 A It was. 
18 Q Who was the occupant? 
19 A Myself. 
20 Q Okay. With what regularity were you in 
21 205 25th Street between January 1st through 12th of this year? 
22 A My recollection, at that period of time I was — I was 
23 there every day. 
24 Q Including weekends? 
25 A Including weekends. 
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Q And what were you doing there on a daily basis? 
A A number of things. I have an — on 205 25th Street, 
I was there taking stuff there from — and cleaning out my 
garage at my — at my house and storing stuff there. 
Q You mean delivering things from the home and your 
garage to be stored at that premises? 
A That is correct. 
Q Okay. What else? 
A And approximate — during that time period, I was 
placing signs in my windows on the main level. 
Q And you put quite a number of signs in, didn't you, 
during that time? 
A I did. There was probably about 25 signs that was 
placed on 205 25th Street. 
Q These were signs of a commercial nature, or not? 
A No. They were signs that I had put up to — to my 
frustration — 
Q What did the signs say? 
MR. JUNK: Well, I don't know that that's really 
relevant to — 
MR. KNOWLTON: It's relevant to whether it's vacant 
or not, and there's a definition of vacant meaning whether it's 
occupied or being used on a regular basis -
THE COURT: Right. But isn't -
MR. KNOWLTON: - for legal, customary purposes. 
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THE COURT: But isn't that the basis for the other 
two — I don't know what — whether something's on the sign makes 
any difference. He put up signs. That's probably enough, 
isn't it, to — 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Well, was the building used for 
the purpose — 
A Yes. 
Q This is not necessarily a commercial sign? 
A No. They — they were noncommercial speech, political 
signs. 
Q Okay. Messages of your own to the community? 
A That is correct. 
Q All right. Was there anything unlawful about that 
activity, to your knowledge, at that time? 
A At that time there was not. 
Q Okay. Was it a purposeful action and use of this 
property on your part? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q All right. Now, let me ask you this — let me just 
read this to you. 
"...not used by a person on a regular 
basis for the usual and customary purposes for 
which a building is designed and lawfully 
permitted." 
Does that meet the definition of your building at 
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permitted function . in Ogden, 
Utah, in 2002, I assume. 
A Unfortunately not. 
Q All right. But to your knowledge, placing signs on 
it was lawfully permitted? 
A That was correct. 
Q All right. Storing tools in it was lawfully 
permitted? 
A That is correct. 
Q Moving materials in and out of it for storage 
purposes was a lawful purpose, to your knowledge? 
A That is correct. 
Q Okay. Now, let's go to 207. That's the adjacent 
hotel building. 
A That is correct. 
Q I assume, then — if you know, do you know what that 
building was designed to do? 
A To store people and their possessions. 
Q Okay. Do you know if it was — did you ever see it 
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i 
operate as a hotel? 
A No. 
Q That was before your time? 
A Yeah. It was — yeah, it had closed down before I 
think we had even moved to the state. 
Q Between the dates January 1st through January 12th, 
was this building, 207, empty? 
A It was not. 
Q Why not? 
A ^Cause I had an office located on the second floor. 
Q Tell me about the office on the second floor. 
A I have a couch, a desk, a little refrigerator, a 
drafting table, pictures, files. 
Q How much space is occupied by that office? 
A Oh, it's approximately 400 square feet. 
Q Is there anything illegal about having an office on 
25th Street at this location? 
A For my purpose, I — there's — 
Q Is an office space a permitted use in that area of 
the city? 
A It is. 
Q Okay. Did you have office equipment in it? 
A I do. 
Q And was it there throughout January 1st through 12th? 
A It was. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
1
 Q 
shop? 
A 
all kind 
Q 
frame? 
What else was there? 
I have a wood shop. 
Where's the wood shop? 
Downstairs on the main level. 
And what materials or equipment made up your wood 
I have a planer, table saws, a jointer, chop saws, 
— all kinds of power tools. 
Okay. Were they in use by you during that time 
A Probably not. 
Q Okay. I mean was — you're talking about wood-shop 
equipment? 
A Wood-shop equipment. It's actually a room dedicated 
for doing woodwork. 
Q I mean do you — have you been doing woodwork in that 
location? 
A I have. 
Q Maybe not during the 1st through the 12th -
A Yes. 
Q — but at times before that? 
A I have. And in times subsequent to that, I have. 
Q Oh. That's a personal hobby of yours? 
A It is. 
Q And a personal activity that you're engaged in? 
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A 
Q 
That is correct. 
Is there something illegal about conducting a 
wood-shop activity at 25th Street? 
A 
Q 
through 
A 
Q 
A 
Not to my knowledge. 
So if I'd have looked through the windows on the 1st 
the 12th, what would I have seen on the first floor? 
On the 207? 
207 we're talking about. 
You would have seen a huge amount of restaurant 
equipment on the west side of the building. 
Q That would be storage, again? 
A Storage. 
Q Okay. 
A Probably a couple of commercial refrigerators. 
Q Storage? 
A Maybe a motorcycle. A lot of boxes of personal 
property that belongs to me. 
Q Okay. 
A And... 
Q Now, would it be fair to say that 207, during the 
time frames that we're talking about here, was not empty? 
A No, 207 was not empty. 
Q All right. Was it occupied on a regular basis by an 
occupant? 
A It was. 
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Q Who was that occupant? 
A That would have been myself. 
Q Okay. Was it being used by a person on a regular 
basis? 
A It was. 
Q How regular were you using that property, 207, 
between the 1st and the 12th? 
A Approximately every day. 
Q Okay. And was it being used for the usual and 
customary purposes for which this building was designed and/or 
built? 
A It was. 
Q Okay. Storage of persons or property? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. All right. Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover? 
Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover? 
A Excuse me? 
Q Do you know Mr. Wayne Glover? 
A I do. Sorry, I didn't hear you. 
Q Did you pick up a couple of letters that were sent to 
you from his office dated January 9th? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. I'll just ask you to take a look. I think 
I've got correct copies of those documents. Do you know when 
they received - when they were received by you? 
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1 A I received them I believe about the 14th. 
2 Q Okay. They are dated the 9th. 
3 A Yeah. 
4 Q If they were mailed the 9th, would you have received 
5 them at that address in Layton on the 9th? 
6 A No, I would have not. 
7 Q So it would almost certainly be some day later than 
8 the 9th? 
9 A That is correct. 
10 Q So you think it was the 13th? I'm sorry. Did you 
11 say — 
12 A 13? I - I think I said the 14th, but... 
13 Q All right. 
14 A Approximately the 14th. 
15 Q And then apparently you responded to that with a 
16 letter that you delivered to Mr. Glover? 
17 A I did. 
18 Q Okay. Have you registered either of these buildings 
19 as being vacant under the Ogden City ordinances? 
20 A I have not. 
21 Q Tell me why not, Mr. Edwards. 
22 A Well, for a number of reasons. The first reason is, 
23 in reading the definition of vacant pursuant to the ordinance, 
24 it is my belief and opinion that the buildings do not meet that 
25 criteria. 
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1 Q What about vacant? 
2 MR. JUNK: Well, are you going to - I'll object to 
3 that, him commenting on his testimony. 
4 MR. KNOWLTON: I will withdraw it. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Let me ask you this question, Mr. 
7 Edwards. 
8 I A Okay. 
9 Q Are these buildings leased to anybody for any reason? 
10 A They are currently. 
11 I Q When were they leased? 
12 A Both buildings have been leased, I believe, since 
13 about the first part of July. 
14 Q This summer? 
15 MR. JUNK: Well, then I'll object to anything about a 
16 I lease. 
17 J Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Okay. Have they been used in the -
18 well, let me — for what purpose are they being leased? 
19 I MR. JUNK: Well, I'll object to that, too. I don't -
20 MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I think I'm entitled to relate 
21 it back. 
22 THE COURT: We want to tie it back to January? 
23 Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Have you ever leased these 
24 buildings in the past? 
25 A I have not. 
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I 
Q Okay. 
A Well, I have to modify that. I have. 
Q All right. Have you received income from them in the 
past? 
A I have. 
Q Tell me about it. What was -
A Approximately twice a year some movie company comes 
into Ogden, and they want to shoot down on 25th Street, and 
almost inevitably I end up leasing the buildings to some movie 
company, television series. 
Q All right. And with what regularity has that 
happened to either of these buildings in the past? 
A Approximately twice a year I enter into some kind of 
agreement with a movie company. Sometimes I get paid; 
sometimes I don't. 
Q So there has been at least this use that you have put 
them to? 
A That is correct. 
Q All right. And is there a use being made to them 
now? 
A Yes. They are currently leased to a television 
series called "Everwood." 
Q For how long? 
A Currently there is twelve months still pending on one 
lease with the company, one of - their lease either expiring 
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this month or it expires next month, and they just renewed 
their lease about three weeks ago. 
Q How much is this paying them? 
MR. JUNK: Object. I don't see what relevance this 
really has to us. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, it certainly has some relevance, 
your Honor. It shows the purpose for which the owner is making 
use of his property. 
THE COURT: Well, but the key question is in January 
of this year whether or not they were vacant. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I think if he was holding the 
property in readiness for leasehold purposes and leasing 
purposes. 
THE COURT: But he didn't lease them till July. 
MR. KNOWLTON: What? 
THE COURT: He didn't lease them till July. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, then they're not leased all the 
time. 
THE COURT: So why would - I guess that's the 
question. Why is what he did with them in July relevant to 
what is being charged in January? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, yes. I'll withdraw that. It's 
not really that important. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have for 
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Mr. Edwards. 
I have 
there 
day? 
THE COURT: 
the Roy City 
at 1:15. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
JUNK: 
COURT: 
Let 
court 
And, 
me ask you before 
calendar at 
you 
Could we 
KNOWLTON: That' 
know, I' 
\ finish 
s why I 
1:30, 
we go 
and I 
've got an — 
any : 
need 
further. 
to be 
this trial on another 
tried to get you to 
continue it. 
THE COURT: Well, I know. We got about two-thirds of 
the way through, so... 
MR. JUNK: I have an adoption at 1:30 -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUNK: — unless it's canceled. 
MR. KNOWLTON: [Unintelligible.] 
THE COURT: Yeah, if we could, and we can finish, and 
that will give you a chance to talk to your attorney, and then 
do the cross. Can we do it tomorrow? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I haven't read my book, but I think 
I'm pretty open. 
THE COURT: Are you? Well, I've got all afternoon, 
or we could do it at the end of the city calendar. 
MR. KNOWLTON: The afternoon I think would be my 
choice. 
MR. JUNK: Huh? 
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THE COURT: 
MR. JUNK: 
do it at 10:00? 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
Bad choice? 
I think we — how about like 10:00? 
How long is the city calendar? 
There's not very many. 
Can we 
THE COURT: It's not very many? 
Do you want to shoot for 10:00 or 10:30 tomorrow 
morning? 
Are you okay with that, Mr. Edwards? 
MR. KNOWLTON: 10:00 *o clock? 
MR. JUNK: 10:00 o'clock tomorrow? 
THE COURT: Yes. All right. Well, we'll see you 
tomorrow morning, then, at 10:00 o'clock. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken, to be resumed 
on Friday, October 18, 2002, at 10:00 a.m.) 
-c-
OGDEN, UTAH - OCTOBER 18, 2002 - 10:15 A.M. 
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1 HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Bruce Edwards. We have, I think, two 
4 cases we were trying, and I think Mr. Edwards was on the 
5 witness stand when we took a recess yesterday. 
6 Do you want him to come back up, please? 
7 MR. KNOWLTON: Yes. 
8 Bruce, step right up. 
9 THE COURT: All right. And this is on case 0420 and 
10 0315. All right. Go ahead, if you're ready, then. 
11 BRUCE EDWARDS, 
12 having been previously duly sworn, called 
13 at the instance of the defendant, testified 
14 further upon his oath as follows: 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed) 
16 BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
17 Q Mr. Edwards, let me just — yesterday I asked you 
18 about some notices that were sent from Ogden City to Westland 
19 Development, two letters dated March [sic] 9th. I asked if you 
20 received them or ever saw them, and I believe you stated you 
21 had. 
22 A I did. That is correct. 
23 Q And the question I had was when you would have seen 
24 them for the first time. 
25 A I received those on January 13th or 14th. 
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That is correct. 
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Okay. 
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registration of th: 
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ilding, or 
Q Yes, sir, after that. 
A Not in writing. 
Q Okay. I'm just looking at the provision of the 
ordinance that suggests that there's ten days. You have ten 
days to comply after given the written notification? 
A Yes, there is. 
Q Did you — when would this ten days have come up? 
A It would have had to come up at — no sooner than 
January 19th. 
Q So if you got it the 9th, the date it was actually 
dated, then you'd have had the ten days up to the 19th to 
register. Is that what you're saying? 
A That would be correct. 
Q Okay. If you got it the 14th, you'd have until the 
24th -
A That's -
Q - with the ordinance? 
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1 A Yeah. That — that should be logically correct. 
2 Q Okay. Let me show you a couple of photographs that I 
3 will mark. Counsel has indicated there may be another way to 
4 handle that, but let me proceed just for a second. You 
5 testified yesterday that you occupied both of these buildings. 
6 A That is correct. 
7 Q And I think you indicated there is an office. You 
8 maintain an office in these buildings? 
9 A Yes, I do. 
10 Q Which floor is your office on? 
11 A The second floor of the Helena Hotel. 
12 Q Could someone observe that from the sidewalk looking 
13 in one of the windows? 
14 A No, they would not be able to. 
15 Q Okay. And then I think you indicate that there is 
16 some materials that you have stored in both buildings? 
17 A There is. 
18 Q And a wood shop? 
19 A There is. 
20 Q Where is the wood shop? 
21 A The wood shop is in the - the south portion of the 
22 Helena. The Helena's kind of shaped like the state of Utah -
23 Q All right. 
24 A - and it's - so it's in that little top square kind 
25 of section of the -
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Q 
level? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Can someone observe that shop from the outside street 
No, they would not be able to. 
With what regularity did you occupy these buildings? 
I am generally down there at least six days — 
Let me be more specific. Between the 1st and the 12th 
of January of this year, with what regularity were you actually 
there, if at all, on these premises? 
A My best recollection — recollection between 
January 1st and January 12th is I was there every day. 
Q How long would you be on a daily basis during that 
time frame? 
A Probably no less than an hour or two on Sundays, and 
as long as maybe eight to ten hours on other days. 
Q Do you take your son with you there from time to 
time? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
there. 
Q 
I do. 
How old is he? 
He would have been four in January. 
Did he use this building as you do? 
No, not as I do, but he has — 
I see some toys in these pictures. 
He has toys and things like that that are available 
Let me show you Exhibits 5 and 6. Tell me what these 
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photographs — tell me what they are. 
A Exhibit No, 5 is pictures of the interior of the 
El Buracho, or 201 - or 205 25th Street, and these pictures 
were taken in September but reasonably reflect the property 
that was — was in the building during January. 
Q All right. So they reasonably and accurately depict 
the condition of the building in January of this year? 
A Yes, they do. 
MR. KNOWLTON: We'd move the admission of 5 and 6, 
Judge. 
MR. JUNK: When were those pictures taken? 
MR. KNOWLTON: September. 
THE COURT: September. 
MR. JUNK: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll admit D-5. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 5 received) 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) And apparently it shows your desk, 
does it not, on one of them? 
A Yeah. For the admission number 6, the top center 
picture is a picture of my office and the bottom left — the 
right-hand corner picture is a picture of my office. It shows 
a toolbox with miscellaneous, you know. There's a chop saw, 
and there's tools and things in there. It shows a picture of 
my son's little Jeep, pictures of plumbing supplies and 
hardware and stuff that I've stored in the building. 
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Q How about the other ones (inaudible) Exhibit 5? 
A Well, I already described this one, but — 
Q Oh. 
A Well, no I didn't. This - No. 5 is of the 
El Buracho, and it shows, you know, we use a claw-footed 
bathtub when they have special events out on 25th Street for — 
like the street — for putting soda drinks and that kind of 
stuff in, fill it full of ice and drinks. 
Q Say that again. 
A There is a claw-footed bathtub in the one picture 
that's used for special events on 25th Street, like the Street 
Festival, where we fill it full of ice and put drinks and 
things in it. 
Q So do you participate in that? 
A I have participated in numerous activities. This 
year the Street Festival was not held down on 25th Street, and 
the thing stopped at Grant. 
Q Okay. 
A And it shows a — there's a — a wok and an ice-cream 
machine and some other restaurant equipment, and a snow blower 
and exercise equipment in storage. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have. Just a 
moment, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: That's all I have. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Any cross? 
2 MR. JUNK: I'll cross. 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. JUNK: 
5 Q Now, if I understand you right, Bruce, from the 
6 pictures you've just submitted, they were taken in September? 
7 A That is correct. 
8 Q And you're saying that the property would have been 
9 in the same general condition in September that it was back in 
10 January? 
11 A That is correct. 
12 Q Now, just for the record, you don't live at these 
13 buildings, do you? 
14 A I do not. 
15 Q You have a residence somewhere else? 
16 A I do. 
17 Q Now, how long have your — have you had an interest or 
18 your family had the ownership of this property? 
19 A Six, maybe seven years. 
20 Q Okay. And, if I understand, the buildings are just 
21 located at the corner of the courthouse parking lot, just a — 
22 A They are. 
23 Q That would be the back of it. 
24 A They are. 
25 Q So just not too far from here. And when - let's see. 
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When you purchased those — I guess I'm a little familiar with 
this — you had purchased them, and your intent was to build a 
bed-and-breakfast and a restaurant? 
A I'm going to say that — that's incorrect. 
Q Okay. At some point you had that plan to build a 
bed-and-breakfast and restaurant, did you not? 
A Yeah, but they — they were never purchased. 
Q For that, or — okay. But that was — 
A [Unintelligible.] 
Q But that was your — at some point that was your 
intent, was it not, to build a bed-and-breakfast and a 
restaurant in those building? 
A That is correct. 
Q And how is it that they were going — this 
bed-and-breakfast and restaurant were to be laid out in that — 
these two buildings? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, I'm going to object as to the 
relevance. I don't know what difference it makes what he 
intended at some remote point in time. The question is whether 
or not these buildings were vacant on the dates charged, 
January 1st — 
MR. JUNK: Well, I think -
MR. KNOWLTON: - through 12th. 
MR. JUNK: But I think it goes into the customary use 
and purpose of the buildings. 
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1 MR. KNOWLTON: Not his intent. 
2 THE COURT: I'll allow it. Go ahead. 
3 Q (BY MR. JUNK) Okay. How is it that you had planned 
4 to lay out the bed-and-breakfast and the restaurant in those 
5 buildings? 
6 ! A How was my intent to lay them out? 
7 Q Yeah. Did you have some kind of plan where the 
8 restaurant would be and where the bed-and-breakfast rooms would 
9 be and how you'd — 
10 A Okay. The El Buracho was going to be possibly a 
11 restaurant, and the second and third floor of the Helena were 
12 going to be the bed-and-breakfast. 
13 Q Okay. Now, you had some partners or something that 
14 you were going to do that with? Is that -
15 A No. 
16 Q Now, if we walk through the — if we went and walked 
17 through the El Buracho — that's 205 — today, what would we see? 
18 Essentially what — are any of the pictures there? 
19 A Those pictures would reasonably reflect what's there 
20 today. In addition, there is property owned by "Everwood" 
21 stored inside the El Buracho and the Helena. 
22 Q Okay. And "Everwood" is the movie that you've leased 
23 with after; is that right? 
24 A That is correct. 
25 Q And apparently they have changed the front of the 
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building? 
A They have signs that have been attached to the — both 
buildings. 
Q Okay. But other than the "Everwood" property — 
you've got some of that. You've got the other things that 
would be in these pictures. What exactly would be there? 
A What exactly would be there? 
Q Yeah. Well, let me just ask you. What would be 
there different today than would have been in, say, January, 
besides the "Everwood" property? 
A Besides the "Everwood" property? Quite — actually 
quite a bit. There — I have moved a lot of things out of the 
building. I rented a house that I have in Ogden to an 
individual, and I furnished that house with property that was 
located in the building, including two children's bedroom sets, 
a master - master bedroom set, some couches, living-room 
furniture, tables and chairs. 
Q Okay. 
A So all of that property came out of mostly the 
El Buracho, and some of it came out of the Helena. In 
addition, I have moved stuff into the building, some 
construction material, some doors that I purchased, and some 
property from my parents' estate. 
Q Okay. Now, you indicated that there was some duct 
work or something in — 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
HVAC 
know 
the 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
HVAC. 
HVAC. And where is that located at? 
It's located on the roof of the building. 
Okay. So that's not on the interior of the building? 
No. There is some — there is a huge amount of an 
located in the interior of the Helena. 
Q 
A 
, I'm 
Q 
roof 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
buildings 
A 
buildings 
Q 
A 
Q 
in those 
Okay. 
Okay? So when you talk about the El Buracho, so, you 
trying to — 
All right. So there's some on the — the exterior, 
of the — 
Of the El Buracho. 
— El Buracho. 
And on the interior of the Helena. 
And what is the use for that? 
Heating, air conditioning, ventilation. 
And are you going to use it in those particular 
? 
The majority of it will probably be used in those 
, but I have used a few pieces for other things. 
When would they be used in those buildings? 
When will they be used in those buildings? 
Yeah. I mean what would be the purpose for their use 
buildings? 
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A Oh. The purpose of the use in those buildings is to 
provide ventilation for the heating and air conditioning 
system. 
Q Okay. When you renovate the buildings? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, you indicate also there was a wood shop. 
A That is correct. 
Q Now, what is the — is that wood shop used? 
A It has been. 
Q And when was it used? 
A It's been used for... 
Q Well, let met ask you. Was it used, I guess, when 
you were renovating the building yourself? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. But that has stopped, has it not? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Now, if I understand it correct, you don't 
have any business license or you're not licensed to do any 
business in that — in either of those buildings, are you? 
A I do not. 
Q And have there ever been any business licenses for 
either of those buildings during your ownership tenure? 
A There hasn't. 
Q And I understand there's not any building permits at 
this point that you have with the city to do building or 
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construction at this time. 
A There has been no construction going on in the 
building for some time. 
Q But I'm just saying there's — 
A And there — and there are no construction permits 
outstanding. 
Q Okay. Have you ever had a construction permit for 
that building? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Okay. When was that? 
A Four or five years ago. 
Q Okay. And have you applied to the city for any 
certificate of occupancy? 
A No. 
Q Do you know what zone those particular buildings are 
located in? 
A I do, but - I think C2 or - CBDC2 or something like 
that. 
Q How about CBDI? 
A Okay. 
Q Are you familiar with the permitted uses in the CBDI? 
A I have read them. 
Q Okay. Is a warehouse or storage a permitted use? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, let me interpose an objection 
as to the relevancy. We're not charged with violating any 
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zoning ordinances here. 
THE COURT: Well, the question is whether or not the 
building's vacant or not — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well -
THE COURT: - and I think what he's saying is he's 
storing equipment there. 
MR. KNOWLTON: The question is -
MR. JUNK: Well, also, though -
MR. KNOWLTON: - what is permitted use, if this 
witness knows. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JUNK: But also, if you look at the definition of 
vacant, it says lawful use, and I guess my argument would be is 
that if it's not a permitted use in that zone, then that would 
not be a lawful use. 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. It says designed and lawfully 
permitted. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JUNK: Well, okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: It doesn't say permitted within that 
zoning area. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Isn't it true that warehousing or 
storage is not a permitted use in that particular zone? 
A Not - I don't - I don't believe that the definition 
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1 of warehousing — okay. 
2 Q Well, I'm just asking -
3 A My — my personal — 
4 Q The question was, is — 
5 A My personal property is not warehousing. I mean I'm 
6 not — I'm not opening — I don't have a warehouse open to the 
7 public. So — 
8 Q But it's true that that — those are not permitted 
9 J uses; is that correct? 
10 A Not to my knowledge. 
11 Q Okay. And you have never applied for a nonconforming 
12 use permit with the city, have you? 
13 A I have not. 
14 MR. JUNK: Your Honor, if I could approach. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 Q (BY MR. JUNK) I'm going to show you what's been 
17 marked as City's Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11. At least are you 
18 familiar what — what the pictures — there's four pictures in 
19 each it looks like. Are you familiar with what the pictures at 
20 least represent? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And what are — maybe you could go through. 
23 A Okay. The - do you want - do you want me to go 
24 through each picture? 
25 Q No. Just a - are they generally pictures of 
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different angles of the — 
A Well, the -
Q — building and the property? 
A Well, the top two pictures most reasonably depict a 
piece of property that was commonly referred to as the 
Bamberger Building. 
Q Okay. 
A Okay? Which identified the rear of the property. 
Q Okay. That wouldn't have relevance to this, would 
it? 
A It would not. 
Q Okay. Why don't you just put a — take your pen and 
cross through that, then. 
A Which? The two pictures? 
Q The pictures that deal with the Bamberger. 
A Okay. The bottom two pictures are of the exterior of 
the El Buracho. 
Q Okay. Go on. 
A The top left-hand picture is an exterior picture of 
Lincoln, off of Lincoln of the El Buracho. The right-hand 
picture is a picture of the interior of the El Buracho showing 
the - at least three of the dressers that I had - that were 
used in furnishing this house that I had previously referred 
to. 
Q So if I understand, then, they would have been there 
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during the January period of time but wouldn't be there now. 
A Yeah. They would not be there currently. 
Q And it appears at least there's a date on these 
pictures, is there not? 
A Yeah. It says February 21st. 
Q Okay. 
A Okay? Then the bottom - or the bottom left-hand 
picture shows some windows and doors and, again, the — one of 
the dressers that I have in the building. And the right-hand 
side basically shows — mostly it shows a part of a cooler on 
the left that's sometimes been used for special events down on 
the street, and a sign that downtown Ogden procured and had 
available when they were displaying the women — they put up a 
display and had it in the El Buracho, the women of 25th Street. 
The top left-hand picture shows the exterior windows 
from, you know, probably about the curb. The top right-hand 
picture shows the west side of the Helena. The bottom 
left-hand pictures shows the second and third floor, primarily 
in the transom windows of the Helena. The right bottom picture 
shows one window of the Helena. 
Left top picture shows another window of the Helena 
Hotel. The bottom right picture is of the Helena. It has a 
pretty good view of the mountains. It refers to a sign that — 
again, the sign that downtown Ogden and a display that downtown 
Ogden put together of women of 25th Street and notorious 
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25th Street, talking about Fanny Dawson. 
The left picture, again, is property that downtown 
Ogden was storing in my building that they use at the rodeos 
and stuff like that they - they had displayed for Pioneer Day 
this year in front of the Eccles Building. 
Q Okay. 
A And the bottom right-hand picture really doesn't show 
much except a sign. 
Q Okay. But what — can that be looking in one of your 
windows up? 
A Yeah. That - that would — and I — I think that that 
picture was taken of the El Buracho. 
Q Okay. Would these — these would be fair and accurate 
representations of the building around the February 21st period 
of time? 
A I do not — no. 
Q They're not? 
A A number of those pictures would not represent. 
Q In what way would they not? 
A Okay. 
Q Okay. 
A This picture here would not be representative of 
what - what that looked like on — on the - in January, nor 
would this picture, nor this picture. 
Q And why? 
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A Because on — at that point in time there were — these 
windows were obscured from being able to take those pictures. 
Q Okay. So other than those three pictures that you've 
pointed out, and the ones we've crossed out, they would be fair 
representations of what the buildings looked like in January? 
A Of the exterior. 
THE COURT: Let's see. I don't think you ever 
offered Exhibit 6, did you, Mr. Knowlton? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I don't recall. 
THE COURT: I know you offered 5. I've -
MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, I thought I offered -
THE COURT: - got it up here. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - them both at the same time, two 
exhibits. 
THE COURT: I didn't ever indicate. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'll move it's admission at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you have any objection to 
six? 
MR. JUNK: Which was six? The pictures? 
THE COURT: Well, there's two sets of pictures. 
MR. JUNK: Oh. No. 
THE COURT: There's Exhibit 5 and then Exhibit 6. 
All right. We'll admit Exhibit 6, then. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 6 received) 
MR. JUNK: Your Honor, I'm going to move to admit 
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Exhibits 
the ones 
9, 1C 
that 
representative 
Mr. 
THE 
Knowlton? 
MR. 
THE 
, 11, and 12 
Mr. Edwards 
!, which will be the 
has indicated 
j of the property at 
COURT: Did you get 
KNOWLTON: Yes. I ] 
COURT: All right. 
that i 
the time in 
to look at 
pictures 
tfere not 
January. 
those, 
have no objection. 
We'll admit 
but for 
9, 10, 11, and 
12, except for the ones that he said did not accurately 
reflect, and I don't know how you want to identify those, 
but... 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think he's withdrawing them. 
MR. JUNK: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you withdraw the ones that he 
indicated do not accurately represent the condition in January? 
MR. JUNK: And at this time, your Honor, I feel — I'm 
going to ask that — my opinion is the best evidence of this 
particular building, because it's so close, is to go look at it 
at this time. I think it's - Mr. Edwards has submitted 
pictures that were taken in September, and indicating that the 
building is very close to what it was in the condition in 
January. And so I'm asking that we just walk over and take a 
look at it. 
THE COURT: All right. What's the defense position 
on that? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, I oppose it. Gosh, we're in 
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October. It's the middle of October. It's remote in time 
January 1 through 12. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess the real question is 
whether or not it now looks the same as it did in January. 
That's the issue. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Let's not. Let's not. 
MR. JUNK: Well, he just submitted - I find it kind 
of funny that they've just submitted pictures that were taken 
in September and want to tell that it's in the same condition, 
but now they want to say that it's too remote in time. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I don't want to waste the time. I 
don't want to spend the rest of the day on this case, Judge. I 
guess that's my concern. 
MR. JUNK: Well, my opinion is — 
THE COURT: All right. Why don't we finish the 
evidence? I'll take your motion under advisement, and let's go 
ahead and finish the testimony. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. I'll just move to admit these 
pictures, then. 
THE COURT: That's 9, 10, 11, and 12? 
MR. JUNK: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right. And you had no objection to 
any of those, Mr. Knowlton? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No, I haven't any objection. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12 received) 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Any other questions that you 
2 have? 
3 MR. JUNK: Yeah. 
4 Q (BY MR. JUNK) So but for the things that you have 
5 indicated, then the pictures that were taken in February would 
6 be consistent with what was in January, as at least the way it 
7 looked and things of that nature? 
8 J A Try that one more time because -
9 Q All right. 
10 A — you... 
11 Q Apparently these pictures were taken in February. 
12 I A Okay. 
13 Q And you've already indicated that some of them were 
14 not consistent with the way the building looked in January. 
15 A That is correct. 
16 Q But for what you've had excluded, these pictures 
17 I would be fair and accurate of the condition of the building in 
18 January? 
^ Cw * did11'*1 s e e which ones you had excluded. 
20 Q Well, the ones that you pointed out as excluding. 
21 A Okay. Now, on the exterior of the building, that 
22 would be true. That would be correct. 
23 MR. JUNK: I don't believe I have any further 
24 I questions of this witness. 
25 J THE COURT: All right. Any other questions, 
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1 Mr. Knowlton? 
2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
4 Q Mr. Edwards, in January, January 1 through 12, was 
5 there any apparent commercial activity that you were making use 
6 of this building for? 
7 A No, there was not. 
8 Q [Unintelligible] restaurant or a hotel or a buffet or 
9 a bar or any business with an obvious commercial function and 
10 purpose, was there? 
11 | A No, there was not. 
12 Q Were you conducting any kind of profession or 
13 occupation that required licensing by Ogden City in that 
14 building during that time? 
15 A I did not. 
16 Q Were you nevertheless occupying the building during 
17 those days, 1 through 12 of January? 
18 A I did. 
19 Q Was this use personal or professional or commercial? 
20 A I used it for my own benefit and work that I needed 
21 to do at other properties and stuff like that. I — 
22 occasionally I had the equipment, resources there. 
23 Q You didn't have a dental office in there, did you? 
24 A No. If I needed - if I needed to have a board planed 
25 or I needed to do — to have a piece of plyboard cut to exact 
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1 dimensions, or something like that. 
2 Q Were you engaging in any occupation that you are 
3 aware of requires a license from the city to engage in in your 
4 own property on that day? 
5 A Absolutely not. 
6 Q Now, you're storing your property, your own personal 
7 property, in your own real property. Does that require some 
8 special license, to your knowledge, from Ogden City? 
9 A I've never — I have no knowledge of Ogden City or any 
10 other city that requires any kind of license like that. 
11 Q Were you storing goods for other parties as in 
12 I warehousing? 
13 A No. 
14 J Q So all of the property that was stored and/or kept in 
15 the premises from 1 through 12 January was your property? 
16 A There's a motorcycle in the property the belongs to a 
17 friend of mine, but... 
18 Q Did you — did you charge somebody for that? 
19 A I did not. I have never charged anybody for any kind 
20 of storage. 
21 Q It's not a business you are engaged in? 
22 A It's not a business I'm engaged in. It's some place 
23 to keep it out of the snow. 
24 Q Were you engaged in the business of storing goods for 
25 third parties for consideration? 
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1 A I am not. 
2 Q All right, 
3 A I've never received any consideration from any party 
4 for any storage in any brick building. 
5 Q Were these — were your buildings vacant from 
6 January 1st through 12th? 
7 A They were not. 
8 Q Under any definition? 
9 A I — under any definition that I — under Black's Law 
10 Dictionary, which says empty is — or vacant — 
11 Q Well, I don't care what Black's says. But you were 
12 there. You occupied them? 
13 A I did. 
14 Q Your child occupied them? 
15 A He goes down there routinely. 
16 Q You did it on a regular basis from January 1st 
17 t h r o u g h 12 t h? 
18 A I d i d . 
19 Q If not a daily basis? 
20 A My recollection is I was there every day. 
21 Q It was consistent and regular and usual? 
22 A It is. 
23 Q And the use that you were making of your buildings 
24 during this time frame was the use designed by you, was it? 
25 A It is. 
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Q And the use that you have made you had designed the 
building to accommodate, had you not? 
A I don't know if I — where I designed it, but it -
it - it -
Q It's the use you made of your own property? 
A Yeah. It's the use I made of my own property, and 
I'm not sure I can say I designed the use, but — 
Q All right. 
A - but it's suits the purpose of that use. 
Q I mean is there some special, unique use originally 
designed for these buildings that your use was inconsistent 
with, in your opinion? 
A Absolutely not. In fact, I believe the definition of 
a hotel is to store people and their property. 
Q And the definition of a brothel is where you can have 
sex for a fee. 
MR. JUNK: I'll object to that. I mean -
THE KNOWLTON: It's argumentative, yes. Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) You weren't there to design the 
original use? 
A No. 
Q Did you even know what the original use of the 
property was designed to be? 
A In the case of the El Burocho, a brothel. In the 
case of the Helena, for storage of property and persons. 
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I 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have, 
Mr. Edwards. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q Now, you're familiar with the history of the 
building. Have there ever been — besides the brothel and the 
Helena, have there ever been any other businesses in those 
buildings? 
A I want you to repeat that again because I'm — 
Q All right. 
A What I think you said is — 
Q The history. Has there ever been a recognized — 
besides what you're using it for, besides the Helena and the 
El Buracho — 
A Okay. 
Q — since those periods, when was the last time there 
was a business in — where people were coming and going? 
A In either business, or — 
Q In either one. 
A Okay. The last time either property has been used 
where a business license has been issued, based upon the 
history that I know of those buildings, was in the early 1970s. 
Q Okay. 
A Okay. So it's been thirty-plus years since the 
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properties have had a recognized, retail, functionable 
business. But during that time period, the Helena — 
Q I believe you answered my question. Now, I 
understand you — you've now contracted with this movie company 
for a year to use the front fagade of your building? 
A That is correct. 
Q Now, on your block, there are businesses, are there 
not, that have regular customers? 
A There are. And there are other buildings that are in 
the same category as mine which do not have regular customers 
and are not considered vacant. 
Q Well, you've got, what, restaurants on your block? 
A Correct. 
Q Pawnshops? 
A No pawnshops on my block. 
Q Okay. A block down or something? 
A A block down. 
MR. JUNK: All right. That's all the questions I 
have. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Just so the record is straight, these are historic 
buildings registered with some registry? 
A Yeah. Both buildings are on the National Historic 
Register and on the State Historic Register. 
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( 
1 Q What that means to you is that you can't actually 
2 change the outside of the building? 
3 A No. I — you cannot modify the exterior of those 
4 buildings. I even petitioned to have the El Buracho 
5 demolished — 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A% — and the city told me that that is not a 
8 possibility. 
9 Q Because they're historic buildings, whatever that 
10 means, legally you understand that to be you cannot destroy, 
11 level them, raze them, or modify the exterior? 
12 A That is correct. 
13 Q And the interior, however, are you as the owner at 
14 liberty to do that? I mean subject to — 
15 A Yeah. There's - there's very little said by the 
16 State Historical Society about what you can do on the interior 
17 of the buildings. 
18 Q So there's no historical limits about the interiors? 
19 A There's very few historical limits. You're — you're 
20 pretty much given a free rein on the interior, but they — they 
21 have a lot to tell you what — you know, what happens with the 
22 exterior. 
23 MR. KNOWLTON: Thank you. That's all. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
25 MR. JUNK: I don't have anything. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, you can step down. 
MR. KNOWLTON: That's all that we have. 
THE COURT: So the defense rests. 
Any rebuttal? 
MR. JUNK: Yes. I will recall -
THE COURT: Mr. Glover? 
MR. JUNK: Mr. Glover. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Come on up, sir. Let's see. And I think 
Mr. Glover testified yesterday. 
MR. JUNK: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand, sir, you're still under 
oath? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
WAYNE GLOVER, 
having been previously duly sworn, called 
at the instance of the plaintiff in rebuttal, 
testified upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q Mr. Glover, you're familiar with the zone that these 
two buildings are located in? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what zone are they located in? 
A My check tells me it's in the central business 
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district, the intensive zone. 
Q Okay. And you're familiar with the permitted uses in 
that zone? 
A I have read them, yes, sir. 
Q And is storage or warehousing, is that a permitted 
use? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, I'm going to object. It's 
argumentative and speculative. And if the ordinance, the 
zoning ordinance, is relevant, the best evidence is the zoning 
ordinance, not his recollection. 
THE COURT: Well, I do think it's relevant, though, 
at this point. I'm going to allow the testimony. Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) Is that a permitted use? 
A I don't recall that from the list, sir. Without 
referring to it directly, but I don't recall it being there. 
Q Well, if I submit to you, I guess this - I'm going to 
show you what's been marked as City's Exhibit No. 12 for 
identification, and what does that represent? 
A This is a list of the permitted and conditional uses 
in the central business district zone. 
Q And did you review that recently? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you're looking at it now. Does it indicate that 
warehousing or storage is a permitted use? 
A I don't see that use listed here, sir. 
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Q If someone does not have a permitted use but they 
want to use a property in an un-permitted way, is there a 
method to apply to do that through the city? 
A I guess you could change the ordinance. 
Q Can you ask for a non-permitted use permit? 
A No, I'm not aware that there's anything like that, 
sir. 
Q Okay. Now, for Mr. Edwards to occupy his buildings, 
would he have to apply to the city for some certification of 
occupancy? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, I'm going to object unless 
there's some expertise this witness has that he's not shared 
with us at this point. I mean he says, "I'm in charge of 
buildings and inspections" — 
THE COURT: All right. Maybe you can just lay a 
foundation — 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
THE COURT: — as to whether or not he knows about 
that. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) What is your title, again? 
A Pardon me? 
Q What is your title at Ogden City? 
A I'm a manager of building services. 
Q And as a manager, are you familiar with the building 
and occupational laws and ordinances of the city? 
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A Yes, sir. The building process generally, building 
permits. Business licensing, that's also a function under my 
division, 
Q And you're the — 
A And a building official. And as part of that, we 
operate the development services counter for Ogden City, where 
all the development issues come in, where people apply for 
permits, land uses, subdivisions, all of those kinds of things. 
Q And you're the — the manager or the lead individual 
for Ogden City of these particular subjects that you've 
indicated? 
A For building permits and business licenses, yes, sir. 
Q And for a building such as the two that we're talking 
about, the El Buracho and Helena if someone were to desire to 
do a building and get a permit, they would do it through your 
office? 
A Yes, sir. You'd apply to me for a building permit. 
Q And also, if you wanted some type of occupancy or 
certification of occupancy, would they apply to you also? 
A Well, indirectly. What it would involve pretty 
typically is application for a business license and/or 
remodeling permit or building permit for that matter, at the 
end of which, then, we would somehow wind up with a certificate 
of occupancy. That's one of the charges that I have, is to 
issue certificates of occupancy. 
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Q And is there a certificate of occupancy for either of 
these buildings at this time? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'm going to object. It's irrelevant, 
your Honor. This is prior crimes, prior wrongs. We're not 
charged here with violating city ordinances. 
THE COURT: Well, but it seems to me the reason it's 
relevant is the question of whether or not the building is 
vacant. And Mr. Edwards' contention is that it's being 
occupied and that he's using it for storage. So for that 
reason I think it is relevant, and because he's saying it's 
being occupied. So I'll overrule the objection. 
Q (BY MR. JUNK) I'll ask you again. Is there a 
certificate of occupancy for either of these buildings? 
A I have no record of one, sir. 
Q And you've checked your records? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And is there any ongoing permits for building in 
either of these buildings? 
A There's no permit for remodeling in either one of 
those two buildings. 
MR. JUNK: That's all the questions I have of this 
witness. 
THE COURT: Any cross? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yeah. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
Q Does Ogden City not have people that are engaged in 
zoning administration? 
A Do they have? 
Q Yeah. Does Ogden City hire people that actually 
specialize in things like zoning, what uses are permitted in 
what areas? 
A Yes, sir, they do. 
Q Is that your office that administers zoning in Ogden 
City? 
A Not in my office, sir. It's on the counter where — 
where I have my office. 
Q I'm sorry. I can't hear you. 
A It's at the counter where I have my office. 
Q So my question, is that your office, is that your — 
A No, sir, it's not — 
Q — responsibility? 
A — my office. 
Q It's not your responsibility? 
A No, sir. 
Q And it's not one of the sub-responsibilities of your 
office? 
A Well, actually it is, sir. 
Q I'm sorry. You have - you have some administrative 
supervision jurisdiction over zoning? 
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A Yes, sir, we do. 
Q Well -
A We look at those land-use issues as a condition to — 
Q What — I wasn't finished — 
MR. JUNK: I'm going to object. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) - with my question. 
MR. JUNK: He was answering. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Just a moment, Mr. Junk. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) You have to let me finish my 
question, and then I'll let you finish your answer. Thank you. 
So let me try again. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you handle zoning in your office? 
A No, sir, I do not. 
Q Who does? 
A Greg Montgomery. 
Q And what is his job? 
A He's a manager of planning, the planning division. 
Q I see. Now, have you worked in that office before? 
A In the planning division? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A No. 
23 Q Do you have experience in the zoning or 
24 administration or enforcement of zoning in Ogden City? 
25 | A Yes, sir, I do. 
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Q What does that experience consist of? 
A Originally I was a housing and zoning inspector for 
Ogden City. 
Q And how long ago was that? 
A Started in 1982. 
Q And how long did you work in zoning as an inspector? 
A Well, the zoning function was transferred — the 
zoning enforcement was transferred to the planning division 
probably in 1994, something like that. 
Q How long did you work in zoning inspection? That was 
my question. 
A 1984 to about 1994, sir. 
Q About ten years? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. Now, you are familiar with the permitted use 
in the central business district? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. And the storage of personal property is not a 
permitted use of real property in the central business 
district? 
A Not from the list that I've seen here, sir. 
Q Is my office, 427 27th Street, in the central 
business district? 
A I don't recall, sir. I would have to look the 
address up on the map. 
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Q So storing my personal property, old library books, 
old law books, that's not a permitted use in the central 
business district, if I'm in the central business district. Is 
that what you're telling me? 
A That's what it says here, sir. 
Q Oh. Does it say there that the storing of personal 
property is forbidden? 
A No, sir. It doesn't say — 
Q What does — 
A - that's it's -
Q - it say? 
A - permitted. 
Q It just gives a list of items that are permitted. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Okay. So it doesn't actually forbid storing old law 
books? 
A It doesn't say it's not permitted because there are 
only two choices. 
Q Okay. Is storage — storage of personal property 
permitted in a residential area? 
A I'd have to go back and look at the zoning for that 
specific use. 
Q Do you store personal property in your own garage? 
A Oh, yes, sir. 
Q Is that permitted use in a residential area? 
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1 A I don't know the answer to that, sir. 
2 Q Well, do you think you can run a business of storing 
3 people's property in a residential area? 
4 A Storing people's property? 
5 Q Yeah. Do you think you can run a commercial 
6 warehouse storage facility out of your home in Ogden? 
7 A Probably not. 
8 Q That probably would be a violation of the zoning 
9 ordinance for a residential area, would it not? 
10 A I would make that assumption, yes, sir. 
11 Q That probably would not forbid you from storing old 
12 tools and bicycles and kids' toys and your own personal 
13 property in your own garage, however. Would that be a fair 
14 statement, Mr. Glover? 
15 A It sounds like a fair statement, counsel. 
16 Q Okay. Now, do you know if Mr. Edwards has been in 
17 | the business of storing people's goods in either of these 
18 buildings during the dates of January 1st through 12th of this 
19 year? 
20 A Do you mind repeating the question? 
21 Q Well, do you have any reason to believe Mr. Edwards 
22 was engaged in business, a business, a commercial business, of 
23 storing goods between January 1st and January 12th? 
24 J A No, sir. I don't have any [unintelligible]. 
25 Q But you're telling me storing his own goods in his 
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1 own building during those dates would require a license from 
2 Ogden City? 
3 A No, sir. What I'm saying is it's not one of the 
4 permitted uses outlined in the ordinance. 
5 Q You're saying that these buildings cannot be used for 
6 anything other than the permitted uses outlined in the 
7 ordinance? 
8 I A That's my understanding of the ordinance, yes, sir. 
9 | Q So I can't even keep my own personal property in my 
10 own law office if I'm in the downtown business district? Is 
11 J that what you're telling me? 
12 A No, sir. I'm not telling you that at all. 
13 I Q You just don't know? 
14 A No, sir. What I'm saying is the permitted uses, the 
15 question you asked specifically is not on the list. 
16 Q I see. 
17 A That's what I'm testifying to. 
18 Q So working in your own building at a desk — 
19 J MR. JUNK: Well, he answered the question, your 
20 Honor. I'm going to object to asking that again. 
21 MR. KNOWLTON: No, I wasn't asking it again. 
22 THE COURT: Go ahead and ask your question. Go 
23 ahead. 
24 I Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Sitting in a building owned by -
25 | the person's own building, sitting at a desk in their building 
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doing paperwork is not a permitted use in the central business 
district — is that what you're telling me? — under Ogden zoning 
ordinances? 
A No, sir. I don't think I said that at all. 
Q Well, that's my question. Didn't you tell me that 
in - well, just tell me. Is it or is it not legal to sit in 
your own building and do paperwork at a desk in the central 
business district? 
A I'm not aware that's illegal, no, sir. 
Q I mean I assume if he's not plotting to overthrow the 
government, it probably would be perfectly legitimate and legal 
behavior. Yes? 
A I would assume that's legal behavior, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. 
A I don't know that there's anything illegal about it, 
if that's your question. 
Q Do you need a license to do that in Ogden, Utah, to 
sit at a desk and do paperwork on your real estate and real 
property holdings? Is that a licensed activity where he has to 
; 
have a permit? 
A No, sir. 
22 MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have for 
23 i Mr. Glover. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Any other questions? 
25 MR. JUNK: Yes, I have. 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. JUNK: 
3 Q Mr. Glover, you had testified yesterday that you went 
4 over to the property on — sometime in November? 
5 A I don't recall it exactly. As I recall, the dates 
6 were in January, but I — 
7 Q Well, one time before January and then January. Did 
8 you also go over sometime in February? 
9 A It's possible, yes, sir. I don't recall the 
10 dates but there was another — another action that may — was 
11 about that time, yes, sir. 
12 Q And did you take some photographs of the property? 
13 I A I didn't personally press the button on a camera, but 
14 I was present when the photos were taken, yes. 
15 Q I'm showing you what has been collectively marked as 
16 j City's Exhibit 13. Are you familiar with those particulars? 
17 A Yes, sir. 
18 Q And were you there when those pictures were taken? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And what do those pictures represent? 
21 A These are pictures of the property that we're — that 
22 we're here for today that — that show the condition inside 
23 I through the windows, taken from the sidewalk. 
24 I Q Okay. And these pictures were taken on what date? 
25 j A The note says "2-21-02," sir. I would assume that'd 
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be the 22nd [sic] of February of this year. 
Q And are - those particular photographs, how would you 
relate those to the property that you observed in January? Do 
you see any differences in those photos versus what you 
observed — 
A I think they're substantially the same. 
Q And were you able to look through the windows and see 
when those pictures were taken? 
A On this date we could, yes, sir. 
Q And would you have been able to look through the 
windows also on — in the January date that you had gone through 
and at least see substantially the same properties on the — 
A That's my recollection, yes, sir. 
MR. JUNK: Your Honor, I'm just going to move to 
admit Exhibit 13. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I don't even know what it is. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Can we reserve on this till I cross? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. I think that's all. Go ahead. 
THE COURT: All right. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. KNOWLTON: 
24 Q Did you take these photographs? 
25 A I was present when they were taken, yes, sir. My 
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1 staff and I took those pictures that day. 
2 Q Well, somebody wrote "2-21-02." 
3 A Yes, sir. 
4 Q Who wrote that? Is that your writing? 
5 A That would have been Lee Evans, the inspector who 
6 accompanied me on that day. 
7 Q You didn't write this? 
8 A No, sir, I did not write that. 
9 Q And you didn't take the photographs? 
10 A Not personally, no, sir. 
11 Q And you're saying that you looked in these windows on 
12 or about January — February 21st? 
13 I A Yes, sir. 
14 I Q And this what you saw? 
15 A Yes, sir. That's a pictorial representation of what 
16 j we saw. 
17 Q So this would have been, what, about a month and a 
18 half after the end of the violation that he's charged with in 
19 I this case? 
20 A Yes, sir. 
21 Q So is there any way you can tell me, Mr. Glover, 
22 whether or not this was the condition of the property between 
23 January the 1st and January the 12th of this year? 
24 A I think I testified yesterday that - that I had seen 
25 similar things in that area on the January. 
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Q How would you — I thought he — I thought he had signs 
in the windows earlier in January. In fact he was charged with 
having signs in his windows in January, was he not? I mean the 
city charged him; it's one of the charges. In fact, it's not 
before us today, but in the same information. Were there not 
signs on his building in January? 
A There were some signs there, yes, sir. 
Q And those signs obscured the ability to look into the 
building. It's one of the violations, in fact. Yes? 
A Not totally, no, sir. You could see around the 
signs. They weren't totally covered. 
Q So your guess is that this is a little bit like what 
must have been there in January? 
A Yes, sir, that's my recollection. That is my 
recollection, yes, sir. 
Q Are you familiar with the zoning - I mean this 
ordinance giving the registration of vacant buildings? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And this is your department. This is what you do for 
a living, is enforce this regulation, this ordinance. Yes? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And it's a new one, as I suppose that it came in -
what, December of last year — 
A Roughly, yes. 
Q - it was passed? 
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A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q So we've only had, what, six to eight months — ten 
months to deal with it at all. This is probably the first 
prosecution under the ordinance, likely. 
A Yes, sir, I think it is. 
Q Okay. This thing, as I read it, this all falls in 
16-8 (b) dash whatever, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q And as I look under 16-8 (b)-3, it really says that 
you give a notice. You mail a notice, and the city sends a 
notification to the owner of the vacant property. And then 
they have ten days to register the building, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q (Reading) 
"The owner of the building shall, within 
ten days of notification, register such building 
as a vacant building and submit a vacant-building 
plan, unless a stay is granted under subsection E 
of this section." 
That's literally what it says. 
A Yes, that's exactly what it says. 
Q Okay. So you sent notices to Mr. Edwards, or the 
owner of the property, Westland Development, January the 9th, 
two notices, one for each building? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q You caused your staff to send those out? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q You believe, because of your ordinary office 
procedures, it probably got mailed, although you didn't see 
that? 
A I did not see it get mailed personally. 
Q Bruce said he got it, so that's a safe bet it was 
mailed by your office. 
A That's kind of the bet I would make, yes, sir. 
Q It's not likely he would have received it at the 
address in Layton on the same day it was mailed, not by the 
U.S. post office. Yes? 
A Not — not the same day as mailed, no, sir. 
Q He might get it the next day or even a couple of days 
later? 
A Typically, yes, sir. 
Q So the 10th of January would probably be the earliest 
he would have got it, unless that was a Sunday — I don't 
remember — right? 
A I'm not familiar with the process of the post office. 
Q All right. 
A I assume there'd be some delay getting — 
Q So let's say — let me just - I didn't mean to cut you 
off. 
A You bet. 
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Q Let's just say — and 
Wednesday — but let's just say 
the 10th of January. Under the 
before he's out of compliance, 
A Yes, sir. 
Q From the day he gets 
Bruce tells me the 9th was a 
he gets it the following day, 
ordinance, he's got ten days 
right? 
it. So he's good to go till the 
20th of January before he's violated any law, isn't he? 
A Could happen, yes, sir. 
Q What do mean could happen? Isn't that what it says? 
MR. JUNK: I'll object to that. Mr. Knowlton can 
argue what the law says. 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. I want this witness to help me 
with this. I think this is — 
MR. JUNK: Now -
MR. KNOWLTON: You discussed this department. 
THE COURT: I'll allow him to answer the question -
go ahead — if he can. 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) He has ten days from the date he 
gets notice, yes or no? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And that's the way the statute — the State ordinance 
reads, and that's the way you construe it? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q That's the way your department, I assume, enforces 
it. So if he's got ten days from the date he gets notice, and 
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he gets notice the following day, on the 10th, one-day delivery 
by the post office from Ogden to Layton, then he's not in 
violation of anybody's ordinance until ten days has expired. 
If you count the next days, that would be the 20th. The 20th of 
January would be the first day he'd be in violation if he fails 
to register. 
MR. JUNK: Again I'm going to object, because I think 
that's for the Court to interpret the actual law. 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. No, I think it's -
THE COURT: He can answer the question, if he can. I 
don't know if he has — 
Q (BY MR. KNOWLTON) Is that what you understand, 
Mr. Glover? Does he have ten days to comply [unintelligible] — 
A Well, yes, sir [unintelligible]. 
Q What's the earliest, in your opinion, that 
Mr. Edwards could have gotten notice, or the owner could have 
gotten notice of your notice? 
A Well, based on the letter he provided me, the 13th of 
January was the date he effectively got notice. 
Q Okay. So he'd have till the 23rd of January before 
he's in violation of the ordinance. Yes? 
A Yes, sir, that's correct. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that's all I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other questions, 
Mr. Junk? 
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FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JUNK: 
Q But he never did comply with the ten days, did he, as 
far as coming in and actually registering in that leeway time 
that you had given him? 
A No, sir. 
Q Never has registered at all, has he? 
A No, sir, he has not. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you have any objection to 
that exhibit P-13, the photographs? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Could I have just a moment, Judge? 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, I do object to 13. These were 
these were the photographs, if I remember, that Mr. Junk 
manually removed from the ones that were admitted and he 
removed them because Mr. Edwards said that they did not fairly 
and accurately depict the building on the dates in question, 
January 1 through 12. And I don't know that this witness has 
told us anything different. He didn't even take the 
photographs, and I think he said — 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter whether he took the 
photographs. The question is whether they reflect the 
condition of the building, right? 
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MR. JUNK: And he indicated that they were 
essentially — or consistent with what he observed in January, 
consistent with what he observed in February. 
THE COURT: I'll allow Exhibit 13. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 received) 
THE COURT: Any other questions for Mr. Glover? 
MR. JUNK: No. 
THE COURT: Did you have any other questions of 
Mr. Glover? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No, not of this witness. 
THE COURT: All right, sir, you can step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
All right. Any other testimony? 
MR. JUNK: Not at this time, no. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you want to argue the 
case, since you've rested. 
MR. JUNK: Yeah. I guess I'd renew my motion to go 
look at the... 
THE COURT: Okay. And you're objecting to that? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yes. I think it's a waste of time. 
THE COURT: I appreciate the offer. I think I have a 
pretty good picture of what this looks like just from the 
photographs, so I'll deny the motion at this time, Mr. Junk. 
MR. JUNK: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Any argument on the matter? 
2 MR. JUNK: Yes, your Honor. Your Honor, the first 
3 issue that I will address is I believe that Mr. Knowlton is 
4 making a point about the ordinance that does allow that once a 
5 violation has been noted that a notice will be given and given 
6 ten days to cure that particular problem by registering and 
7 I presenting a plan. 
8 A letter was sent out in this particular case, and 
9 it's true that we did give him ten days. In this case, though, 
10 Mr. Edwards did not ever come in and cure that particular 
11 problem that we had given him notification of, and therefore we 
12 have, then, cited him for the period of time when the actual 
13 inspections were taken. 
14 Now, the ordinance was still established. He did not 
15 have it registered; he has not presented a plan. We did comply 
16 with the ordinance in giving him the ten days to come in and 
17 comply with that, and he has failed to do that, and so he is — 
18 j in my opinion and argument, is that he was in violation. He's 
19 never cured that particular problem, and therefore we can go 
20 forward. 
21 j I think there's not any — obviously there's no 
22 defense that he's made about registering or presenting a plan. 
23 He's not said that he has complied with that. His whole 
24 | defense is is whether or not this is particularly a vacant 
25 building. And my argument is is that in fact it is a vacant 
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building. 
The definition of vacant, at least in the ordinance, 
is, A, it's empty. Well, I guess there are clutter and things 
in it. I mean there's no — there's no argument that he is 
storing things, but I don't know — I don't know if that is what 
is intended on empty, but I think it's the other two that I'll 
focus on more. 
B, it says not occupied on a regular basis by an 
occupant. Well, we've already found that there is not any 
occupational certificate for this property. There's no ongoing 
business. It's true that Mr. Edwards may go into the property 
occasionally to check on things, but he doesn't have any 
building permits, so there's no building going on in that 
property. He doesn't live in that property. And so my 
argument is is that although he may visit the property, he may 
even sit at a desk, that he does not occupy that property under 
the definition of this particular ordinance, and this 
building — these two buildings should both be declared as 
vacant. 
Further, the third section indicates not used by a 
person on a regular basis for the usual and customary purposes 
for which a building is designed and lawfully permitted. And I 
think this is clear, that he is again maybe there on a regular 
basis, but it's not for the usual and customary purpose for 
these particular buildings and what is set up in the zoning 
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ordinances of the City of Ogden for that area. 
A storage or warehouse is not a permitted use. And 
maybe the — he has indicated again that there's no business 
license. There hasn't been a business license for that 
property since the seventies. He's in fact leased the front of 
the property out for a year, which indicates to me there's not 
an intent for the next year to even use this particular 
property for any type of business. And there's not any zoning 
or building permits that have been issued to renovate or to use 
this particular property in the future for what I would 
consider as the customary or lawful use. 
So, again, I think the Court should determine that 
these buildings are vacant, and therefore Mr. Edwards does need 
to comply with the ordinance by presenting a plan and also 
register those buildings with the city and comply with the 
ordinance. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Junk. 
Mr. Knowlton? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, Mr. Edwards has probably been 
over here with the city more times than anybody I've ever 
known. And I don't know that the history is important, but I 
suppose it has something to do with it. 
Bruce has used of his property in ways other people 
have not. I suppose one the uses he's made is the he's used 
his windows to hold signs to make statements about Ogden City 
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that are not particularly complimentary. That's for another 
day, obviously, and that's not the issue that we have here for 
today. The question that we're dealing with is whether or not 
he has failed under the Ogden ordinance to register a building, 
and then if it's a vacant building, to register and submit a 
plan, put a plan together. And then, obviously, 
[unintelligible]. 
I guess the first problem, the easy problem, that I 
see as far as the defense is concerned, is that if you take the 
city at its word, you pull out 16-8 (b)-3 — this is their 
ordinance, a brand-new ordinance. It was brand new since in 
December, and this is their first enforcement case. And then 
it says except as provided in subsection B of this section, 
which is the one just below it that deals with single-family 
dwellings, not applicable here. 
"Whenever a building is vacant for more 
than 90 days, or whenever any building is 
vacant and such building or premises thereof 
contains one or more public-nuisance violations 
as defined herein, then the owner of the building 
shall, within ten days of notification, register 
such building as a vacant building and submit a 
vacant-building plan, unless a stay is granted 
under subsection E of this section," 
which goes down and describes how you could do that. 
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Now, if I hear the testimony of Mr. Wayne Glover, he 
says - and I don't think there's much dispute about this - he 
says his staff sent out a letter January 9, and he says 
Mr. Edwards obviously got it January the 13th because he came 
in that same day and handed in a letter responding to this, and 
I don't think [unintelligible]. 
Now, if I read the ordinance and take the city at its 
word, Bruce is good for ten days from the 13th. There's no 
crime that Bruce could have committed until the expiration of 
thirteen [sic] days. And so the earliest that he could have 
been guilty of any criminal offense under the city's own 
ordinance would be ten days from the 13th of January. That 
gets us to the 23rd of January of this year. 
Now, that would be nice if we were charged through 
January 23rd as another date, but we're not. And I think in a 
criminal case we have a right the hold the city's feet to the 
fire. They haven't even asked to amend their own information, 
and their own information says that Bruce committed the offense 
from January 1st through January 12th, 2002. You know, we're 
just outside by ten days the limit, the time frame, under which 
they seek the criminal conviction. 
And so I don't know how you can do it, and I don't 
know how you can say, well, since there's no evidence that he 
actually did within the ten days or thereafter, somehow he's 
retroactively guilty back to some time before he even got the 
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1 notice. He got the notice on the 13th. That's a day after the 
2 12th, the day after the information [unintelligible]. So I 
3 don't see how any court can find a criminal violation by 
4 Mr. Edwards or any other person under the city's ordinance if 
5 you read the ordinance. 
6 Now, that's just the simple solution to the problem. 
7 The real concern I have is that this building is not vacant. 
8 ! Mr. Junk obviously has this thinking that he says, if it's a 
9 | comraercial building and it's a commercial property, and if it's 
10 located in a commercial section of the city, ipso facto it has 
11 I to be used for commercial purposes. 
12 I Now, that just defies common sense and the law of 
13 I property. You know, there's a lot of limitations on owning 
14 I property, but one of the bundle of rights that an owner of 
15 I property has is the right to choose, within the legal 
16 | framework, what use he can make of his own property. And just 
17 I because a commercial use is a permitted use — like running a 
18 J hotel or a restaurant or a bar or a nightclub, but not a 
19 J brothel — doesn't mean that that owner has to exclusively use 
20 the property for that purpose. 
21 J Now, maybe the city would like it. Maybe it would 
22 j helpful tax-wise if we did, but there's no law anywhere that I 
23 can - know of that compels the owner of commercial property to 
24 I use it for a commercial purpose. And, of course, there is no 
25 j licensing requirement for an owner to use his property unless 
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he uses for a purpose the law requires be licensed, like 
practicing law or dentistry or running a bakery or whatever 
else. 
Now, that gets you to the definition of vacant under 
this statute, and the property need not be registered, is not 
liable to be registered, unless it's vacant. Now, they say, 
"Well, he doesn't live there." And you say, "Well, is 
residence the same thing as occupancy," and I think the Court 
knows better than that. 
I go down to my office every day — but not every day, 
most days. I don't live in my office. I don't spend the 
nights in my office. But I don't think anybody would argue 
that I don't make — I don't occupy it on a regular basis. 
Bruce doesn't have to live in his property in order to make use 
of his property on a regular basis. 
Now, we have Wayne Glover from the city, and we have 
the assistant who've come in and said on two occasions they've 
gone to the outside of the building, and they've looked in and 
they've seen nobody. Once, I guess Mr. McDougal (sic) said that 
was during the lunch hour. "I looked in the window. I didn't 
see anybody. I assumed the place was vacant." And then 
Mr. Glover told us on two occasions he goes down, and he spends 
five minutes looking around some signs and doesn't see anybody, 
and that's the basis for his conclusion that it's vacant. 
Now, I don't know what the city's got besides those 
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two witnesses to bring to this court evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this property is vacant under the 
definition of the ordinance. 
Now, Bruce's testimony is largely uncontradicted. He 
says, "I know I have a right, if I wanted to ask for it, to 
build a commercial facility there. I also use it for a 
purpose — for my purposes as I have designed it" — it's his 
property - "and I have designed it to be used as an office 
where I go down on a daily basis, some days as long as ten 
hours, and other days as short as maybe twenty minutes. And I 
do about the same thing Mr. Knowlton does when he's at his 
desk; I do my paperwork, and I do the work that's associated 
with owning this building and owning some other property, and 
other paperwork that I have to do as part of my everyday 
functions, and what it is I do for a living and what it is I 
want to do as a hobby. 
"And I use the property while I'm there and have my 
i 
son play with his toys. And then, while I'm there, in the past } 
and still, I have a wood shop, with equipment to operate a wood 
shop, and materials to make with the wood shop as a hobby and 
on a personal basis." 
And then he says, Judge, in addition to all that — 
what is one man's junk is another man's treasure — he says, "I 
store a lot of my personal property there." Now, I guess we 
spent a lot of time with, gosh, running a warehouse is not a 
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permitted use down there. Storage, you know, commercial 
storage is not permitted down there. But I don't think anybody 
is seriously suggesting to this Court that storing your own 
personal property, even your own real property, is a use for 
which is excluded in a downtown business district. 
That's no different than me keeping old law books 
that out of date out in the library that I haven't bothered to 
throw away. That's like saying I can't keep personal property 
stored in my garage at home. Well, that's nonsense, and I 
don't know how anybody argues that. 
So you look at this definition of vacant, and you 
say, "Is it empty?" Well, even the photographs that the city's 
brought us show this property is not empty. And then you say, 
"Is it not occupied on a regular basis by an occupant?" And 
you say, "Well, what is the contradiction to the testimony of 
Bruce?" He wasn't seen on two occasions of five minutes each 
by Mr. Glover. That's their testimony, and then on two 
occasions — or, yeah, just one occasion in each building by his 
associate, when he goes down on the lunch hour — Bruce wasn't 
seen inside the building. On the strength of that, they 
conclude, and urge the Court to conclude, this building is 
vacant. 
And of course, in spite of that, Mr. Edwards has 
testified under oath to this Court that he's there on a daily 
basis every day, probably if not ten hours on most days, at 
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least for a period of time that is regular. It's a regular 
basis by the occupant of the building. 
And we're not getting charged here, Judge, with 
occupying a building contrary to a certificate of occupancy. 
That's something for another day if Ogden City's concerned 
about that. That's a separate crime, and that's not one that 
we're facing here. 
And then, of course, this other question. This, I 
guess is the one of the city's best arguments, is C. They say: 
"not used by a person on a regular basis 
for the usual and customary purposes for which 
a building is designed and lawfully permitted." 
Now, you say, wait. You can't say it's not being 
used by Bruce on the regular basis. He's clearly using it on a 
daily basis. That is regular basis, a multi-daily basis. So 
it's used on a regular basis, and it is in use for the usual 
and customary purposes for which the building was designed, and 
that's for what Bruce has designed it. It's his property. 
It's his choice to make a decision what use should be made of 
it. 
He has designed this building to his own needs for 
the storage of his own property, for the maintenance of his own 
office, and for the running of his own hobby shop, this wood 
shop, all of which are lawfully permitted. And the only time 
they're not lawfully permitted is if he wants to do them 
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commercially. If he wants a license to run a wood shop and do 
work for other people, he'd probably have to be licensed. And, 
on the other hand, if he wants to practice law from that 
office, I suppose he'd better have a license for that too. 
But he has designed his building. This doesn't say 
for the purpose for which it is historically or originally or 
once upon a time designed and lawfully permitted. If that's 
true, then this one building on the corner can only be used for 
a brothel. It's an illegal purpose, no less than the 
[unintelligible] Building, because that's a bar, and that's 
another purpose, and you have to have special licensing to run 
it. And even the owner of the building can't use his property 
for a bar unless he has special permits. 
Anyway, I ask your Honor to take a look at that, and 
I think if you do, in addition to the evidence, you will fairly 
conclude with me that there is no evidence that the city's 
presented, and it's certainly not beyond a reasonable doubt — 
that's the criminal standard — by which Mr. Edwards can be 
convicted of this crime. 
Now, you can go through Section 16-8(b), and you look 
for the penalty section without success. At least I looked 
without success. The only penalty section I could find is whenj 
you turn over to Section 16-12-1, and that talks about remedies 
and penalties. Now, the city doesn't have any remedies, and of 
course they've chosen to proceed criminally. And this one 
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says, subsection (a), misdemeanor: 
"Any person who fails to comply with any 
of the provisions of this title is guilty of a 
Class B misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof 
shall be punished as provided in Title I, 
Chapter 4, of this code." 
It seems to me it's an all or nothing. So Bruce is 
either guilty of a misdemeanor, if they have presented evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt to this Court's satisfaction, or he's 
not guilty, and interestingly he's not even charged with a 
Class B misdemeanor in this case. It's been mis-charged. 
There is nothing in here I find that says "or such lesser 
penalty as the city may elect." 
And I don't know that coming in and saying we've 
decided to charge him with an infraction as a necessary lesser 
included crime that the city can convict somebody of, as 
opposed to a Class B, which is what the ordinance says a 
violation shall comprise. And I suppose if that's the case, 
then the city can simply say, "Well, we're going to convict you 
or charge you with some lesser offense, really because we just 
don't want to go to the trouble of giving you the right to have 
a jury trial that you would be entitled to if we applied the 
law as written." That's an unusual feature. 
And so I don't see how, as alleged, the city has 
established a crime at all under their very own ordinance. So 
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that's unique to me, and I'll leave it up your Honor's 
consideration, because I don't know how that will play. 
Those are my observations, Judge. I just think, number 
one, within the ten days, the time frame that they've alleged, 
they haven't proven guilt, couldn't prove guilt; secondly, that 
they have not shown and could not show beyond a reasonable 
doubt the matter that is before this Court [unintelligible], 
and therefore that Mr. Edwards is under the provisions of this 
registration act. And then three, it's a misdemeanor, it's a 
Class B misdemeanor, and that's not what the information 
charges. I would urge you to dismiss it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Knowlton, have you looked at 
Exhibits 8 and 9? Somebody's put plywood across the windows. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Where? 
THE COURT: On Exhibits 8 and 9. I guess that's the 
building we're talking about, isn't it, or one of them? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I don't [unintelligible]. 
THE COURT: I guess I'm curious to know how you — 
what you think — what's the significance of somebody putting 
plywood across the windows on the question of whether or not 
the building is vacant. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think we entered submissions of 
that. What if you put up plywood across your living-room 
window? Because the window's broken and you don't want to pay 
to fix it — that'd be a good reason — or because you don't want 
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1 somebody to stick boards through it if you're doing work in the 
2 area, or because — 
3 THE COURT: [Unintelligible.] 
4 MR. KNOWLTON: - [unintelligible] take shots at you. 
5 There's a million reasons. 
6 THE COURT: So you don't think it has any 
7 J significance? 
8 | MR. KNOWLTON: Oh, I don't think so. Counsel can 
9 certainly argue it, but there's no evidence before the Court on 
10 I why that plywood was put there or how long it's been there or 
11 | what reason it was. I can think of numerous reasons why you'd 
12 | do it, legitimately do it. 
13 j THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
14 J Any response? 
15 MR. JUNK: Yes, just a couple of things, your Honor. 
16 I First, as far as Mr. Knowlton's last argument, I believe that 
17 j that has been addressed by the Court of Appeals, where they 
18 I have indicated that the prosecutor does have the authority to 
19 j charge a crime as an infraction on these type of situations. I 
20 believe the case is McDonald. I'd be glad to provide 
>• •"—'•" i* 
21 Mr. Knowlton with a copy of that. 
22 And then just a — I think it is important to look and | 
23 see the boarding up of the windows. In fact, one of the 
24 ordinance — provisions in the ordinance is that you can't 
25 j obscure windows, and one of the things that you can't obscure 
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1 them with is the plywood. I think that is relevant to indicate 
2 that it is a vacant building. 
3 My argument is, your Honor, Mr. Knowlton can make, 
4 you know, a flowery argument about Mr. Edwards coming down to 
5 the property and some of the storage and doing these things, 
6 but I — my opinion is is that does not take this building out 
7 of a vacant status. And as you look at — sure, he can do all 
8 those things, but still, under this ordinance, this is a vacant 
9 building, and the purposes of the particular ordinance is to 
10 then take it from that vacant status into the traditional 
11 status. 
12 And although despite Mr. Edwards' going to the 
13 j property and maybe even sitting at this desk or — well, anyway. 
14 And the purpose of the plan on these things are so that the 
15 plywood in front is taken away. You can have a plan. When 
16 will that plywood or these opaque windows, when will they be 
17 restored to actual windows? When will these other problems — 
18 | when you look in from outside, you see the accumulation of this | 
19 personal property. One of the things is that you can't have 
20 | rubbish or things within your vacant building. 
21 Now, again, Mr. Knowlton says one person's junk is 
22 another person's treasures, but the purpose of the ordinance is 
23 to say that when people walk by these buildings that that 
24 accumulation isn't visible. And so just because you accumulate 
25 these type of things — it's even anticipated that people would 
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have those type of things inside these buildings — but that 
does not take it away from the vacant status. 
And I think if you look at the overall thought 
process and the traditional use and the things that — what 
Mr. Edwards is trying to bootstrap into saying that this isn't 
a vacant building, our argument is is that the Court will find 
that it is vacant. 
And as I've already argued about the ten days, yes, 
we did give him notice. We complied with that. But he 
didn't — he never came in. Yes, he would have not been 
charged. We were asking him not to charge him, and we were 
giving him the ten days. But then when he didn't comply with 
that, then we did charge him, that it was actually inspected. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Judge, may I just make an observation 
on the information with respect to your question? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: This charge of the windows and glass 
exterior doors on the building being painted or otherwise 
obscured by plywood. One of the allegations that we're not 
trying today was held for a determination [unintelligible]. 
THE COURT: That's the two that we're not trying, 
right? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yeah. That's the first of those two. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
All right. Well, I appreciate the arguments, 
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counsel. Let me address this question about the allegation, 
and the violation is alleged to have occurred between 
January 1st and January 12th, and what I see is a situation 
where the city sends notice to the defendant — I think it was 
about the 13th — telling him essentially that you've got ten 
days to correct the problem, and you've got ten days to 
register the building or file a building plan, and if you don't 
do that, then you're going to be in violation. And that's how 
I read that, is to say, if you correct the problem, there's not 
going to be a prosecution here. But if you don't do that, then 
we find that you're in violation of the ordinance. So I'll 
deny the motion to dismiss on the question of the date on the 
information being January 1 through January 12. 
On the elements of the offense, there's no dispute 
that he failed to register the building, in either case, and 
there's no question that he failed to provide a building plan. 
And the only issue here is whether or not the building is 
vacant. Mr. Edwards' contention here is that the buildings are 
not vacant, that he stores equipment and tools inside the 
building, and that he occupies the building because he comes 
down there every day on a regular basis. He also claims that 
he has an office on the second floor, and he has some woodwork 
or a wood shop that he has there inside at least one of the 
buildings. 
That evidence, of course, is countered by Mr. Glover, 
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who says he never applied for a business license; he never 
applied for a building permit; he has no certificate of 
occupancy; and storage is not a permitted use for either one of 
these buildings. 
In addition to that, we have testimony from — well, 
we also have testimony from Mike McDonald, who said he went 
there on the 9th of January. As far as he was concerned, both 
buildings were vacant. No one was there. There was no 
evidence of any activity. The doors were locked. It appeared 
to just be open space where there was lumber and plywood 
stored. 
And I think again that was consistent with 
Mr. Glover's testimony when he said he went down there in 
November of 2001 and again during the period of January 9th 
through 13th. He said no one was there. It was not occupied. 
It appeared that there was some partial construction going on, 
but in his opinion the buildings were not habitable. 
And also we have this evidence about the plywood. I 
just thought that was significant* that — on the question of 
whether or not the building,is*^vacant or not, that somebody 
would put up plywood over the windows on a least one of the 
buildings. It certainly suggests to me that the building is 
not being occupied. I can't imagine any kind of business going 
on if you put plywood over the windows. So I thought that 
evidence was significant. 
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I'm going to find in this matter, Mr. Edwards, that 
the city has proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt on 
both cases, the cases ending in 0315 and 0420, on the two 
counts of failing to register a vacant building, and also the 
count involving failing to provide a building plan for that 
particular building. So I'll enter convictions on both of 
those counts on both cases. 
Now, did we want to do sentencing at this time also? 
MR. KNOWLTON: It's up to you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, it's actually up to Mr. Edwards. 
He has the right to be sentenced in not less than two days or 
more than forty-five. Do you want to waive that time? 
MR. EDWARDS: Sure. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to say 
about sentencing? 
MR. KNOWLTON: No, but I think you've heard probably 
more than you needed to, Judge. Mr. Edwards is not a typical 
criminal. It's hard for me to view this as typically criminal 
behavior. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I don't know what else to tell you. 
can certainly see a number of reasons why [unintelligible] — 
THE COURT: These are infractions. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - [unintelligible] city requested. 
THE COURT: Right. As I understand it, the maximum 
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penalty would be $750 plus an 85 percent surcharge on each 
count? 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think that is the worst-case 
scenario. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you have any 
recommendation or suggestion as far as sentencing? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I think this is minimal. I 
think the criminal intent you're talking about is quite 
minimal. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything that Mr. Edwards wants to 
say? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, let me just go on to say one 
other thing. The city itself has recommended disposition on 
these under the ordinance, and I think it's $25 on a first 
offense — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: - unless I'm misinformed. 
Isn't that not right, Mr. Junk? 
MR. JUNK: You'd have to point that out to me, 
Mr. Knowlton. 
MR. KNOWLTON: The bail schedule under 16-12-3, 
failure to register or re-register a vacant building. 
MR. JUNK: I think that's - that would be on the 
civil deals, charges on a civil penalty. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Initial penalty, $25, standard 
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1 I penalty, $100. 
2 That's the importance the city attaches to it. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Anything else you wanted to 
4 add or say? 
5 MR. KNOWLTON: No. 
6 THE COURT: All right. And anything Mr. Edwards 
7 wants to say? 
8 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
9 I THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
10 MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor, I was in this court back in j 
11 October of last year. The city had several charges for zoning 
12 violations against me. Our first court had fifteen charges on 
i j 
! 
13 the El Buracho and fifteen charges on the Helena. We went to 
14 | court on Tuesday morning, and Mr. Junk came to court and says, 
15 I "Your Honor, I forgot my [unintelligible] today." 
16 | That day I worked on preparing for the next day's 
17 trial, and Tuesday there was a city council meeting. Mr. Junk 
18 contacted my attorney, Mr. Knowlton, and said, "Mr. Knowlton, 
19 j we would like your client to take down the signs that he has 
20 attacking - against the city administration." 
21 j I have been in a dispute with Ogden City for 
22 three-plus years. The city administration has told me many, 
23 many things that they've never been — that they've never 
24 followed up with. They have sent people down to meet with me 
25 and have treated me like I'm some kind of cockroach from a 
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1 third-world country that they're going to grind in the ground. 
2 Wednesday morning Mr. Junk approached me and says, 
3 "Mr. Edwards, the city would like for you to take your signs 
4 down for six months." And I said, "No, that's not going to 
5 happen." He says, "Well, we're committed to get these problems 
6 resolved." And we talked for a few minutes, and I said, 
7 "Okay." I said, "If the city's resolved to - or committed to 
8 resolving these problems, I'm prepared to take my signs down 
9 for sixty days." I said, "If you can't solve the problems in 
10 j sixty days, you cannot solve the problems in six months." 
11 Mr. Junk called the mayor, came back and says, "Okay, 
12 I we have a deal. You take the signs down." You know, so he 
13 made part of the plea bargaining — a plea bargain, take — 
14 taking the signs down that I had attacking the administration, 
15 signs that said "Ogden City Administration Has No Integrity," 
16 signs that said "Ogden City Administration Is Incompetent," 
17 "Why Would Anybody Do Business in Ogden?" 
18 Prior to this, just — I had said — I had to go to the 
19 mayor's office and try to meet with the mayor, and his 
20 secretary said that he didn't want to meet with me. So I sent 
21 a letter to the mayor that said, you know, based upon how I had 
22 been treated in Ogden City and what I know about how the city 
23 does business, why would anybody want to do business in this 
24 town? You will have thirty days to contact me if you'd like to 
25 discuss this. Otherwise, I will launch an advertising 
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campaign, you know, to let other — I think — it was my position 
it was patriotic duty to let other people know how Ogden City 
conducts its business. 
Well, I entered into an agreement with Mr. Junk to 
take the signs down. Mr. Junk entered into an agreement that 
the city was committed to resolve the problems. In the sixty 
days that followed that agreement, not one person from the city 
met with me or dealt with me. I went to the city council. I 
said, "I am available. Here is my home phone. Here's my cell 
phone. I am willing to meet with anybody at any time." 
Downtown Ogden contacted the mayor's office and said, j 
"Bruce is willing to buy lunch. Let's meet with Bruce, and 
let's see what we can — let's see what problems we can get 
resolved." 
And these problems include Ogden City going outside 
Utah state law and doing activities that are illegal. You 
know, one example — I've got hundreds of examples, but I don't 
want to waste the Court's time. I do want to supply one 
example of the way Ogden City does business. 
I also am involved in the property across the street 
from the El Buracho, commonly referred to as Pancho's. For 
several years at the Street Festival, Ogden City would locate 
their Port-A-Potties right next to where I was doing business. 
I approached special events and talked to Carolyn Bachman and 
said, "Would you please remove your Port-A-Potties from next to 
139 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
my business?" And Carolyn Bachman said, "We own the sidewalks, 
and we can do whatever we want to on those sidewalks." They 
were never removed. 
The next year, Carolyn Bachman — or special events 
placed their Port-A-Potties again right next to where I'm doing 
business. So after about the second or third time that 
happened, I just decided it is not worth doing business in 
Ogden. So I got out and subleased the business. 
The next year, the city placed their Port-A-Potties 
right next to where - a business by the name of Grandma's 
Tacos & Burritos were. They contacted me on Friday of the 
Street Festival and said, "Bruce, you need to get this resolved 
for us." So I went to the city administration, said, "Look, 
you know, we've been here before. This is extremely 
unprofessional." I spent two hours in the city administration 
office trying to get someone to deal with it. Nobody did. I 
went to the health department. I said, "You know, this has got 
to be a health-code violation." And they said — the — the 
administrator of the health department said, "Yeah. There is a 
law, a Utah state law, that says that you cannot have 
Port-A-Potties within 100 feet of food establishment." 
I then took that ordinance to the city. I said, "Now 
look, you know, remove these Port-A-Potties from next to this 
business." They again were not removed. I went to the Street 
Festival the next day, took pictures of where the 
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1 Port-a-Potties were located next to food vendors, and the — 
2 Ogden City has the Utah State Chili Cook-Off rights. And from 
3 where they were preparing chili, the Port-A-Pot- — from where 
4 the guy was cooking his chili, the Port-A-Potties were four 
5 feet away. 
6 So back on track with - with the - so nobody met with 
7 I me from Ogden City in that sixty-day period of time. I knocked 
8 on doors. I made telephone calls. Nobody was interested in 
9 trying to resolve any of the problems that the city had. I 
10 entered into that relationship in good faith. Ogden City 
11 entered into an agreement in this court, made with me, that 
12 I said, you know, you take your signs down, we're going to get 
13 I some of these problems resolved. 
14 I On December 31st, I put my signs back up. On 
15 j December 9th, the city passed this ordinance that says you 
16 | cannot have signs in a vacant building. Okay. Now, the — the 
17 | city — on January 2nd, Ogden Police Department contacted me 
18 j about the signs being — being up. I contacted the police and 
19 i half a dozen attorneys and got legal opinions from them, 
20 I including the ACLU, and the - I was told by the police 
21 | department and I was told by Mr. Glover's department that they 
22 j were forcibly going to go in my building and remove those 
23 signs. 
24 I Now, it's my opinion that the building is not vacant, 
25 has not been vacant, and I don't believe the city has acted in 
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good faith relative to any business or any dealings that I have 
had with this city. They have always told me one thing, and 
they have always done something different. That's all, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. 
Does the city want to be heard, Mr. Junk? 
MR. JUNK: Yes, your Honor. I think that the long 
sort of history with the city is not the issue in this 
particular case. In this case, all we're asking Mr. Edwards to 
do is register his building and present us with a plan. 
Therefore, based on the two convictions, I'm asking that the 
Court would issue a $750 fine on each case, and then indicating 
that there would be some waiver or reduction of that fee if he 
would comply with ordinance and present us with a registration 
and with the plan. 
THE COURT: All right. On the case ending in 0315, 
I'm going to impose a fine of $750 on count 1, also $750 on 
count 2, for a total of $1,500. On the case that ends in 0420, 
it will be the same sentence, $750 on count 1, $750 on count 2. 
The total fine will be $3,000. 
Mr. Edwards, I'm willing to suspend half of that if 
you will take care of the problem, say within thirty days, if 
you'll register the building and also provide a building plan. 
So thirty days from today would be November 18th of 2002. 
And I assume, counsel, you've told Mr. Edwards that 
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he has the right to appeal. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yes. And I was just going to ask if 
your Honor would grant a stay on the payment of the fine, if we 
could have thirty days to explore that possibility. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, let's see. Maybe what I 
should do is set that — the situation about complying, then, 
out sixty days. Right? It would give him a stay for thirty 
days, and then give him another thirty days. 
Is the city all right with that? That would give him 
sixty days. 
MR. KNOWLTON: And also if it could be stayed pending 
appeal, if he decides to do that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think you have to do that. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess I need to just - rather 
than say yes or no, I guess I need to know whether or not he's 
going to appeal. I guess — you've got thirty days to decide, 
so. . . 
But let's change that to sixty days, then, in which 
to comply. So he's got thirty days to appeal. We'll go out 
sixty days, then, and that'll be December 18th. And like I 
say, I'll suspend half of that fine on the condition that he 
comply with registering the building and also filing a building 
plan. Okay? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Okay. 
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***** 1 THE COURT: Will that work? 
2 MR. KNOWLTON: Thank you. 
3 | THE COURT: All right. 
4 THE CLERK: I've still got the other two cases. 
5 THE COURT: Oh, that's the other thing we need to 
6 talk about. Do we want to set those for trial, or... 
7 MR. JUNK: What we're -
8 THE COURT: We've got two other cases. 
9 1 MR. JUNK: What we were are doing is we're waiting to 
10 set at least one of those for trial until after we have a 
11 ruling on the civil case. So we're just — 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 MR. JUNK: — set up for disposition. 
14 THE COURT: That's the case ending in 4365 involving 
15 waste material or junk and the land use? 
16 MR. JUNK: Actually that one we've been continuing. 
17 Bruce has that completed all but providing a tarp over the 
18 | back. 
19 MR. EDWARDS: Well, I have the tarp. 
20 I MR. JUNK: Okay. And I assume you'll have that 
21 within thirty days? 
22 j MR. EDWARDS: Yeah. 
23 | MR. JUNK: Okay. 
24 | THE COURT: All right. How about case 0506? That's 
25 windows and glass. 
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MR. JUNK: Right. We think we need to just — 
THE COURT: Do you want to continue those, then? 
MR. JUNK: Yeah. Maybe we could put it on that — 
that December date, that's sixty days away. At that point we 
could see if he — 
MR. KNOWLTON: Put it on for what? 
MR. JUNK: What's that? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Put it on for what? 
MR. JUNK: For disposition. That's the one that — we 
were waiting to get a determination from the civil case to what 
sort of date to set for trial. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I don't know that that's going 
to be signed within thirty days. I would be shocked. 
MR. JUNK: I said sixty. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Or even sixty. 
MR. JUNK: Well, at least we would have a date for a 
trial. Then we could set a date for trial after that. I just 
want to — 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I think it's going to be a lot 
longer than that. 
MR. JUNK: To set a trial date? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I mean I think it's going to be 
thirty to sixty days before the motion for summary judgments. 
MR. JUNK: Well, at least just like to monitor, and 
since we'll be coming back on the December date, I'd like to at 
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least put them on for those dates for disposition. 
THE COURT: All right. So you want to put them on 
the calendar on December — was it 18th? 
MR. JUNK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. At 2:00 o'clock. Can you meet 
that? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Yeah, that's fine. 
MR. JUNK: What day is that? 
THE COURT: That would be a Wednesday, December 18th 
MR. JUNK: Could we do it the 10th? 
THE COURT: Do it at 10:00 o'clock on the city 
calendar? Sure. 
THE CLERK: And that's just for disposition? 
MR. KNOWLTON: Report. 
THE COURT: A report? All right. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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